Introduction

Poorly guarded and managed borders including coasts have serious implications for National Security. The serial blasts of March 1993 in Mumbai and multiple coordinated terrorist attacks of November 2008 in Mumbai happened because of poorly guarded maritime border. On both occasions, criminals and terrorists entered India through the sea (Das, 2014). Despite India’s coasts being vulnerable to sub-conventional threats and challenges, very little attention was paid for long time to secure them. While some steps were taken like initiation of Operations Swan to patrol the coasts off Mumbai in wake of March 1993 terrorist attacks, concerted measures to secure coasts had to unfortunately await the terrorist attack of 26th November 2008. It was only in last decade that coastal security emerged as an important element of national security

India has 7,516 kilometers long coastline which includes 5,422 kilometers of coastline in mainland and 2,094 kilometers of coastline bordering around 1382 islands. There are nine states viz. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and West Bengal and four Union Territories viz. Daman & Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry and Andaman & Nicobar Islands situated on the coasts. The peninsular coastline of India is shaped by Bay of Bengal in east, Indian Ocean in south and Arabian Sea in west. There are two island groups: Lakshadweep and Minicoy in Arabian Sea and Andaman & Nicobar in Bay of Bengal (Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2012).

Territorial integrity of India is intimately tied to concept of ‘boundaries’ or ‘borders’ and it is this territorial integrity that gives it its cartographic characteristics as a physically and politically recognisable nation state. Coastal security at its most fundamental level, seeks to provide for this territorial integrity in maritime domain. Coastal security has to deal with maritime borders. It is common error to assume that term maritime border denotes nothing more than simple correspondence with corresponding land borders (Chauhan, 2017).The ambit of coastal security extends from India’s promulgated baselines (which define outer limit of our internal waters) through Maritime Zones of India, and thence into the High Seas. Landwards of these baselines, full majesty of Indian law applies. Upon crossing land borders of India, applicability of Indian municipal laws abruptly ceases, and municipal laws of some other state begin to apply. To seaward of these baselines, however, one encounters not so abrupt cessation, but, rather, an internationally mandated gradual decrease in legal jurisdiction. In the Territorial Sea (with width of 12 nm from the baselines), the sole exception to full applicability of municipal law is right of innocent passage. In the Contiguous Zone (with a width of 24 nm from the baselines), the only laws that the State can apply are related to health, immigration and customs. In the Exclusive Economic Zone (with a width of 200 nm from the baselines) State jurisdiction is limited to sovereign rights to exploit living and nonliving resources. On the Continental Shelf (with a width that could, given certain conditions, extend up to 350 nm from the baselines) even sovereign rights of exploitation are limited to non-living resources alone. Consequently, legal aspects of the country’s internal security are far more nuanced seaward of the baselines than they are landward of them. This complex mix of national and international law and consequent inherent difficulties in segregating the two with the same degree of clarity as obtains on land, requires India’s coastal security to be handled by multiple agencies, but controlled and coordinated by a single one whose mandate extends uniformly from the Territorial seat of the High Seas. The government has correctly, vested overall responsibility for coastal security in Indian Navy, since India’s coastal security options, are complementary and not contrary to Indian Navy’s core military preparedness at sea (Chauhan, 2017).

India’s quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location are twin factors that have defined India’s growth as a nation and evolution as a cosmopolitan civilization. This seamless nature of maritime domain also enables a steady flow of threats and challenges. In recent years, rise in non-traditional threats, especially maritime terrorism has necessitated increased focus on coastal, maritime and offshore security. Even before the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack security vulnerabilities used to plague India from maritime space.India’s coasts have been always vulnerable to transgressions by terrorists, insurgents, smugglers and petty criminals. This vulnerability stems from number of reasons. India’s coastline is not only long but is also characterised by diverse range of topography such as creeks, small bays, back waters, rivulets, lagoons, estuaries, swamps, mudflats, as well as hills, rocky outcrops, sandbars, beaches and small islands. The waters bodies and river channels run deep inside the coasts, making the shoreline highly indented with numerous river channels and rivulets, as well as backwaters and bays. Due to their remoteness these coastal approaches to the mainland often remain unguarded, or poorly guarded, thereby providing ideal spots for the clandestine landings of arms, explosives and other contraband by smugglers as well as infiltration by terrorists (Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2012).

