Abstract

While most nuclear weaponisation initiatives dealt only with the nuclear programme, the Pakistani one led to a nuclear proliferation network contrived by members of the same programme. This scenario consisted of a stunningly intricate and painstakingly concocted transnational network led by notorious non-state actors with occasional albeit tacit approval of the State (Abbas, 2018). This episode is unique not only for the scale and magnitude of the proliferation network but also the motivations which drove dozens of individuals, operating innumerable organisations, institutions, front companies, myriad middlemen, intemperate profiteers and above all numerous scintillating nuclear scientists and physicists to engage in this unprecedented exercise. It involved an alleged role of State actors, specifically the omnipotent military establishment which brought immense ignominy to the Pakistani State. In light of the recently concluded four-day conflict between India and Pakistan where India's Operation Sindoor decimated numerous Pakistani military assets, debates surrounding the Pakistani nuclear programme, its security or the lack of it thereof, and the decision making processes which drive Pakistan's nuclear policy have gained paramountcy in the Indian psyche. There is, thus, a need for a timely reminder of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and of the inherent fecklessness of, what academicians like Kenneth Walz call, ‘nuclear mythmakers’ (Walz, 1990).

Keywords: Pakistan, AQ Khan, proliferation, nuclear, network, Libya, Iran, North Korea.

Origins

The Pakistani nuclear programme finds its origins in the ‘Atoms for Peace’ Initiative introduced by the administration of US President Dwight D Eisenhower in 1953. Pakistan was one of its earliest beneficiaries (Abid, 2021). With this the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was founded in the year 1956 with Dr. Nazir Ahmed as its first Chairman (Ahmed, 2011). Munir Khan, also known as ‘Reactor Khan’ who joined the organization in 1972 as its chairman, remained in office till 1991 (CIA, Declassified document, 1999; Abbas, 2018). Till the 1960s, Pakistan had developed little by way of breakthroughs in nuclear technology with the PAEC, bureaucrats and the Foreign and Finance Offices often at loggerheads with each other especially when it came to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle and establishing reprocessing facilities for the same (EBSCO, 2023). This is seen through the conflicts surrounding the deal between Pakistan and Canada over the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] (Donohue, 2014). Things came to a head in May 1974 with India's Operation Smiling Buddha, which declared her as the sixth nuclear power of the world after the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. This coupled with the defeats she had inflicted on Pakistan in both the 1965 and 1971 wars led to grave introspection in Pakistan. Zulfiqar Bhutto's declaration in an interview in 1965 that “Pakistan would eat grass to build the bomb” had amounted to little (Rajiv S.S.C., 2013). Bhutto was arguably the most vociferous proponent of the programme and General Ayub was its biggest hurdle (Abbas, 2018).

Dr. A. Q. Khan: All of this was set to change with the arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan on the Pakistani nuclear landscape. Like Munir Khan, who was employed in the IAEA till 1972, Dr. A.Q. Khan was working as a metallurgist for the European Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Corporation (URENCO), based in the Netherlands (Abbas, 2018). Here he began his career as a nuclear smuggler in the 1970s (Correra, 2006). Born in Bhopal in 1936, he'd raised suspicions among his colleagues with his frequent strolls into areas of the facility unrelated to his line of work and more importantly, without the consent of his employers (Laufer, 2005). Conjecture continued to grow as Khan was observed asking ‘suspicious questions’ (Laufer, 2005). Many colleagues claim to have seen him ‘roaming the facility, taking notes on the uranium enrichment process in a foreign script’ (Singh, 2009). Dutch intelligence had grown far too suspicious of Khan by this point and was on the verge of arresting him, only to be stopped by the CIA in both 1975 and 1986 (Singh, 2009).

