Abstract:
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) poses a significant threat to international security and economic stability due to maritime terrorism. As a crucial route for global trade, the IOR encompasses vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and strategic chokepoints. The threats of illegal activities like piracy, terrorism, smuggling etc. are increasing in the region day by day. Terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have expanded their illegal operations to include violence via land, sea, air, and cyberspace, making the security landscape more and more complex. These terrorist groups exploit marine areas for illegal activities such as trafficking and smuggling of drugs and weapons. The connection between piracy and terrorism further complicates the situation, as pirates often collaborate with terrorist organizations.
As response to such illegal activities, the international community and regional state have implemented various counter-terrorism measures. These include increased naval patrols, enhanced global collaboration, and the establishment of maritime security frameworks. Despite these efforts, the economic impact of maritime terrorism remains significant, leading to potential economic disruption and loss of life.
This paper aims to elucidate the concept of maritime terrorism, offering an assessment of marine based attacks, threats, vulnerabilities, and the implications of such activities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It also underscores the importance of sustained vigilance and international cooperation to tackle the evolving threat of maritime terrorism in the IOR.
Key Words: -Maritime Terrorism, Coastal Security, Counter-Terrorism and Indian Ocean Region
Introduction:
Definition of Maritime Terrorism
Though there is no universally accepted definition for maritime terrorism, it is widely accepted to cover a wide range of potential attack scenarios, including terrorists entering under false pretenses of being seafarers, smuggling of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations on merchant ships, and hijacking and use of the weapons against other ships or port facilities. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has defined maritime terrorism as “the use of violence at sea or to a ship or fixed platform for political ends, including any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”
In other words, Maritime Terrorism refers to the use or threat of violence at sea or in maritime environments by non-state actors, aimed at achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives. This type of terrorism targets vessels, ports, offshore energy installations, and maritime trade routes, intending to create fear, disrupt economic activities, and exert pressure on governments or societies. The growing importance of maritime trade and offshore resources makes maritime terrorism a significant global concern. Maritime terrorism often focuses on critical chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, or the Strait of Hormuz, where attacks can cause significant disruption to global trade and energy supplies.
Factors contributing to Maritime Terrorism
Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Region is fueled by several factors that create vulnerabilities for terrorist groups to exploit. Authorities encounter significant limitations when boarding vessels under foreign flags on the high seas or in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which grant special rights over marine resources. Terrorists exploit these restrictions by using vessels registered to complicit states or shipping containers to conceal their activities, contributing to nuclear proliferation. Countries with extensive coastlines have numerous points of entry, making comprehensive maritime security difficult and providing opportunities for terrorist infiltration. Support from state and non-state actors, through the supply of arms, bases or both can offset weaknesses in an organization’s capabilities, allowing them to carry out larger operations than they could manage independently.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, flanked by Yemen and Somalia, has been a focal point for major terrorist events. These include the 2000 al-Qaeda bombing of the USS Cole and an attack on a French oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden, just south of the strait. As recently as January 2024, Houthis launched a missile at a British tanker in the Gulf of Aden. After three months, the Houthis began assaulting cargo ships, and the rebels from Yemen destroyed four submarine communication cables that run under the Red Sea connecting the East African nation of Djibouti with the Saudi Arabian city of Jeddah. Internet connections between Europe and Asia have been severely disrupted by these cables, which are controlled by AAE-1, Seacom, EIG, and TGN, especially affecting Gulf countries and India.
Maritime Terrorism in Indian Ocean Region: Risk and its Implications
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), extending from Southeast Asia to the East Coast of Africa is one of the most culturally diversified regions in the world. Its status as one of the dangerous areas is a result of its diversity, since multiple security risks affect not just the millions of residents but also the United States and its allies. The Indian Ocean region is increasingly recognized as a strategic focal point in global affairs. This area is marked by significant trade and energy transfers, alongside a spectrum of activities ranging from political instability to threats like piracy, terrorism, and transnational crime. Around 80 percent of the world's oil and main commodities are transported through the region's crucial sea lanes and major chokepoints, including the Straits of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandab, and Hormuz. Since trade is the foundation of the world economy, the Indian Ocean Region is essential to its facilitation. The high volume of trade passing through these routes enhances the geopolitical significance of the IOR. This perspective remains relevant amid the ongoing competition for maritime supremacy in the region. The absence of a leading authority has led to power struggles and terrorist groups targeting major powers' vessels in the region.3 The significance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) increases its vulnerability with the presence of busy Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), unstable governments in the neighboring countries, several shatter belts, abundant resources and the lack of a dominant power all contribute to its threats and weaknesses. Such conditions draw the terrorist organizations to carry out illegal activities in these regions.
