Abstract

The Indo-Pacific region, a focal point of global geopolitics, has been significantly impacted by China's aggressive expansionism and military assertiveness, particularly since Xi Jinping's rise to power. This paper examines the historical context and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the region's economic significance and the challenges posed by China's actions, including its territorial claims and coercive tactics against neighbouring countries. The key findings reveal China's belligerence and military expansion, has destabilized the region. The revival of the Quad—comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia—emerges as a response to Chinese actions, and aims to ensure a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific.' Despite the Quad's efforts, questions remain regarding its effectiveness in deterring China, given the lack of a formal military alliance and differing national priorities. The paper argues for a reevaluation of military strategies among Quad nations to counter China's ambitions, emphasizing the necessity of a unified military approach to maintain regional stability and deter aggression. Ultimately, the Quad's ability to adapt and strengthen its military capabilities will be crucial in addressing the challenges posed by China's expansionist policies. This study highlights the importance of military power in countering China's ambitions and ensuring peace and prosperity in the region.

Introduction

Before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Indo-Pacific was arguably the most talked about region in the world for nearly two decades. Although the Russia-Ukraine war diverted some attention towards Europe, geopolitical and economic developments in the Indo-Pacific were not off the radar. The Chinese-origin COVID-19 pandemic, China’s dubious role in its spread and the supply chain disruptions due to China’s policy of weaponising the pandemic brought the fragility of the region to the fore. Making matters worse was that this revisionist power (China) shamelessly used its economic and military might to deflect responsibility for the pandemic and continued to make noises about “reunifying” Taiwan by force, if necessary. Its ‘grey zone’ warfare against the Philippines, Taiwan and Australia has destabilised the region. Equipped with the world’s largest navy (numerically), China has been making increasing forays into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The singular focus of China is to become a ‘super-power’ and, in due course, overtake the U.S. Power struggle is an enduring feature of global geopolitics. However, in its quest for power, China seeks to overturn the present global order and replace it with its version. China’s ‘powerplay’ must begin in the Indo-Pacific to achieve its objectives and then spread further outwards. However, as a resident power with considerable interests in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. is China’s nemesis. And therein lie the roots of the problem that nations in the Indo-Pacific face. Is it just about territorial ambitions, the curse of geography or economic greed that drives China and invites pushback from other powers? Or is it because of the region's importance that has led to perhaps this century's most significant geopolitical rivalry? To understand this, it is essential to first examine the region and its worth.

The Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is the maritime region that spans the Indian and Pacific oceans. The term Indo-Pacific was pioneered and intellectualised by German geopolitician Karl Haushofer in the 1920s, but his idea varied considerably from the term’s modern usage1 . The Indo-Pacific houses half the world’s population and 60% of the global economy. It has witnessed two-thirds of global economic growth over the past five years2 . Seven of the world’s largest militaries are present in the region. Blessed with a vast biodiversity, the Indo-Pacific is a critical region for oceanography and the study of marine biology. Unfortunately, adverse effects of climate change, extreme weather events, rising sea levels and global warming have posed enhanced risks to human and animal habitats as well as ecological and environmental damage.

The rebirth of the Indo-Pacific in its present form happened in 2007 when the then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe referred to it in his epochal speech titled ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ while addressing the Indian Parliament3 . In his speech, Mr Abe made the case for harnessing the influence of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and that of India in the Indian Ocean along with the U.S. and Australia to build a partnership that could ensure freedom and prosperity in the region. Through their Navies, these four countries had effectively got together and reacted with alacrity to provide Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HADR) in the aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami. This fact would have been uppermost in Mr Abe’s mind. What Mr Abe left unsaid but discernible to a keen watcher of geopolitics was China’s brazen destabilisation of the region through its illegal actions and the need for leading democracies to counter it effectively. The Quad (or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as it was known then) was born from these developments.

