Military History
A crow would need to fly only 99 km from Phare Dazong (on the tip of Chumbi Valley) to Jalpaiguri. A Chinese composite Independent Mountain Division, rolling down from there, perhaps may need to fight a maneuver battle for about 230 km to reach Jalpailguri and cut off the entire North East. The Indian Army would have to fight a static retreating nodal battle, with odds of our 10: 1, while PLA, would have complete freedom to maneuver around our forces once they cross the passes. Therefore 'Chumbi Valley' for long has been a dagger pointing at our jugular vein & facilitates severing entire North East from the rest of India. Fortunately, Chumbi has so far been lightly held by PLA, nothing to frighten Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, ( King of Bhutan), Indian Army HQ, MoD or MEA. The Chinese had built an excellent Class 60 road from Lhasa to Gyangze (Gyantse), but the road axis further down towards Duxiang, Palizhen, Yadong to Phare Dazong, with sideways access to the passes in Sikkim (Kerang, Lachung, Nathu La and Jelep La), and Damthang in Bhutan, was in less than perfect state, denying rapid build-up of PLA forces into Chumbi to pose any military threat to Sikkim, Bhutan or the Chicken's neck area. This was the main reason why there was comparative peace in that area.
Recent discovery that the Chinese have built a Class 60 road up to Palizhen, and proposes to carry on to Phare Dazong, through the Doklam plateau (part of an inaccessible glacial area, demarcated with dotted line, as no man's land), is rather alarming. Chumbi valley is sparsely populated and such a heavy duty road below Gyantse has only one purpose, to destabilize the equilibrium of a fragile peace in that area (since 1962). Unfortunately India has no ‘locus standi’ since Doklam plateau is part of Bhutan, reason why MEA has been rather silent, and instead inspired Bhutan to react. To back them, it is only natural for CoAS to beef up 33 Corps and go on the offensive.
This road should not be allowed to be built, even if we have to blast the PLA effort with everything that we got (aka Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh did at Nathu La in 65 & to a lesser extent in 1967). Similarly, in 1986-88, Gen. Sundarjee reacted at Somdorung Chu, with a feint/ threat of a riposte from the Giagong plateau, boosted by Mechanised forces.
The blunder of not using our air- power, as Panditji did in 1962, should not be repeated. With the Air Force bases at Kalaikunda & Hashimara, this EDGE must also be exploited.