Upon his return to his homeland in 1976, Dr. Khan began working for the PAEC under Munir Khan but a schism soon emerged between the two men. His dissatisfaction led Bhutto to create a new organization for him to lead, independent of the PAEC and Munir Khan and focusing on the centrifuge project to build a uranium enrichment facility, as opposed to the plutonium route being employed by the PAEC (MacCalman, 2016). Thus in July 1976, Khan founded the Engineering Research Laboratories later renamed the Khan Research Laboratories in May 1981 in recognition of his contributions by the Zia ul Haq government (MacCalman, 2016). The gradual separation of the KRL from the PAEC and the autonomy bestowed upon it in terms of management, control, and procurement led to the genesis of an illicit export network (Ahmed, 2011). The overthrow of the Bhutto government and the assassination of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto himself in 1979, paved the way for the rise of a military dictatorship under the leadership of Zia ul Haq. Khan then acquired the Chinese design for a bomb used in their tests (Ahmed, 2011). Dr. Khan's role in the programme and the proliferation network it engendered was so perilous that former CIA director George Tenet once referred to him as being “at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden.” (Leaver & Parsi, 2009). These episodes describe masterfully the conflicts between the civilian authority and the military which rules the roost in Pakistan. While drawing out the dichotomy between the words and actions of the Pakistani nuclear mythmakers in their quest to find the bomb, it's paramount to examine the internecine power plays which plagued the nation especially in the 1990s. This reveals the travails of the Pakistani political landscape and how seekers of power manipulate their way to the zenith in the Islamic Republic.

Pakistan acquires the bomb: In the 1980s both the PAEC and the KRL conducted nuclear cold tests (Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018). A.Q. Khan thus informed Zia that Pakistan was ready for a nuclear test at short notice (Aftergood, 2009). A.Q. Khan also claimed in a late 1987 interview given to veteran Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons which could be used to defend it against an Indian attack. He further stated that “America knows it. What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.” (Chari, 2013).

Western reactions: The West, specifically the Americans had prevaricated when it came to the Pakistani nuclear programme. While the stated position of the USA was in stark opposition to the program, it had to make significant amendments to its nonproliferation policy to accommodate its broader security interests. In the 1970s, Congress through the Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act cut off aid to Pakistan though it was restored in 1979 (Weiss, 2005). The reason behind this restoration is illustrated best in a note sent by then US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to then President Ronald Reagan highlighting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan as being, from then on, the primary driver of the USA's Pakistan policy (Weiss, 2005). Thus, significant and decisive legislations like the Glenn and Symington amendments, passed by Congress to halt the Pakistani nuclear program were rendered ineffective by the Presidency (Pandey, 2023).

Proliferation networks: Iran, North Korea and Libya

Iran: Iran, having attained its nascent nuclear capabilities from the Atoms for Peace initiative of President Eisenhower, further developed its capabilities with the assistance of the A.Q. Khan network from 1987 onwards (Rowberry, 2013). An IAEA report states that it received a set of technical drawings for a P1 centrifuge and some samples of centrifuge components in 1987 (Laufer, 2005). According to further IAEA reports, AQ Khan gave Iran components for 500 centrifuges and designs for P2 centrifuges. Khan reportedly would order twice the amount of material required for the nuclear programme and would sell the surplus to his clients (Laufer, 2005).

The first contact with Iran in this regard was established in 1987 though relations between the two states were cordial for decades till then. There have been reports of Iranian scientists training at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) (Janardhan, 2025). Khan himself is said to have visited the Bushehr reactor which had been built with Chinese assistance (Laufer, 2005). He's said to have offered a deal to help Iran create a cascade of about 50000 P1 centrifuges (Broad & Sanger, 2004). The alleged transfer of P1 and P2 centrifuges reveals a daring operation which couldn't have been undertaken without the approval of those in the highest echelons of the government. This aligns with the larger pro Iran tilt of the then Army Chief M.A. Beg, himself a Shia. This ties in perfectly with Khan's own admissions of Beg's complicity as also statements by former American diplomats like Henry Rowen (Rowen H. S., 2004)

Iran not only bought nuclear components off the shelf from Khan but also used his list as shopping guidelines to purchase those items from other sources (Clary, 2005). This also points to how unsuccessful western export controls proved to be. Iran developed its nuclear program based on the technology provided by Pakistan. The far-reaching consequences of that particular deal have become clearer with the passage of time. There are independent claims stating that the arrangement with Iran was a quid pro quo. This claim doesn't sound far-fetched since the Pakistanis were undergoing a forex crunch themselves in the mid to late 1990s. The conversations and meetings between high-ranking officials of both states prove state knowledge and complicity in the matter (Abbas, 2018)

