On June 18th, 2017 Indian border troops interrupted China’s road construction attempts at Doklam, at the tri junction between China, Bhutan and India. China claims that, it is normal road construction at mutually recognized Sikkim sector into Chinese territory and Bhutan has ceded claim on it. For China, this is clearly demarcated borderline which has been established by the 1890 convention between Great Briton and China related to Sikkim and Tibet and has been accepted by Indian Government in 1947.1 India considers this dispute to be China’s high handedness. Doklam, for India is Bhutanese territory. India – China special representatives’ dialogue agreed to settle such disputes through consultations in 2012. China’s military activity changed the status quo and unilaterally upset the equilibrium. India insisted that, both countries should take the army back simultaneously and open dialogue. China emphasized on Indian army to go back first and then opening of dialogue. Subsequently in June this year Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in Astana agreed on not allowing differences to grow into disputes. Indian diplomacy, while standing firm on its position on national security, represented the spirit of togetherness, and finally its restraint and resilience engulfed the clouds of war.
But, a Chinese contingent of troops still stands at the border; less than1000 feet back from where the PLA had drawn up its battle lines in the summer. “There is a heavy presence of Chinese troops a few hundred meters away from the site of standoff and they are likely to remain at least until the winter” said Rajeev Rajan Chaturvedy, a researcher at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore.
But Doklam is not an isolated event. India – China have a long history of rivalry and Doklam is a part of a bigger design, Apart from border disputes and staple visas to Nuclear Supplier Groups membership & Maulana Masood Azar, there have been may disagreements. China – Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes through Gilgit – Baltisten and Pak Occupied Kashmir in an absolute No –No for India. Unipolar Asia does not serve India’s purpose but, India understands the importance of being able to solve bilateral issues in peaceful manner China in that sense in hawkish. Nine dash line to trade protectionism, China has been bullying other nations, or wooing them with economic muscle. China today has no competitor in Indian Ocean Region. Geunhye of South Korea is in Blue House now, Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines, despite winning the Arbitration has mend his ways, Malaysia has swung towards China by signing historic defense agreement, and military leadership of pro – western power in Thailand has inked naval accords with China. Chinese hawkish designs are evident in South China Sea, in terms of disputes with South Korea, Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam. It is on this background that the Doklam logjam has to be analyzed.
China was repeatedly threatening military action as a possibility to end standoff between it and Indian troops. Wang Wenli, a Chinese diplomat had ever signaled that the time running out to peacefully resolve the crisis.2 Whereas, Bhutan’s ambassador to India Vetsop Namgyel states that Doklam is a disputed territory and Bhutan has an agreement with China that pending the final resolution of boundary issue, peace and tranquility should be maintained in the area. The National Security Advisors meeting it BRICs had also not resulted into any definite solution. Global Times was constantly threatening India of military action and reminding India of 1962 wars.
India considered these statements as Psywar, as preached by Sun Tzu China appeared to have taken its symbolic representation as a scary fire- breathing dragon a tad too seriously, full of the belief that the moment it arches its body upright and spews verbal tinder, its neighbors, including India will cower in fear and do its bidding
Though Global Times threatened to annihilate all Indian troops in borer regions,4 and warned India against publicity challenging a country, supposedly superior in strength. India did not budge, barely five years after 1962, Indian forces inflicted a crushing defeat to the Chinese army during a skirmish at Nathula & Chola over 400 Chinese soldier died, compared to 80-100 indians.5 1979 Sino – Vietnam war, was a complete debacle of Chinese army.6 in this war, over 23000 Chinese died and 43000 wounded compared to 10000 Vietnamese fatalities, Indian defense forces today seem equipped to guard her interests. It is essential that mutual co-operation is displayed. This is especially important as India has a terrain advantage in Doklam and Aug.14, 2017 two more Chinese incursions in Ladakh by Indian army
Theoretical construct:
Chicken Game:
Remember our 1950s youths racing their cars towards one another and seeing who will be the first to swerve to avoid a collision? Now we suppose the players have no choice in the matter” each is genetically hardwired to be either a Wimp (always swerve) or a Macho (always go straight). The population consists of a mixture of the two types. Pairs are picked at random every week to play the game. Figure below shows the payoff table for any two such players – say, A and B
To find the proportions of Wimps and Machos in such as ESS, let us calculate the fitness of each type in a general mixed population. Write x for the fraction of Machos and (1-x) for the proportion of Wimps. A Wimp meets another Wimp and get 0 for a fraction (1-x) of the time and meets a Macho and gets -1 for a fraction x of the time. Therefore the fitness of a Wimp is 0 x (1-x) – 1 X x = -x. Similarly, the fitness of a Macho is 1 X (1-x) – 2x = 1 – 3x. The Macho type is fitter if
1-3x>-x, 2x<1, X<1/2
If the population is less than half Macho, then the Machos will be fitter and their population will increase. On the other hand, if the population is more than half Macho, then the Wimps will be fitter and the Macho proportion will fall. Either way, the population proportion of Machos will tend towards ½, and this 50-50 mix will be the stable polymorphic ESS
The Hawk –Dove Game
The game is played not by birds of these two species, but by two animals of the same species, and Hawk and Dove are merely the names for their strategies. The context is competition for a resource. The Hawk strategy is aggressive and fights to try to get the whole resource of value V. The Dove strategy is to offer to share but to avoid fight. When two Hawk types meet each other, they fight. Each animal is equally likely (probability ½) to win and get V or to lose, be injured, and get –C. Thus the expected payoff for each is (V –C)/2. When two Dove types meet, the latter retreats and gets V/2. When a Hawk type meets a Dove type, the latter retreats and gets a 0, whereas the former gets V.
