Abstract:
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Maldives has opened an important gambit in India’s strategic posturing towards the greater Indian Ocean. The warm welcome given to the Prime Minister during the country’s 60th Independence Day has increased India’s strategic radar towards the atoll nation generally and more specifically to the Western India Ocean. The trip and strategic significant of it is a continuation of India’s increased engagements with countries in the atoll nations and also develop its own military capabilities in its island outpost such as Lakshadweep which has got increased strategic interest from New Delhi. Further, India wishes to nullify China’s Island Strategy of encircling India’s immediate neighbourhood with Beijing’s military outpost. Further, the trip was a paradigm shift in India’s strategic outreach towards Maldives as previously Indian military personnel were asked to leave the atoll country following Maldivian President Muizzu taking power in 2024. In that regard, strategic observers within India note that the Indian Prime Minister visit to Maldives is a continuation of the neighborhood first policy developed the Modi government. The visit will amplify India’s strategic emphasis in the Indian Ocean as a part of its overall maritime security strategy in the wider Indo Pacific region.
Keyword:India Maldives relations, Indo Pacific, Geopolitics, Indian Ocean, Maritime Strategy
Introduction
As a part of expanding its maritime horizon, India has taken a leap forward in increasing its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by forming the maritime alliance with Maldives which was sealed during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi state visit to the atoll country late July this year.
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the Maldives conveys multiple strategic messages which includes but not limited to resetting of bilateral relations, a counter to China’s rising influence, and a strong reaffirmation of India’s naval assertiveness in its backyard
India’s strategic interest in Maldives and it’s expanded strategic choices in the Indian Ocean
In the above context, Indian PM Modi’s visit to the Maldives is seen as a major turnaround in bilateral ties after a spell of strain and tension between Maldives and New Delhi. It assumes significance as Muizzu, known to be close to China, came to power in the island nation in November 2023 on the back of an “India Out” campaign.
Earlier, Muizzu’s policies resulted in fissures between Maldives and India. Muizzu government asked the Indian Military personnel to leave Maldives.
On the other hand, India and Maldives will initiate talks for Free Trade Agreement in the near future. The change in dynamics of the relationship could be attributed to the growing need for India as an economic partner to Maldives and the importance of New Delhi as an important geopolitical player in the Indian Ocean.
Earlier, around 70 Indian defence personnel were stationed in Maldives to maintain radar stations and surveillance aircraft in the archipelago. Indian warships also help patrol the Maldives’ exclusive economic zone. This collaboration was of strategic interest to New Delhi amid its geopolitical competition with China in the Indian Ocean region.
Meanwhile, Maldivian President Mohamed Muizz campaigned against Indian Military Personnel in his country.
Earlier, India has provided assistance to Male when needed most as evident during In 1988, a group of Maldivians led by Abdullah Luthufi and assisted by about 80 armed mercenaries of a Sri Lankan secessionist organization, People Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), attempted to overthrow the government of the island republic. Back then, President Gayoom was saved from the coup by inviting Indian forces to intervene.
On the other hand, it is noted that China has envisaged a “string of pearls” strategy that prescribes the construction of maritime bases aimed at encircling India.
It’s understood that all Great Powers which wants to dominate in the Indian Ocean have set their eyes on Maldives historically. Traditionally, all powers that aspired to control the Indian Ocean have sought a base in the Maldives.
The southernmost island, Gan Island in the Seenu Atoll, served as a base for the British Royal Navy during World War II. Gan met the requirements for safe, deep anchorage in a strategic area. In addition, Antsiranana on Madagascar, the Diego Garcia atoll as well as the Aldabra and Farquhar islands and the Desroches in the Seychelles are important strategic locations in the western part of the sea.
The strategically important Gan Island base was set up by Britain to curtail Japan’s westward expansion in the Indian Ocean. Further, in 1957, it was transferred to the British Royal Air Force which vacated it in 1971 after the Maldives had gained independence. Following the British departure, Iran, Libya and the Soviet Union all tried to secure the Gan Island base to counter the American military presence in Diego Garcia.
Meanwhile, in 2008, terrorist activity in the Maldives spiked with a bombing in Malé and the settlement of a jihadist community in Himandhoo, a previously uninhabited Maldivian atoll. India seeks to coordinate counterterrorism efforts with the Maldives to stamp out this presence.