The creeks along coasts of Gujarat and West Bengal’s Sundarbans are most preferred routes for infiltration and smuggling. These creeks create a maze of channels, which weave in and out of international borders, many of which cannot be approached from Indian side. The dense mangroves provide refuge to infiltrators during low tide and numerous islands and sandbars which dot the entire coastline provide ideal hideaways for infiltrators and their contraband. Boats can easily land and disappear in stealth and avoid detection by taking advantage of topography. Such terrains make the border extremely porous to infiltration and smuggling (Das, 2009). There are 1,376 landing points along entire coast (Government of India, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture)

External challenges emanating from across the border such as infiltration, illegal migration, smuggling, terrorism etc. aggravate internal security problem. The erection of fencing along IndiaPakistan international border as well as Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir, is major factor that has forced Pakistan to modify its proxy-war strategy and start using sea as an alternative infiltration route across India’s west coast. The Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 when 10 terrorists from Pakistan sneaked into Mumbai through the sea by hijacking an Indian fishing trawler demonstrated that coastal borders are vulnerable to infiltration (Ministry of Home, 2008). In March 1993, few tones of arms and explosives, landed by Pakistani intelligence agencies on Ratnagiri coast, were transported by Indian underworld to perpetrate Mumbai carnage. Fifteen years later on 26th November 2008, Pakistanitrained terrorist group sailed by boat from Karachi and landed in heart of Mumbai to wreak havoc in Mumbai for three days. This terror attack clearly highlighted poor state of our intelligence, gaps in ocean surveillance and huge challenge of effectively policing and guarding long and vulnerable coastline (Arun Prakash, 2016).

Fishing remains primary source of livelihood for coastal population. India is 7th largest fishing nation in the world and Indian coasts accounts for approximately 4 million fishermen settled along the coast in 3288 marine fishing villages. Besides fishing, other major industrial activities such as shipbuilding, manufacturing, oil exploration and refining etc. are also concentrated in coastal areas. Indian coasts also house number of urban centres which are hub for industrial and economic activities. There are number of scientific research centres, nuclear power stations, defence installations, energy infrastructure, shipyards, refineries located in coastal regions which are vital for India. Indian coasts house 13 major ports and 147 intermediate / minor ports facilitating large scale sea trade which are cheapest means of transportation. About 90% of our foreign trade by volume and nearly 70% by value of external trade are through seas. However, existence of these high value assets has increased the vulnerability of India’s coasts to terrorist attacks (Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2012).

The seas around India are one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world and known for transportation of 75% of world’s maritime trade and half the world’s daily oil consumption. Under provisions of UNCLOS III (United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea), India has claim over huge adjacent sea space in multiple maritime zones with enforcement rights. It has sovereign jurisdiction over territorial waters that extends up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, criminal jurisdiction in matters like smuggling, immigration, pollution, etc. over contiguous zone which extends to 24 nautical miles from the coast and jurisdiction over vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for economic exploitation which extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coast and continental shelf beyond it.

The EEZ is spread over 3.1 million sq. km. which can be used for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing ocean resources like fishing, ocean mining, drilling for oil and gas etc. Thus vast coastal sea area is reservoir of natural resources like sea-food items and petroleum and natural gases. India has large number offshore infrastructure in coastal waters / EEZ. Such infrastructures include manned and unmanned platforms, oil wells, oil rigs, different types of support vessels. Such structures become attractive targets for terrorists. India’s development is closely linked to maritime environment and hence it is logical to ensure security and sea governance of coastal areas.

India’s coasts have been vulnerable to anti-national activities like smuggling of goods, gold, narcotics, explosives, arms and ammunition as well as infiltration of terrorists into India through these coasts. Government is implementing corrective measures from time to time (Das, 2013). Physical proximity of India’s coasts to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Gulf countries adds to its vulnerability. India has faced cross-border terrorism for long. With increased deployment of security forces and surveillance equipment, security along land borders has been sufficiently tightened. However, security over ocean domain with sea routes remain poorly guarded. The eastern Indian seaboard has been increasingly witnessing steady increase in illegal migration from Bangladesh. Various ‘push and pull’ factors such as poverty, demographic pressure, religious persecution in Bangladesh and promise of better opportunities in India have contributed to this migration. Earlier, almost all illegal migration from Bangladesh used to take place into Northeastern states of India through poorly guarded land border. With construction of fences along land border, sea routes are exploited to enter India.

Indian coasts are prosperous and support dense population residing in big and small towns and cities that dot the coastline. Access to sea through major and non-major ports has facilitated setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which have resulted in growth of number of industrial hubs. This process of industrialisation along the coast has been boosted by import of crude oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). In case of Gujarat, Gulfs of Kutch and Khambhat have emerged as major corridors for importing crude oil for India. This has opened up avenues for establishment of oil refineries and storage tanks by major oil companies, along Saurashtra coast in Vadinar, Salaya, Sikka and Jamnagar as well as LNG terminals in Hazira and Dahej. Similarly, import of LNG through various ports in west coast has led to planning and construction of number of terminals at Dabhol, Kochi, Ennore, Mangalore and Mundra. Single mooring points (SPM) or single buoy points (SBMs) have been constructed in seabed from where these oil refineries, storage tanks and LNG terminals receive oil and gas.