The analysis of the game is similar to that for the prisoners’ dilemma and chicken games, except that the numerical payoffs have been replace by algebraic symbols. We will compare the equilibria of this game when the players rationally choose to play Hawk or Dove and then compare the outcomes when players are acting mechanically and success is being rewarded with faster reproduction.
Rational Strategic Choice and Equilibrium
1. If V> C, then the game is a prisoners’ dilemma in which the Hawk strategy corresponds to “defect” and Dove corresponds to “cooperate.” Hawk is the dominant strategy for each, but (Dove, Dove) is the jointly better outcome
2. If V (smaller than)C, then it’s a game of chicken. Now (V-C)/2 (smaller than)0 and so Hawk is no longer a dominant strategy. Rather, there are two pure – strategy Nash equilibria : (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk). There is also a mixed – strategy equilibrium, where B’s probability p of choosing Hawk is such as to keep A indifferent:
p (V-C)/2 + (1-p)V = p X 0 + (1 – p) V/2, p = V/C.
Analysis:
China – a hawkish player would be better off maintaining this position as long as others play a Dove. But if other nation, say, India plays Hawk, both would be better off moving aside. Thus how India continues to remain firm, more and more hawkish players would emerge, till the time Dove strategy becomes evolutionarily stable strategy. But, as today there are far more Doves than Hawks, India should not move aside even in future logjams.
Countering opponents strategic moves:7
1. Irrationality: It could work in both the cases
2. Cutting off communication: If India cuts off communication; active or passive to threats given by say, Global Times, if would work.
3. Leaving escape routes open: in this case the threatening side can move aside.
4. Undermining the opponents motive to uphold his reputation
5. Salami tactics: Do not comply with other wishes to a small degree at a time
Conclusion:
Analyzing Doklam issue through Game Theoretic approach this is typically a Hawk – Dove game and being Hawkish is an evolutionarily stable strategy for India at this time. Along with this India could play other given moves to counter opponents’ strategy so as to ensure peace in the region
Key Words:
Doklam, India, China, Game theory, Chicken game, Hawk Dove game
Abstract:
Over the summer, the world held its breath for 10 weeks while the two most populous and butted heads over a planned Chinese road through disputed border region between China & Bhutan. Just as quickly the standoff began, however it ended with both sides pulling back early. September and yet around 1000 PLA soldiers still mean the disputed Himalaya border region. This paper analyses this issue using Game Theory and hints at India’s possible strategic option.
References:
1. Wang Dong, “there is a standoff between China and India in the Himalayas’ “, World Economic Forum, Aug.16, 2017
2. Aneja , Atul,’ To end Doklam standoff China hints at some Action’, The Hindu, August 17,2017
3. Gumaste, Vivek.’Why 2017 is not 1962,’ Rediff.com, August 8, 2017
4. Global Times, ‘Modi must not pull India into reckless conflict’. China, Aug. 4, 2017
5. Fravel, Taylor. ‘ Strong Borders, Secure Nations’, Princeton University Press, 2008
6. Nguyer Minh Quang, ‘The bitter legacy of 1979 war’, Feb.23, 2017
7. Dixit, Avinash, ‘Games of Strategy’, Viva Books, India, 2010