North Korea: While Pakistan and the DPRK enjoyed strategic relations from the times of Z.A. Bhutto, the cooperation strengthened under Benazir Bhutto's premiership (Abbas, 2018). A.Q. Khan himself undertook several trips to the nation which serve as circumstantial evidence to the close nuclear cooperation between the two powers (Tertrais, 2008). The deal between the two was essentially a barter with Pakistan accepting the liquid fuelled missile technology in exchange for providing nuclear technology to the DPRK (Clary, 2005). The Pakistani Ghauri missiles were a result of the designs of the No Dong missiles provided by the North Koreans (Abbas, 2018). Since it was necessary for Pakistan to come up with a missile delivery system for its nuclear warheads, they are believed to have engaged in this egregious trade off. Khan, according to Musharraf, could have helped the North Koreans with uranium enrichment and uranium hexafluoride production (Clary, 2005). A lot of uranium containers were apparently from Pakistan thus proving its complicity. General Jahangir Karamat's visit to the DPRK in 1997 points to the same (Singh, 2009).

Libya: It's believed that Gaddafi's Libya was one of the key financiers of the Pakistani nuclear programme alongside Saudi Arabia (The Hindu, 2025; Kazi, 2004). This was in exchange of ‘certain nuclear cooperation’ namely the transfer of 20 complete L1 centrifuges, 2 used L2 centrifuges and 2 small cylinders of UF6 besides weapons designs provided originally by the Chinese to the Pakistanis (Perkovich, 2008). While other instances have more concrete incidents of State involvement, the Libya case seems more of a gambit by A.Q. Khan and his accomplices in order to enrich themselves than an outcome of deliberate state policy. This demonstrates that the Libya deal was far more a product of Dr. Khan’s greed and an inveterate pan-Islamism than a thoroughly calculated move approved by the Pakistani state. This though is contradicted by Benazir Bhutto who alleges Musharraf's involvement in the deal (Abbas, 2018).

Other clients: There have been instances of collusion between Pakistan and Iraq as also Syria though it rarely came to fruition (Laufer, 2005). It's been reported that the Saudis having invested significantly in the Pakistani programme may buy a few bombs off the shelf if the need arises (Urban, 2013).

Network's exposure and its ramifications: The shipment of the A.Q.Khan network's nuclear materials to Libya was exposed in the incident involving the seizure of components on the BBC China leading to international outrage (Singh, 2009). By this time, pressure from the Americans had grown on the Pakistanis to rein in Khan. Thus, the State began to gradually curb his activities. The formation of the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division were aspects of the same strategy (Luongo and Salik, n.d.). With the hierarchy changed and Khan denied direct access to the country's Chief Executive, he was gently eased out of his role in 2001 over concerns of corruption and proliferation related activities (Ahmed, 2011). With the revelations by Libya to the IAEA and sanctions placed by the State department against KRL, the noose began tightening around Khan's neck. The final blow came the following year when he was arrested and sentenced to house arrest after his admission of guilt (Laufer, 2005). Various members of the infamous network have been subsequently arrested including the Tinners, Gotthard Lerch and B.S.A. Tahir (MacCalman, 2016).

Analysis: While analysing the motivations of various members of the infamous network, it's important to take a very academic and critical view of the incidents and guard against any sort of dogma. This is achieved not only by analysing the particulars of the programme but also by delving into how numerous factors play a role in the rise of such perilous transnational networks run primarily by non-state actors.

Political instability, tepid civil- military relations, the preponderance of the security establishment in the decision-making processes of that nation, institutional rivalries and bureaucratic inefficiency led to the rise of this proliferation network. However, there are a number of causal factors which may also have played a crucial role in what transpired in the State of Pakistan. Primary among them might be an errant weakening of civil society and the silencing of an enlightened and informed citizenry. While India stands out as a State with a vibrant and fearless civil society, Pakistani policy makers having successfully decimated their own in pursuit of a “hard state” have suffered the consequences of their megalomania. Another key reason behind the formation of this network was the financial gain which accrued to its members. Khan himself was said to have been the proud owner of numerous expensive properties in Dubai and is believed to have invested immensely in a hotel in Timbuktu (Times of India, 2004). This stands in good stead when one looks at allegations stating that the Iranians paid Khan over 3 million US Dollars in cash for his assistance. His net worth is said to have peaked at 400 million dollars, a handsome amount by any measure (Powell & McGirk, 2005).