Rise of China Has Destabilised the Indo-Pacific

In the perception of the strategic community in the U.S., the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the erstwhile USSR considerably reduced threats to American interests in the Indo-Pacific. Without a credible threat, the strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific was absent. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the mainland U.S. resulted in terrorism attaining the numero uno position in threats to the U.S. Retaliating to the 9/11 attacks with military force, the U.S. launched its Global War on Terror (GWOT) and sent troops into Afghanistan. The U.S. military assumed Counter Insurgency (CI) and Counter Terrorism (CT) as their primary mission. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) became the primary theatre of operations and attention. This resulted in other commands, especially the Pacific Command (PACOM), being relatively relegated in importance and funding

The U.S. soon got bogged in CI/CT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, spending billions of dollars. The cost in terms of American lives lost, and battle casualties kept mounting. This period coincided with China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001. Ironically, India was amongst the most vociferous champions of China joining the WTO. Soon enough, China started unleashing its manufacturing prowess even as it ‘gamed’ the West and acquired technology mainly through stealing and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) theft. However, the West was happy with cheap Chinese goods and merchandise. Many in the West foolishly believed that integrating China into the global economy and exposing them to Western ideas and culture would wean the Chinese from communism into embracing democracy. Equally imprudent were many within India’s strategic community who advocated China’s cause in the WTO (and other global fora) and believed that this was a way of improving relations and eventually settling the border dispute.

Obviously, for these ‘China apologists’,4 lessons of history held no relevance. In 2003, China had about a 6% share in global trade, and its GDP was US $ 1.6 trillion, which made it the world’s sixth-largest economy in nominal terms. In 2010, its GDP rose to US $ 6 trillion, making it the world’s second-largest economy. While many economists predicted China’s growth, such a spectacular rise was unexpected.

Even as the U.S. spent considerable time, energy and resources in Afghanistan and Iraq, the first decade of this century saw China steadily increase its military presence in the disputed South China Sea (SCS), a part of the Indo-Pacific. The Chinese Navy (PLAN) started sailing into the Indian Ocean and up to the Persian Gulf under the guise of anti-piracy missions. Despite China and the member-nations of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signing the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ in November 2002, Chinese vessels continued harassing and damaging sea-going vessels and fisherfolk from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Philippines

Sadly, the early promise of the Quad in 2007 did not last long. Riled by this grouping, China berated it and protested vehemently. It pulled out all the stops to induce, coerce and intimidate Japan, Australia and India. In 2008, led by a pro-China Prime Minister, Australia pulled out of the Quad. Though supportive of the Quad, India had different ideas about its purpose. These were not necessarily congruent with those of the other countries. India did not want to be seen as provoking China. It was sensitive to China’s reaction since it wanted to secure a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver that depended upon China’s approval5 . The trade relationship was also on an upswing, and it was mistakenly thought to pave the way towards a border solution. Surprisingly, it was the U.S. that also demurred and appeared not too keen to take the Quad forward. Former Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr Shyam Saran, said, “The US said it wanted to go slow.6 ” The reason was that the George W. Bush administration wanted to keep China engaged in the so-called “six-party talks” about North Korea’s nuclear program. The U.S. attempts to solicit support from the UN Security Council to condemn Iran’s nuclear weapons programme also relied on China’s support7 .

By the end of 2010, the Obama administration realised that American preoccupation in Europe and the Middle East damaged its interests in Southeast Asia. Hence, in 2011, President Obama announced that the U.S. would prioritise the Asia-Pacific region (the term Indo-Pacific was not commonly used then). This ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ by the U.S. was backed by policymakers across the political spectrum in the U.S. Importantly, the policy has been continued through subsequent administrations. By displaying a sound understanding of the changes occurring in the region and engaging intensely, the thinking within strategic circles within the United States was that it could enhance economic integration and more effectively deal with a rising China8 . It was also an acknowledgement that China’s rise in the IOR and Pacific region held the biggest strategic challenge to American power.