The blast of 1993 and the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai underscored the risks of Maritime Terrorism when coastal waters are not properly secured. Historical incidents such as the 2003 attack on Iraqi oil terminals in the Persian Gulf by explosive-laden speedboats further illustrates such threats. Although the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has seen comparatively fewer acts of Maritime Terrorism in recent years, extremist organizations connected to Al-Qaeda are nonetheless keen to target critical maritime chokepoints such as the Bab al-Mandeb, which divides Yemen from Djibouti. Recent attacks have included Houthi missile strikes on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. These incidents highlight the ongoing threat to maritime security in the region. Furthermore, it has been stated that since 2019 Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT) has been preparing to employ marine channels in order to disrupt ports, assault high-value targets such as coastal nuclear power facilities, and infiltrate and strike India's oil assets in Bombay High
Terrorist organizations like as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of the Philippines, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) were well-known for their considerable maritime capabilities twenty years ago. With the highest potential of executing marine based illicit activities, ASG stood out. The majority of its members are from the provinces of Sulu and Basilan. They have carried out multiple kidnappings of coastal communities and vessels, including the raid on Ipil in 1995 that left almost 100 people dead. ASG was connected to the bombing of “Super Ferry 14” in Manila Harbor and was responsible for more than 100 fatalities when they bombed the ferry “Our Lady Mediatrix” in February 2004.5 Terrorist activities in Africa have been an imminent threat to the political stability and security of the continent since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Terrorist groups have multiplied across the continent, especially in West and East Africa, where the actions of groups like Boko Haram and Al- Shabaab are causing states to become unstable. These groups posture themselves against Western ideas and influences, seeking to upend the current power structures and promote the Islamization of these countries. Africa has thus been significantly harmed by organized Maritime Terrorism. Following the collapse of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, terrorist groups extended their extremist ideologies across the continent, focusing especially in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Sahel.
Analysis of sea attack in the Indian Ocean Region
• Houthi Attack and its implications
The Houthis, a Shia-Islamist group originating in the Saada area of Yemen, control the country's northwest, which includes Sanaa, the capital. They are seen as a component of the "axis of resistance," which is led by Iran and consists of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Houthis have repeatedly attacked commercial ships travelling the Red Sea since November 2023. These assaults jeopardize the safety of civilians and pose a significant threat to the freedom of navigation along this vital global trade route.
The vulnerability of African maritime security has been highlighted by the Houthi militia's attacks on Red Sea shipping. Since November 2023, 133 incidents have been reported, including 14 ships targeted by missiles or drones and 18 seized by Somali pirates. The disturbances caused by non-state actors pose serious threats to the security and economic development of Africa since they violate international law and carry standoff weapons.6 The attacks have hampered commercial lanes that connect the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean—a region that accounts for 25% of all marine activity worldwide. The consequences of these disruptions were immediately visible.7 More than 10 million refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were among the 57 million East Africans who experienced severe food insecurity. Through the Red Sea, food supplies from Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and the Western Hemisphere reached the Horn of Africa and East Africa.8 In particular, the 6.6 million internally displaced people in Sudan were largely reliant on food supplies shipped over the Red Sea. The people of Africa bear the brunt of the marine instability in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, which results in delays, higher consumer goods prices, economic disruptions, and contaminated waterways
• Mumbai Attacks of 26/11
Over the course of four days, ten members of the Islamist terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), based in Pakistan, executed a well-planned series of seaborne operations. The terrorists avoided Indian border crossings and security checkpoints by taking the marine route. They managed to avoid being identified by the Indian Coast Guard by seizing an Indian vessel. Originated from Karachi, Pakistan, the terrorists boarded the large cargo ship and headed south through the Arabian Sea along the Indian Coastline. The terrorists captured an Indian fishing boat after a day at sea, killing every member of the crew but the captain. The attackers dispersed into four groups after landing, each carrying grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and AK-47 rifles. They executed well-planned attacks on six separate sites throughout the city.