Earlier, a 2009 security agreement between India and Maldives envisages that network across the atolls will be constructed and it will be linked to the coastal command in Cochin. The plan also involved that it regular surveys be constructed with the islands with military flights and plans to erect an air force station in the Maldives was also mooted.
The pact was signed in August 2009 during then Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit there. He was accompanied by an Indian military delegation which included top navy officials.
It’s noted that the plan to construct radar was mooted keeping in view of the fact Maldives does not have a Navy of its own. During discussions, the Maldivian authorities had expressed concerns over the “crucial tasks of safeguarding and protecting their vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Maldives, while expressing its need to develop and enhance maritime surveillance and aerial mobility capabilities.
It’s true that Mauritius plays a crucial role in India’s Neighborhood First Policy. On the other hand, Mauritus’s Agalega island remote and strategic location and proximity to Seychelles, Madagascar, and Diego Garcia would help India closely monitor the entire region. The inauguration of the airstrip and jetty is expected to boost security cooperation between the two nations through joint maritime patrolling, monitoring of Exclusive Economic Zones, hydrography, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief programs
Furthermore, the new airstrip will accommodate Mauritius and India’s air and naval equipment, including the Indian Navy’s Dornier and P8-I maritime aircraft for the surveillance and reconnaissance of the regional waters.
While jointly inaugurating the airstrip and jetty at Agalega, Mauritian Prime Minister PravindJugnauth discredited rumors aired since 2018 about India establishing a military base at Agalega, assuring Mauritius’s sovereignty. However, Indian military could maintain its presence through man and material at Agalega for maritime patrol missions and the security of development projects. Furthermore, India is a key defense partner that has exported several helicopters, aircraft, ships, fast patrol boats, and other naval equipment to the Mauritian military forces
Maldives strategic significance in the Indian Ocean
It’s understood that geographically, the Maldives lies between Lakshadweep and Diego Garcia, an important U.S. military base in the IOR. With the backing of Indian naval bases in Lakshadweep and Agalega, Diego Garcia would provide a more effective counterbalance against China’s rising footprint in the region, now further strengthened by the recent Male-Beijing defense pact. The two naval facilities would help India keep a close eye on the entire region while also facilitating India’s joint recce of the blue waters with the United States and other island nations.
Lastly, India’s increased Indian Ocean presence will also enable closer ties with other strategically significant island nations, such as Madagascar and Seychelles. While New Delhi already enjoys a strong defense partnership with these countries, these bases will extend security, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation between India and island nations in the IOR. If the Agalega project brings India success, it would further motivate New Delhi to establish its presence in the Seychelles Assumption Island, which has been in negotiation between the two governments since 2015
In recent years, India has also made a series of attempts to counter Chinese influence in the IOR, including SAGAR and Necklace of Diamonds. The tug-of-war between China and India has resulted in both countries establishing naval bases and other military facilities. China’s building of port infrastructure in Gwadar, Hambantota, Coco, and Djibouti has given Beijing greater access to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and East Africa respectively, inciting India to initiate dialogue with several other IOR partners. These have included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Iran, Oman, and most recently, Agalega in Mauritius
China’s strategic manoeuvring in Maldives
Despite Male’s recent warmth signal to New Delhi as a part of Indian PM Modi’s visit it’s true that Maldives has got closer to China in recent times.
Maldives President Muizzu on his first state visit as a President was welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, during the talks at the Great Hall of the People, referred to President Muizzu as an “old friend,”
Further, it’s true that China and Maldives were moving closer strategically in last decade. One of the new developments was represented by the September 16, 2014, visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who along with 200 representatives of China’s top corporations, met with Maldivian officials to discuss infrastructure projects.
Topping the list was a proposed planto build a bridge connecting the island capital city of Malé to the airport. It seems that for the moment China wants a strategic partnership with the Maldives before moving forward with its ‘New Silk Road’ trade initiative.
The above initiative will involve support to include new shipping lanes connecting China to Africa’s East Coast which pass through waters just south of the Maldives. The current regime welcomes Chinese investment but most of all desires secure access to more tourism dollars.
While Chinese investments contribute significantly to the Maldives’ economic success, concerns have been raised by the World Bank. A development report from October last year warned of a potential build-up of sovereign exposure during the pandemic, coupled with a lack of domestic investment opportunities.
President Xi expressed support for increasing direct flights between China and the Maldives, a move that could significantly benefit the Maldives’ tourism sector. With tourism contributing 79% to economic growth in 2022, the country seeks to leverage Chinese connectivity to boost its travel industry. Additionally, China’s commitment to infrastructure development aligns with the Maldives’ aspirations for economic diversification.