The Aftermath of Quad 1.0

The Chinese worldview has been quite consistent through modern history. While they always had this notion of Chinese ‘superiority’ the manifestation of it in interactions with the world had been largely subdued. Little did anyone predict that Xi Jinping’s ascendancy as the President of China in March 2013 would bring a substantive change in the manner of executing China’s foreign policy. Xi quickly dumped the Deng-era mantra of “hide your strength and bide your time.” In the quest to fulfil the “Chinese dream” he often spoke about a “new era of rejuvenation” in China. Xi fundamentally altered Chinese foreign policy making it more aggressive and assertive in the international arena. His signature ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) was launched to showcase Chinese economic might and offer an alternative to the Westled funding schemes. Chinese diplomats, who hitherto used to display some ‘grace’ in diplomatic interactions, suddenly turned into ‘wolf-warriors’, leading to ‘wolf warrior diplomacy9 .’ China’s assertiveness and aggression was not just limited in the diplomatic realm. Internally, mass persecution of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet continued unabated, even as efforts to erase the limited semblance of freedom that existed in Hong Kong gained traction. Externally, China demonstrated aggression in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea (SCS), Bhutan and India.

Some incidents in the SCS after Xi took over merit a mention here. In March 2013, a Chinese gunboat forced an Indonesian fisheries protection craft to release Chinese vessels found fishing in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. Although recognised internationally as Indonesia’s EEZ, China claims it, citing that it lies within its so-called (and illegal) ‘nine-dash line’10 .

In May of the same year, more than 30 Chinese fishing and patrol vessels tried to intimidate Philippines sailors and marines operating in the area of Second Thomas Shoal, which is under the control of the Philippines11. In May of the next year, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was sunk within its EEZ by a Chinese vessel that rammed the boat12. The harassment of fisherfolk from Vietnam and the Philippines continued regularly in 2014 and 2015 in areas around the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal and Thomas Shoal. In June 2015, China completed the construction of seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands on reefs they had occupied and announced that they would commence construction of military and civilian structures on them13. In the next few months, China engaged in constructing runways on artificially reclaimed land on Mischief and Subi Reefs, after it had finished constructing a 3000-metre runway on Fiery Cross Reef14. Later, in 2016, it was reported that China had deployed Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) on Woody Island.

China’s brash actions had shaken and stirred the region. Voices started being raised against such unprovoked and unilateral actions, but these were cloaked in diplomatic niceties. At a House Armed Services sea power and projection forces subcommittee hearing, experts in the SCS and maritime law recommended the U.S. step up Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), a programme it had started in 1979 and favoured the inclusion of allies like Japan15. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favour of the Philippines and stated that China’s claims in the nine-dash line were unlawful as they were contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Expectedly, China rejected the verdict and became more belligerent in the SCS, East China Sea and beyond. By 2017, the writing on the wall was clear. In June 2017, Chinese troops crossed over into Bhutanese territory in the Doklam area and commenced building a road. The Indian Army blocked them, resulting in a 73-day stand-off. The Chinese Navy, Coast Guard and maritime militia also targeted Japanese and Australian vessels in international waters. China gainfully utilised the interregnum between the dissolution of Quad 1.0 to 2017 to flex its muscles and intimidate neighbours. India, Australia, Japan and the U.S. were in the crosshairs of the Chinese. The dice were cast so that these four countries could come together and reboot the defunct Quad.

Revival of the Quad

Uppermost in the minds of the four countries was the weight of expectations and diversity in ideating the Quad. So, the first step in the revival was a cautious one. In November 2017, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Conference in Manila, senior officials of the four countries met. For the next nearly two years, the meetings continued at the “senior official” level on a biannual basis16. Indication of political ownership came when the Quad Foreign Ministers met formally for the first time for a Quad meeting in New York in September 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic brought a minor disruption in further engagements, but in its new avatar, the Quad meant business. This was evident in the second Quad Foreign Ministers meeting that took place ‘in person’ in Tokyo in October 2020, even as the China-origin pandemic wrought havoc in the world. A few months later, in February 2021, the third Quad Foreign Ministers meeting took place virtually. Thereafter, these meetings became an established affair, with two meetings each in 2022 and 2023, one in 2024 and one in January this year, immediately after President Trump took office.