The Mumbai attacks sparked a re-evaluation of India's maritime security, which resulted in an extensive review of the approach in which the state police, coast guard, and navy work together to counter unconventional threats. Since the Mumbai attacks, intelligence reports have suggested that Lashkar-e- Taiba has been planning another strike on Indian ships and coastal facilities. Additionally, other reports indicate that Pakistani militant leaders continue to train for “samundari jihad” (seaborne jihad) in Indian waters.12 The Mumbai attack exposed loopholes in India’s security strategy in detecting and responding swiftly to seaborne threats. Despite several intelligence warnings before November 26, the attacks underscored India’s ineffective coastal monitoring, largely due to the Coast Guard’s lack of surveillance equipment. At that time, there were fewer than 100 boats to cover over 5,000 miles of coastline, along with limited aviation resources
• The 2004 bombing of Super Ferry 14
One of the most catastrophic incidents was the 2004 attack on the Philippine Super Ferry 14. On February 27, 2004, a ferry weighing more than ten thousand ton departed Manila for Cagayan de Oro City with 899 people onboard. Later, an explosion triggered a fire, leading most survivors to jump into the sea or board rescue boats before the vessel sank. The explosion claimed the lives of 116 people in total, comprising 114 passengers and 2 crew members. Initially, it was assumed that the explosion was a result of a gas explosion gone wrong.
According to officials, Redondo Cain Dellosa admitted to installing a bomb on board on behalf of the Abu Sayyaf organization, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda. The explosives were hidden inside a television. Dellosa belonged to the Rajah Sulaiman Movement, which Ahmed Santos started in the Philippines in 1991.The attack was planned and carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group in collaboration with Jemaah Islamiyah and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement.
• USS Cole Bombing
The US Navy destroyer Cole was attacked on October 12, 2000, in Aden Harbor, Yemen, when it stopped for refueling. A fleet of harbor ships supporting the Cole were joined by a motorized rubber boat carrying explosives. The dinghy was able to approach the ship without any intervention and the explosives detonated. The explosion caused a 40-by-40-foot hole in the ship's port side leading to the deaths of 17 sailors and injuring more than 38 individuals. Al-Qaeda was the architect behind the strike inflicting a serious blow to both the United States and the rest of the globe. In January 2001, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) published the USS Cole Commission Report, emphasizing the need for a more comprehensive Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) strategy for US forces in transit.
• The hijacking of the Achille Lauro
The Maritime Terrorism framework gained significance in 1988, following the hijacking of the Achille Lauro on 7 October 1985 when four members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) seized the Italian cruise ship MS Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt.
The Palestine Liberation Front chief Abu Abbas and the hijackers were aboard an Egyptian Airline when U.S. Navy F-14 fighter immediately intercepted the plane. The aircraft was compelled to land at a military base shared by the United States and Italy in Sicily and the Italian authorities detained the four hijackers but allowed Abu Abbas to leave the country. This incident led to the temporary collapse of Prime Minister Bettino Craxi’s government and strained relations between the United States, Egypt, and Italy
The Achille Lauro incident highlighted significant concerns about the security protocols within the shipping industry particularly for cruise liners. Maritime Terrorism, being less common than other forms of terrorism left the industry unprepared for such an event. This incident underscored the urgent need for enhanced security measures both at ports and on ships. One of the key takeaways from the Achille Lauro hijacking was the ease with which terrorists could breach ship security. Reports indicate that there were multiple instances where officials and crew members should have been alerted and taken preventive actions
Counter Terrorism Policy in the Indian Ocean Region
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) implemented regulations to enhance the identification and deterrent of threats to international shipping in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. As a result, the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention was amended to include the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. In order to combat risks at sea, the ISPS Code focusses on improving the security of ports, port workers, seafarers, and vessels. Under the ISPS Code, ships are equipped with a Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) that sends security alerts to shore authorities in case of threats along with an Automatic Identification System (AIS) to track the ship's location. (Singh, 2019)
By implementing a “coordinated and multi-layered security regime,” Singapore also has strengthened its maritime security in order to counter terrorist threats on land as well as at sea. One of the examples of this strategy is the creation of the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre (SMCC). The SMCC has improved coordination amongst Singapore's marine security agencies, resulting in enhanced training, drills, operational planning, threat assessment, surveillance, and capability development. Improving interoperability amongst security agencies for planning and operational responses is one of its major accomplishments reducing effort duplication and closes any operational gaps.
In August 2024, India inaugurated the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Chennai, Tamil Nadu with the objective of significantly boosting the efficacy and coordination of maritime rescue operations for fishermen and seafarers in distress at sea. This initiative demonstrates government’s dedication to preserve lives and ensuring prompt response to any emergency. The Centre has state-of- the-art communication technologies for managing alerts in real-time and modern technology for monitoring crises through satellite and terrestrial networks. Highly-trained personnel from the Indian Coast Guard specializing in Search and Rescue procedures operate the Centre which includes rescue aircraft, ships and other facilities.22India's ISRR is divided into three areas under the National Maritime SAR Coordinating Authority (NMSARCA), and each area has a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) located in Mumbai, Chennai, or Port Blair. There are 36 Maritime Rescue Sub Centres (MRSCs) functioning under these MRCCs. Modern ships and planes are sent by the Indian Coast Guard Stations with several missions to offer SAR coverage in ISRR.