The strategic partnership between China and the Maldives represents a geopolitical shift with far-reaching consequences. As the Maldives reorients its diplomatic and economic ties, the regional balance of power undergoes subtle transformations. The Maldives-China axis adds complexity to an already intricate geopolitical puzzle in the Indian Ocean, demanding close attention from international observers. The future trajectory of this partnership will likely shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region in the years to come.
China seems to be copying this strategy in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. In the former, it is seeking to contain India by forging alliances with island nations including the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles and building a “string of pearls” of military bases from East Africa to Pakistan.
The strategy is designed to curtail Indian influence in the region so China, with the Americans distracted in the Middle East, can have a free run in other parts of Asia and across the Pacific Ocean but also to encroach upon African countries that welcome its yuan diplomacy — developmental and industrial support with no strings attached.
China has never announced the string of pearls strategy publicly. A recent statement from the Chinese military that it’s considering an offer from the Seychelles to host a Chinese naval base confirms that the strategy exists, however.
Furthermore, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated that it isn’t interested in building military bases in other places.
The Chinese “island hopping” strategy defies historical precedent and differs from the strategies of other and past great powers in that they were usually explicit about their intentions. China apparently believes that concealing its motives best serves its interests.
On the other hand, increased Chinese presence across the Indian Ocean poses a challenge to India as it is trying to project itself as a great power beyond South Asia. However, Muizzu’s attendance at PM Modi’s third-term swearing-in ceremony in June 2024 and Modi’s recent visit signal a potential thaw. Diplomats see this as New Delhi regaining influence in Male, even as Beijing watches nervously from the sidelines.
The diplomatic landscape in the Indian Ocean region witnessed a significant development as China and the Maldives solidified their relationship through a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. President Mohamed Muizzu’s state visit to Beijing marked a turning point in the geopolitical dynamics of the region, with the two nations signalling a commitment to enhanced collaboration across various sectors. This report delves into the implications, motivations, and potential consequences of this evolving partnership.
India’s strategic expansion in the Lakshadweep and its impact in the Maldives and Indian Ocean
It’s noted that as a part of power projection into the Indian Ocean India has started to improve its strategic infrastructure to the Eastern Indian Ocean.
As a part of the sea control strategy, India has started to operate a new naval base INS Jatayu which will be about 258 kms closer to the Maldives than the Indian Navy’s existing base – INS Dweeprakshak – on the Lakshadweep Island.
The new base will augment India’s “operational surveillance” of the region, according to a statement issued by the Indian Navy
A temporary base of the Indian Navy, known as Naval Detachment Minicoy, already exists at Minicoy near the 9 Degree Channel, a busy global shipping route.
The Indian Navy’s surveillance missions received a shot in the arm with the opening of a Naval Detachment (NAVDET) at Androth Island, situated in the Lakshadweep archipelago. The NAVDET would extend the Indian Navy’s presence at Androth by providing a communication network to connect with the mainland.’ It is noted that India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives already have a trilateral maritime security co-operation. From Lakshadweep, India will work closely with the network of 26 radar emplacements deployed across the atolls of the Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian Southern Command
INS Jatayu, therefore, is more than just a naval facility. It’s a message to Beijing: India is prepared and positioned to counterbalance Chinese expansionism across multiple fronts.
Key capabilities planned or under development at INS Jatayu include 2.5 km airstrip capable of accommodating military transport aircraft. Deployment of a BrahMos land-based missile battery, strengthening deterrence capabilities.
A fully functional coastal radar station to monitor surface and submarine activity across a wide swathe of the Arabian Sea INS Jatayu: A Game-Changer in Maritime Strategy in the Western Indian Ocean.
Indian Navy officials have described INS Jatayu as a “maritime equaliser,” particularly as China’s commercial and naval vessels increase their presence in the Indian Ocean.
Beyond its symbolic importance, the base will play a critical role in Surveillance and monitoring of traffic in and around the Nine Degree Channel. Serving as a forward-operating base for naval and aerial missions as acting as a logistics hub for anti-piracy and humanitarian operations.