The year 2020 witnessed increased hostility from China. In January, Chinese fishing vessels were escorted by their Coast Guard into Indonesia’s EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. In response, Indonesia sent military patrols to the region, and the Chinese vessels eventually retreated17. In early May, reports started coming of large-scale intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) across East Ladakh by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Satellite imagery subsequently revealed a massive build-up of PLA troops. The Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) got into action and counter mobilised. Later events, such as the fights that occurred in the region of Pangong Tso and Galwan (in East Ladakh) and Naku-la (in Sikkim), are well known. China’s actions catalysed India into making some long-awaited decisions. It was now evident in South Block that pampering to the Chinese had failed. In a significant move, India overcame its past misgivings and invited Australia to participate in Exercise Malabar along with the U.S. and Japan. The exercise was held in November 2020 (during the pandemic) and drew China’s ire. The Global Times wrote that the exercise was “an ill-intentioned attempt to corner China [and] is a hollow bluff … China will not be disrupted by India’s irrationality or US interference18.”

The quad countries were unruffled by the vitriolic attacks emanating from China. The stage was being set for something bigger. This was the first Quad Leaders’ Summit that was held ‘virtually’ in March 2021. Without naming China, the four leaders emphasised the aspect of a “free” and “open” IndoPacific. But it was clear who this was aimed at. A month later, in April 2021, all 27 countries of the European Union (EU) issued a joint statement calling on all parties in the SCS to abide by the 2016 PCA ruling19. China was the only country that had not accepted the ruling. Slowly, major countries and groupings shed their reservations on expressing concern over China’s actions. The Quad leaders have held six summit meetings to date, and the grouping has evolved into tackling diverse issues. These include health security, HADR, maritime security, quality infrastructure, emerging and critical technologies, climate and clean energy, cyber, space, Quad Investors Network (QUIN), etc. Each of the meetings has reiterated the importance of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) and the willingness of the Quad to resist any nation that unilaterally uses force to disturb and destabilise the region.

Has Quad Deterred China?

Despite the Quad not (yet) being a military alliance, China has consistently reacted wildly to the grouping, be it when it was first formed, revived later and now as it gains more purpose. After dismissing it as an “attention-grabbing” concept that would dissipate “like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean,” the Chinese seem anxious about the progress of Quad. Beijing equates the Quad as a ‘Cold War mentality’ against China. It has not accepted ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a nomenclature and continues referring to the old ‘Asia-Pacific’ construct20. After the latest Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting, it reacted by stating, “Engaging in group politics and bloc confrontation will not bring lasting peace and security, and is not conducive to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the world as a whole” 21. It is now clear to the Chinese that the “foam” has not dissipated. The Quad is here to stay, and this reality queers the pitch for China.

In the Chinese discourse, Quad has often been (wrongly) labelled as an “Asian NATO.” This could mean two things. One is that China is concerned about the grouping and its potential to contest China. Second, it wishes to create this narrative of some countries “ganging” against China to subdue its ‘peaceful’ rise and thereby sow fear in the Indo-Pacific countries of a ‘great power rivalry’ in their vicinity. However, the moot question is whether China has shown a willingness to respect international rules and refrain from its bellicosity. The reality is that it has not, and one reason could be that the Quad does not sufficiently deter it. Beijing could be well aware of the Quad’s history and the differing approaches of its constituents to security issues. India’s historic aversion to alliances is an important factor that the Chinese feel will preclude the grouping from assuming a military dimension. The relatively smaller sizes of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and Royal Australian Armed Forces imply the major responsibility during armed confrontations will have to be borne by the U.S. A globally stretched U.S. and India’s diffidence in militarizing the Quad gives China considerable room to flex its muscles. This has been apparent in the increasing instances of coercion by China (in spite of the Quad’s focus on maritime security and FOIP) in the maritime domain, especially towards the Philippines and Taiwan.

The Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) and the Navy (PLAN) continue to regularly violate the median line in the Taiwan Strait and have undertaken live firing exercises on numerous occasions near Taiwan. Philippine vessels attempting to resupply their troops stationed on the Second Thomas Shoal (within the EEZ of the Philippines) have been subjected to water cannons fired from Chinese Coast Guard ships22 . The feeling among ASEAN countries to avoid being sucked in a Quad-China rivalry has been exploited by Beijing to sow discord and dilute efforts by Vietnam and the Philippines to call out Chinese coercion and grey zone warfare. Illegal activities by Chinese fishermen in the EEZ of other countries have not subsided. The PLAN, PLAAF and Coast Guard continue their ‘show of force’ and indulge in dangerous activities in the close proximity of foreign ships and aircraft in international waters/ airspace. In January of this year, 235 Chinese aircraft and maritime vessels entered the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Taiwan, of which 131 aircraft crossed the median line between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait23. The Quad has consistently stressed “ASEAN centrality,” but divisions within ASEAN have neither helped the Quad nor the China-affected countries in ASEAN, such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. The gravitational pull of the Chinese economy has been successful in weakening the Quad and undermining the strategic impact of Quad.

Another factor in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific is the alignment of Russia, China, and North Korea. China and Russia have a “no-limits” partnership, and it is well known that North Korea has sent its troops to fight alongside the Russian Army against Ukraine. For China, Russia is an advantageous military partner and offers a way to exert strategic pressure on Japan by leveraging Russia’s proximity to Japan and the Russian occupation of Japan’s Northern Territories24. This could create a dilemma for Japan before joining the U.S. in any future military scenarios involving China. Even as it needles the U.S., China would do everything to ensure that the U.S. does not actively step into any maritime conflict in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, it would continue to indulge in provocative actions but in the grey zone. However, against the other smaller nations, China would not hesitate to use force while simultaneously making overtures of peace – a strategy it has used in the past. The lack of a formal treaty or alliance among all the Quad countries ensures that it does not become an ‘anti-China’ grouping and generates wider acceptability in the Indo-Pacific countries. But this is precisely the reason why it also lacks a clear ability to answer some fundamental questions regarding the use of force – Under what circumstances is force to be used? Is it to be used only by the affected country or jointly? What act by China will constitute a threat to Quad? How will the use of force be calibrated once used, and how will Quad control the escalation dynamics? What if North Korea and Russia join the fray to support China? What will the commitment of forces from the Quad countries? There are no easy answers to these questions, and this lack of strategic clarity emboldens China rather than deterring it.

Military Power Can Deter China

A study of China’s history reveals a significant common ground with that of many other countries. Even when countries such as China, the U.K., the erstwhile USSR and European powers in the Industrial Age were ‘strong’, there were limits to their expansionism and conquests. These limits were not due to a lack of desire or ambition but rather due to the deterrence capability that their equally strong or stronger competitors possessed. The primary and most important constituent of this deterrence was military power. Even today, in the information age, military power still retains its numero uno status as the most important measure of a nation's deterrence capability. Chinese behaviour has often been (rightly so) labelled as that of a “bully”. Standing up to a bully requires a strong will backed by strength. In geopolitics, this strength is derived from a nation’s wealth (economy), military power, cultural attractiveness and strategic thinking. The constituents of the Quad have all these in varying degrees, but perhaps only the U.S. has all in abundance. It is, therefore, natural that the U.S. has to do the heavy lifting. However, when viewed as a sum of the military prowess of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia, the Quad has significant strength. Weaving this strength through a formal military coalition with strategic clarity will likely unnerve China. In the short term, it could result in some tensions, but once China understands that the Quad means serious business, it will come around. Standing up to Chinese bullying has always made them scurry and seek an ‘honorable’ exit. Advocates of ‘engaging’ China recommend doing so peacefully and with deference. This is exactly what China seeks. A flashback to the Nathu-la clashes of 1967, the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979, and the Sumdorong-chu incident proves that when countered with military force, the Chinese scampered and blinked. By creating an aura of their invincibility, the Chinese seek to subdue their enemies without fighting. No amount of theorising will diminish this aura. Only a ‘show of force’ or ‘use of force’ will. Importantly, the Quad should articulate the ‘red lines’ to Beijing and unambiguously communicate its willingness to use military force should these be either challenged or violated.