The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in 2017 to combat Maritime Terrorism particularly in the Malacca Strait region. This agreement mandates intelligence sharing, integrated air and sea patrols, and the establishment of cooperative maritime Coordinating Centres in every country. To effectively combat illicit activities such as terrorism, piracy, and others in the region, the TCA aims to enhance collaboration and synchronization between the three nations.
Assessment of India’s Coastal Security
Following the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, India took a number of initiatives to increase security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). One of the major projects was the setting up of the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Gurugram. With a focus on Indian waters, it is an expansion of the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) of the Indian Navy. The IFC collects, aggregates, assesses, and distributes marine data to surrounding nations. India also formed the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) and the State Maritime Security Coordinators in an attempt to enhance coordination in response to emerging maritime threats. Radars, electro-optical sensors, and sonar technology are all used in the Integrated Underwater Defence and Surveillance System (IUHDSS) that the Indian Navy has deployed. This advanced system is designed to detect and monitor potential illegal activities.
Owing to the susceptibility of coastal regions to illicit and illegal operations, the first phase of the Coastal Security Scheme was formulated and sanctioned in January 2005, with a five-year implementation period starting in 2005–06. Later, the program was renewed for a further year, ending in March 2011. Many coastal security measures including the supply of interceptor boats were implemented during the Phase- I of the Coastal Security Scheme.25 The Indian government carried out a comprehensive assessment of coastal security measures in the wake of the 26/11 Mumbai attack. Union Territories (UTs) and Coastal States were directed to work with the Coast Guard to undertake a vulnerability and gap analysis in order to ascertain their further needs for the establishment of the Coastal Security Scheme Phase-II. These Coastal States and UTs submitted comprehensive proposals, which served as the foundation for the program's acceptance of Phase II. With a total budget of ₹1,579.91 crore, the initiative was implemented over a five-year period starting in April 2011 and covering nine Coastal States and four UTs.26 The objective of the Coastal Security Scheme was to strengthen the capabilities of the Marine Police Force for patrolling and monitoring the coastal areas especially the shallow areas close to the shore. Phase I of the program equipped Coastal States and union territories with 204 boats, 153 Jeeps, 312 motorcycles, 97 Check Posts, 58 Outposts, 30 Barracks, and 73 Coastal Police Stations (CPSs). Coastal States and Union Territories were authorized to have 131 Marine Police Stations, 60 Jetties, 10 Marine Operations Centres, 150 Boats, 35 Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs), 10 Large Vessels, 131 Four Wheelers, and 242 Motorcycles under the Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-II).27 The Indian Coast Guard built the Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN) made up of a series of stationary sensors as part of the coastal security framework. These sensors which are located across 46 locations on the Coast and Islands, consist of meteorological sensors, day-and-night cameras, radars, and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). Additional 38 radar stations, 8 mobile surveillance systems, and Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) connectivity at the Gulf of Kutch and Gulf of Khambat have been implemented under CSN Phase-II in order to ensure monitoring of the whole coastline.
Four Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) have been established by the Ministry of Defence in Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi, and Port Blair. The Coast Guard and Navy coordinate staffing and management of these JOC, with additional support from appropriate Central and State authorities. Additionally, the Director General of Shipping released two circulars mandating that all vessels— including fishing vessels longer than twenty meters—be outfitted with Type B transponders for the Automatic Identification System (AIS). For boats under 20 meters, suitable tracking technology was identified based on a pilot study conducted by the Ministries of Defense and Shipping. The government is actively considering rolling out this pilot project along the entire coast.29 To improve safety and security in ports, various initiatives and technological advancements have been made. In accordance with SOLAS (the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) and the ISPS Code under SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the Central Government released the Merchant Shipping (Ships and Port Facility Security) Rules 2024 on June 19, 2024. Ports of call are updating their access control systems with biometric and radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. For enhanced surveillance, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems have also been deployed at all major ports.
Way Forward
Due to a number of circumstances, the Indian Ocean region has been susceptible to Maritime Terrorism. Therefore, combating terrorism at sea is necessary to address these issues. Since there is no dominant authority in this region, limited advanced technology capabilities for gathering data, and no political and economic stability, fighting terrorism has been challenging. To effectively combat maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean region, there is a need to establish dedicated regional group focused on maritime security to enhance coordination and response capabilities. Further, the maritime law enforcement and coastal security agencies (Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Police etc.) needs to enhance their capabilities through training, advanced equipment, and infrastructure development.