It's also necessary to acknowledge what might often be termed as ‘psychological factors’ affecting these nuclear mythmakers. While financial gain was certainly a driving factor behind this endeavour for A.Q. Khan and his gaggle of conspirators, more important was perhaps the megalomania which had taken hold of Khan's mind. His placing a portrait of himself beside the Afghan Sultan Ghauri, while financing the renovation of his tomb is a case in point (Powell & McGirk, 2005). His commissioning of his own biographies displays another more sinister side of Khan (Abbas, 2018). This depicts his rather cold, manipulative nature as his propaganda efforts created a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. His power projection lent him greater heft which translated into financial and political autonomy. This further enhanced his standing amidst his peers, helped him contrive a veneer of impregnability and thus made him more capable of influencing national and political affairs. This emboldened him to operate his network with greater impunity thus fulfilling the cycle.

Another important aspect of this psychological causation is religious fanaticism coupled with a radically anti-Western world view. Khan progressively became more religious as time passed eventually developing some sort of a Messianic complex. This, of course, would fit perfectly into his megalomania and generic superciliousness seen through his constant bickering with PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan (Abbas, 2018).

“We Muslims have to be strong and equal to any other country, and therefore I want to help some countries be strong,” Khan allegedly said once. Time reports ex-colleagues stating that following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, he railed against the West and ‘its operations against the Muslim community.’ (Powell & McGirk, 2005).

It's clear through the choice of Khan's clients and potential clients that he viewed himself and his work as a bulwark against Western imperialist hegemony. He perhaps believed that the West and the US in particular were anathema to the Islamic world in general, driving his rhetoric behind the ‘Islamic bomb’. His outreach to Saddam's Iraq, the Islamic Revolutionary Iran, Gaddafi's radically anti-Western Libyan regime and purported offers to harshly anti-Western erstwhile Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad support this argument (Hinderstein & Albright, 2004). This reflexive contempt for the West in general and the Americans in particular ties well into the generic anti-occidentalism of Pakistani society. The Pakistani masses have the utmost reverence for anyone ostensibly opposing the imperialist hegemony of the West. The naming of a cricket stadium in Lahore after the erstwhile Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi is a case in point (Razvi, 2011). So only, one witnesses a strange phenomenon among the Pakistani masses who evidently believe wholeheartedly in the spirit of Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations not unlike their conservative Western brethren. This ideological parallelism between Western cultural nationalists and Pakistani Islamists is disconcerting to say the least.

While dealing with the history and the present, it behoves one to project a possible future trajectory for that nation's nuclear domain. Financial greed on the part of European financiers and companies, lax export control regimes and an incapacity to regulate dual use technologies all contributed to the A.Q. Khan saga. Political compulsions and intelligence lapses drove Western countries to turn a blind eye to this festering wound for which the world is paying a heavy price even today. Pakistan, which benefits from these black markets to expand its nuclear capabilities, has little reason to work towards ending them (Kimball, 2009).

What can be done:

The UNSC Resolution 1540 adopted in 2004 focuses on nonproliferation efforts and addressing the concerns over non-state actors gaining nuclear capabilities (Arnold and Dolzikova, 2021). Implementing a strict sanctions regime, putting in place measures to prevent illicit trade in nuclear components, dismantling existing proliferation networks, enforcing strict export control measures especially for dual use materials, freezing assets of rogue actors, intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies globally are a few steps which must be considered. Cracking down on criminal networks, terror financing and money laundering through international law enforcement bodies like the FATF and Interpol can help in globalising best practices.

Conclusion:

Thus it can be demonstrated that an intricate interplay of factors resulted in a rogue militaristic state like Pakistan getting hold of the bomb. From insidious institutional rivalry to obdurate bureaucrats, profligate politicking, and an egomaniacal praetorian guard, the Pakistani nuclear programme has been impacted by each of these factors. While looking into the temporal aspects of it, one ought to brood over those intemperate states of the mind which compel a litany of individuals to engage in such deleterious practices. This narrative surrounding the programme and the proliferation network which arose as a result of it, weaves together religious fanaticism, radicalisation and an anti-Western outlook with the sheer lack of civilian oversight, feeble governments, and the hubris of the military class which led to one of the gravest threats the world has ever faced.

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