The security/ military challenges faced by India, the U.S. and Japan are not just from China, although it is the principal threat. Russia and North Korea are a threat to Japan and America, while Pakistan is a challenge to India. Russia is also against the Quad and thus may not be favourably disposed towards India in the long run. The military budgets of China, Russia and Pakistan have kept increasing. It is, therefore, inescapable that the Quad countries increase their military budgets. Australia has increased its defence budget in 2025 to approximately US $ 37 billion (2% of GDP) and plans to increase it to about US $ 63 billion by 2033-3425 . Japan has consistently increased its defence spending for 13 consecutive years and will spend US $ 55.1 billion in 2025-2626. Although this is just 1.3% of the GDP, Japan plans to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2027. The Indian defence budget for 2025-26 paints a rather grim picture. The figure of approx. US $ 78 billion appears attractive, but it is just 1.9% of our GDP and includes pensions.

India faces critical shortages in some crucial platforms and weapons, such as fighter aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, and Air Defence (AD) systems. The Quad countries need to synergise efforts to bolster defence production by getting into mutually advantageous partnerships. Interoperability is being enhanced through joint exercises, and these need to be enhanced in scope by including scenarios in the grey zone. The Quad must work on a Quad capability perspective plan that lays milestones to be achieved in the next five and 10 years. This plan is recommended as a complementary one to each nation’s capability development rather than as a replacement. The focus ought to be on the maritime domain, aerospace domain, cyber domain and applications of emerging technologies to decisively defeat Chinese threats, coercion, and misadventure.

India has been traditionally shy of alliances. When confronted with a grave situation in 1971, it did enter into a treaty with the USSR, although the wordings were obfuscated in semantics. The concept of strategic autonomy needs a relook. There is limited agreement on what it means. Rather than be constrained forever by a debatable concept at best and a mythical one at worst, India has often foreclosed options that could have catapulted it into becoming an indispensable leading power. Beijing will forever be happy with a self-constrained India. The argument is not for blindly getting into alliances but to not kick the can down the road, hoping that Beijing will ‘understand’ us in due course.

Conclusion

Questions may arise whether the ‘militarisation’ of Quad will lead to an increase in tensions and instability. The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is rapidly shifting to China’s advantage. Relative power shifts between benign countries not at loggerheads with each other may, in fact, lead to more stability. However, neither is China benign nor is it interested in upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific. In its desire to be the undisputed power in the Indo-Pacific, it has consistently used intimidation, coercion, and inducements and blatantly disregarded established international norms. Every country in the Indo-Pacific has generally appeased, humoured, and displayed sensitivity towards China. This has been perceived by China as a ‘weaknesses’ of these countries. If there is one important lesson from history, it is that timely opposition to an autocratic bully with expansionist ambitions prevents mayhem later. Chinese actions and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are eerily similar to Hitler’s Germany in the lead-up to World War II. Contesting it should be both a responsibility and a mission. The Quad is ideally suited for both. It has taken measures, but these have been primarily in the domain of ‘soft power’. When confronting an evil that possesses considerable military power, soft power has serious limitations. The answer, therefore, lies in the Quad developing military capabilities that convince China to abandon its chosen path of confrontation and conflict. Needless to say, China will be convinced only when it understands that the combined might of the Quad will bring unacceptable costs and losses to China. And that Quad will unhesitatingly use military force to reign in a belligerent, obstinate and rule-breaker China. India will host the Leaders’ Summit of Quad this year. It is a good opportunity for Quad to shed its inhibitions on creating a military coalition in the Indo-Pacific. Only a military coalition of the Quad can decisively deter an obstinate China and bring stability, peace and prosperity to the region. This requires vision, clarity and commitment. For the sake of a better future for the Indo-Pacific, one hopes the Quad takes the bull by the horns.