Further, as Beijing develops its own capabilities including building ports, airports, and bridges, India’s moves remain firm but focused on regional stability. The timing of Modi’s visit, coupled with the strategic build-up at INS Jatayu, serves as both an olive branch to the Maldives and a firm hand to China
With China expanding its economic and military influence in the region, India is responding with calculated strategic moves. The most significant of which is the recent operationalization of the Indian Navy’s INS Jatayu naval base on Minicoy Island, Lakshadweep
Located just 250 kilometres from the Maldives, INS Jatayu is emerging as a key outpost in India’s naval strategy to monitor and, if required, choke Chinese maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean. It is a corridor through which over 80% of China’s energy supplies and global shipping transit.
INS Jatayu is positioned north of the Nine Degree Channel, one of the busiest and most strategic shipping lanes in the world. Every day, more than 15,000 merchant vessels — roughly 10 to 12 every minute — pass through this route, which links the Middle East, Africa, and Russia to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim.
This channel is not just a global shipping lifeline — it’s also a strategic vulnerability for China, which depends heavily on these waters for its oil and trade imports. Until recently, India’s main point was the Andaman & Nicobar Command, guarding the Malacca Strait choke point. With the establishment of INS Jatayu, India has a second lever, which is located even closer to China’s logistical lifelines
It’s understood that geographically, the Maldives lies between Lakshadweep and Diego Garcia, an important U.S. military base in the IOR. With the backing of Indian naval bases in Lakshadweep and Agalega, Diego Garcia would provide a more effective counterbalance against China’s rising footprint in the region, now further strengthened by the recent Male-Beijing defense pact. The two naval facilities would help India keep a close eye on the entire region while also facilitating India’s joint recce of the blue waters with the United States and other island nations.
Meanwhile, India’s increased Indian Ocean presence will also enable closer ties with other strategically significant island nations, such as Madagascar and Seychelles. While New Delhi already enjoys a strong defense partnership with these countries, these bases will extend security, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation between India and island nations in the IOR. If the Agalega project brings India success, it would further motivate New Delhi to establish its presence in the Seychelles Assumption Island, which has been in negotiation between the two governments since 2015
In recent years, India has also made a series of attempts to counter Chinese influence in the IOR, including SAGAR and Necklace of Diamonds. The tug-of-war between China and India has resulted in both countries establishing naval bases and other military facilities. China’s building of port infrastructure in Gwadar, Hambantota, Coco, and Djibouti has given Beijing greater access to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and East Africa respectively, inciting India to initiate dialogue with several other IOR partners. These have included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Iran, Oman, and most recently, Agalega in Mauritius
In conclusion, it’s expected that India and Maldives will continue their strategic partnership in the years to come with India providing necessary military assistance to the littoral state. Further, India will supposedly use Maldives as a springboard for effective power projection in the Indian Ocean.10
End Notes:
1) Indian PM Modi’s Trip to Maldives Increases New Delhi’s Strategic Antenna Towards the Atoll Nation (Diplomatist, July 28,2025) https://diplomatist.com/2025/07/28/indian-pm-modis-tripto-maldives-increases-new-delhis-strategic-antenna-towards-the-atoll-nation/
2) India-Maldives Reset spells a strategic depth in the Indian Ocean (Indian Newslink, August 5, 2025) https://indiannewslink.co.nz/india-maldives-reset-spells-a-strategic-depth-in-the-indianocean/
3) Mohan Balaji To counter China, India needs to do naval diplomacy (IANS, August 26,2011) https://twocircles.net/2011aug28/counter_china_india_needs_do_naval_diplomacy.html
4) Rumel Dahiya, Maldives Needs Help Now and India Alone Can Provide it (MP- IDSA,February 09, 2018) https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/maldives-needs-help-now-and-india-alonecan-provide-it
5) Balaji Chandramohan, India, Maldives and the Indian Ocean (IDSA, October 13,2009) https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/india-maldives-and-the-indian-ocean
6) Abhijit Singh, Maldives, India and Hydrograph Pact, (ORF, January 5, 2024) https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/maldives-india-and-a-hydrography-pact
7) Maldives seeks scaling back of Indian presence as it woos China (Reuters, August 10,2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/world/maldives-seeks-scaling-back-of-indian-presence-as-itwoos-china-idUSKBN1KV13N/
8) INS Jatayu Positioned to Counter China as PM Modi Plans Strategic Visit to Maldives (Bharat Shakti, July 21, 2025)
9) Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s surging aid to Maldives points to its strategic location”Asia Times, News and Features, 20 April 2016, http://atimes.com/2015/04/indias-surging-aid-tomaldives-points-toits-strategic-location/ (last accessed 21 July 2016)
10) ‘Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy’, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, pp. 2-8