Combating Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean region requires improving Maritime Domain Awareness. This can be achieved by deploying radar systems, satellite surveillance, and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to track vessel movements and identify potential risks. It is also crucial to set up a strong system for exchanging real-time intelligence with international and regional partners so that suspicious persons and vessels may be effectively monitored. Consistent and efficient law enforcement will be ensured by bolstering legislative frameworks for prosecuting Maritime Terrorism and promoting the ratification of International Maritime Security accords. Furthermore, the detection and response capabilities can be improved by investing in developing technology like drones, underwater sensors and sophisticated surveillance systems. These steps, if effectively implemented, may significantly reduce the likelihood of Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean region.
End Notes:
1. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, CSCAP Memorandum No 5 https://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/Memorandums/CSCAP%20Memorandum%20No%205%20-- %20Cooperation%20for%20Law%20and%20Order%20at%20Sea.pdf accessed 30 June 2025.
2. Assaf Gilead, ‘Houthis Hit Submarine Communications Cables’ (Globes, 2024) https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-houthis-hit- underwater-communications-cables-1001472165 accessed 30 June 2025.
3. RJ Aishwarya, ‘Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Region’ (2022) Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2021.2307 accessed 30 June 2025.
4. ‘Pakistan Based Terror Groups Training Cadre for "Samundari Jihad": Government’ (The Economic Times, 2019) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-based-terrorgroups-training-cadre-for-samundari-jihad- government/printarticle/67347936.cms accessed 30 June 2025.
5. Jennifer-Santiago Oreta, ‘Terrorism as an Evolving Threat to Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security’ (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2013) https://amti.csis.org/maritime-terrorism-as-anevolving-threat-to-southeast-asias-security/ accessed 30 June 2025
6. Francis Vrey and Mark Blaine, ‘Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability’ (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2024) https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa- maritime- vulnerability accessed 30 June 2025.
7. Ibid
8. Francis (n 6)
9. Ibid
10. Megan Curran, ‘Soft Targets & Black Markets: Terrorist Activities in the Maritime Domain’ (Stable Seas, 2019) https://www.stableseas.org/post/new-report-terrorist-activities-in-the-maritimedomain accessed 30 June 2025.
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. ‘Superferry14: The World’s Deadliest Terrorist Attack at Sea’ (Safety4Sea, 2019) https://safety4sea.com/cm- superferry14-the-worlds-deadliest-terrorist-attack-at-sea/ accessed 30 June 2025.
15. Ibid
16. Francis (n 6).
17. Keegan B Steele, ‘Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Rim: Peering into the Darkness’ (California State University Maritime Academy, 2017) https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/concern/theses/kw52j904w accessed 30 June 2025.
18. Jeffrey D Simon, The Implications of the Achille Lauro Hijacking on the Maritime Community (RAND, 1986) https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7250.html accessed 30 June 2025.
19. ibid
20. Abhijeet Singh, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Asia: An Assessment’ (Observer Research Foundation, 2019) https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230725121340.pdf accessed 30 June 2025.
21. Ibid
22. Ministry of Defense, ‘Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh Inaugurates New State-of-the-Art ICG Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Building in Chennai’ (Press Information Bureau, 2024) https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2046436 accessed 30 June 2025.
23. Indian Coast Guard, ‘National Maritime Search and Rescue Coordinating Authority’ (Ministry of Defence, Government of India) https://indiancoastguard.gov.in/content/447_3_NMSARCA.aspx accessed 30 June 20
24. Economic Times (n 4).
25. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Coastal Security, Reference Note No 29/Rn/Ref./November/2013 (LARRDIS,2013) https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Refinput/New_Reference_Notes/English/Coastal_Security.pdf accessed 30 June 2025.
26. Ibid
27. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Indian Ocean: The Security Issues, Reference Note No 13/RN/Ref./April/2016 (Government of India, 2016) https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Refinput/New_Reference_Notes/English/Indian_Ocean_Security_issues.pd f accessed 30 June 2025.
28. Indian Coast Guard, ‘Coastal Security’ (Ministry of Defence, Government of India) https://indiancoastguard.gov.in/content/1727_3_CosstalSecurity.aspx accessed 30 June 2025.
29. Ministry of Home Affairs, AnnualReport 2014–15 (Government of India, 2015) 43 https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_14_15.pdf accessed 30 June 2025.
30. Press Information Bureau, ‘Maritime Safety and Security’ (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, 2024) https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2037413 accessed 30 June 2025.