References:

1. Ethan Teekah, ‘Indo-Pacific’ Encyclopaedia Britannica (updated 25 February 2025) available at https://www.britannica.com/place/Indo-Pacific accessed on 27 February 2025

2. John Hopkins University, ‘Three observations about the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific’ 23 September 2024 available at https://washingtondc.jhu.edu/news/three-observations-aboutthe-strategic-importance-of-the-indo-pacific/ accessed on 27 February 2025

3. See https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

4. The term ‘China apologists’ refers to those non-Chinese who harbour good or positive feelings about China and refuse to believe anything bad about China. Another trait of these people is that they go to any extent to justify China’s actions while often criticizing actions of their own country.

5. Tanvi Madan, ‘The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’, War on the Rocks, 16 November 2017 available at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ accessed on 28 February 2025

6. Daniel Flitton, ‘Who Really Killed the Quad 1.0’, The Interpreter, 02 June 2020 available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/who-really-killed-quad-10 accessed on 27 February 2025

7. Ibid

8. Richard Fontaine and Robert Blackwill, originally published in Washington Post and reproduced in https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/obama-tried-to-pivot-to-asia-in- 2011-we-must-succeed-this-time accessed on 28 February 2025

9. For a detailed understanding and explanation of the term see https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/ accessed on 01 March 2025

10. S Bentley, ‘Mapping the nine-dash line: recent incidents involving Indonesia in the South China Sea’, ASPI The Strategist, 29 October 2013

11. T Quismundo, ‘Withdraw ships, Philippines tells China’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 May 2013.

12. J Perlez, ‘China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea’, New York Times, 27 May 2014

13. M Liddy & B Spraggon, ‘Before and After: China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea’, ABC, 22 September 2015 available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-22/south-chinasea-islands-before-and-after/6794076 accessed on 01 March 2025

14. Parliament of Australia,‘South China Sea Chronology’ 23 March 2022 available at https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/ Research/Chronologies/2021-22/SouthChinaSeaChronology accessed on 27 February 2025

15. Cid Standifer, ‘A Brief History of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea’, 02 July 2017, available at https://news.usni.org/2017/05/29/brief-history-us-freedomnavigation-operations-south-china-sea accessed on 01 March 2025

16. Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, ‘Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’, CSIS Briefs 16 March 2020

17. Fadli, ‘Chinese Vessels Retreat to Border of Indonesia’s EEZ in North Natuna Sea’, The Jakarta Post, 12 January 2020

18. Dave Makichuk, Asia Times, 04 November 2020 available at https://asiatimes.com/2020/11/malabar-2020-a-show-of-force-on-chinas-doorstep/# accessed on 02 March 2025

19. South China Sea: Statement by the Spokesperson on challenges to peace and stability, European Union External Action Service, 24 April 2021, available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/south-china-sea-statement-spokesperson-challenges-peaceand-stability_en accessed on 27 February 2025

20. Amrita Jaish, ‘The Quad Factor in the Indo-Pacific and the Role of India’, Journal of IndoPacific Affairs, Vol 4, No. 2, Air University Press, 08 March 2021

21. https://www.deccanherald.com/world/china-responds-to-quad-fms-meeting-says-its-claimsover-south-china-sea-completely-justified-3368061 accessed on 02 March 2025

22. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/18/philippines-tells-china-to-back-off-after-southchina-sea-clash accessed on 26 February 2025

23. Natalie Caloca, ‘China in the Taiwan Strait: January 2025’, available at https://www.cfr.org/article/china-taiwan-strait-january-2025 accessed on 02 March 2025

24. Kevin Rudd, ‘Why the Quad alarms China’, 09 December 2021 available at https://asiasociety.org/magazine/article/why-quad-alarms-china accessed on 18 February 2025

25. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/ Budget/reviews/2024-25/Defence accessed on 08 March 2025

26. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/01/16/japans-passes-record-defensebudget-while-still-playing-catch-up/ accessed on 08 February 2025