Discovery of oil and gas in the sea has also led to development of offshore oil and gas platforms in coastal waters of India. Along west coast, Mumbai offshore basin has largest oil and gas producing field which includes fields of Mumbai High, Heera, Neelam and Bassein. In eastern seaboard, huge offshore oil and gas reserves have been discovered in Cauvery and Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basins.Indian coasts also have strategic installations such as naval bases, power plants, satellite and missile ranges, ports. The eastern, western, southern and far eastern naval commands are located in Vishakhapatnam, Mumbai, Kochi, and Port Blair respectively. India’s largest naval base, with a capability of housing 30 warships, is at Karwar on Karnataka coast. Nuclear power plants at Tarapur, Kudankulam, Kalpakkam have been established close to the sea. Satellite launching and missile testing facilities such as Satish Dhawan Space Centre and Wheeler Islands missile facility are located along the coast. India has 13 major ports such as Kandla, Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Mangalore, Haldia, which handle 90 per cent of India’s maritime trade. These strategic installations are high-value targets for terrorists.

Disputed Maritime Boundary

Unsettled maritime boundaries pose serious security challenges and also hinder offshore development. India’s maritime boundaries with Pakistan and Bangladesh are not delineated because of overlapping claims. Settlement of maritime boundary with Pakistan hinges upon settlement of riverine border along the Sir Creek. The dispute regarding delineation of border in the Sir Creek dates back to 1908. The dispute was resolved in years 1914 and 1924 but was resurrected in 1965 when Pakistan claimed half of Rann of Kutch. The dispute was referred to international tribunal for arbitration. The tribunal pronounced its judgment in 1968, upholding 90 per cent of India’s claim in Rann of Kutch. The tribunal did not take into consideration issue of delimitation of boundary along Sir Creek as it deemed the issue as already resolved (Noorani, 1994)

Sir Creek is a 96 kilometre long estuary which is located in Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan. India asserts that boundary in Sir Creek should be defined according to ‘thalweg principle’, i.e. boundary line lies in middle of the channel. Pakistan contests this and argues that Sir Creek is not a navigable channel and, therefore, principle of mid-channel does not apply. It claims that boundary lies on eastern bank of the channel, which makes Sir Creek part of Pakistan. It also insists that boundary along Sir Creek has to be delineated first in order to delimit maritime boundary between two countries (Roychoudhury, 1999). India however maintains that maritime boundary should be determined first, which can be done ‘by beginning with mutually acceptable points from shore line of India and Pakistan, 250 kilometre out to sea, and working inwards to plot the boundary’ (Joshi, 2012).

With Bangladesh, dispute is over the principle on which maritime boundary between two countries should be delineated. India insists on ‘equidistant / ‘median-line’ principle i.e. ‘low water’ sea baseline; Bangladesh prefers ‘equitable’ principle i.e. ‘straight baseline’ based on 10-fathom depth criteria to offset concavity of its coastline.

The idea of Integrated Coastal and Maritime Security

Paleri (2023) states that coastal security is a term of convenience in strategic national security governance linked with maritime security. The perception is outward into the sea. The impact is vectored into hinterland from the ocean. Understanding specificity of two terms beyond general appreciation is, therefore, vital, for governments and their forces and agencies. Coast is part of land terrain whereas term maritime refers to ocean. It is for government of a nation to make decisions on governing the coast and ocean it has under this statis and more. Coast is applicable to only coastlands (Paleri, 2014) and islands indirectly. A landlocked nation may not have to study about coastal aspects related to ocean even though it is a maritime nation as laws related to ocean is applicable to them. It has to be concerned about oceans as a global commons and legal aspects associated with its usage under ocean property regime applicable to it (Paleri, 2002).

Maritime borders are complex. First, it is not linear like land border. It is more an area than a line. That is one of the reasons why the semantics involved in marine border confusingly rests on the term coastal security. Coastal security is a misnomer in national security decision-making. It is more a media term of usage convenience rather than a decision problem that is diagnostic compatible (Paleri 2014). Coastline is internal to the nation. The sovereign rights of the nation extend beyond the coast. There are more on coast in terms of coastal administration. One of them is interfacial marine environment at the land ocean interface (Paleri, 2009). Coastline is fractal. It changes shape and dimensions constantly, every minute. It is further aggravated by the sea-level rise and reclamation anywhere in the ocean (Paleri, 2009). International law advocates baseline establishment according to tide levels and other parameters to standardise area measurements internal towards land and external towards sea in interfacial administration (Paleri, 2022). The coast is also four dimensional with sea, land, air and outer space for integration in ocean governance. It is highly dynamic but is not border of geo-entity. It lies deep inside territory of a coastland or island nation. That is key factor why it is not the border. That makes the sea coast not a border under maritime law. Managing coastal interface and territorial sea of India is within purview of nine coastal states and four union territories (UT). Two of UTs are island territories

India’s Maritime Borders

India shares maritime borders with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In addition, India shares the legal continental shelf (LCS) maritime border with Sultanate of Oman (Paleri, 2022). India is a coastland with many islands close to the mainland as well as in the ocean (Paleri, 2014). India has vast territorial sea area. Virtually, the maritime border, therefore, should be perimeters of territorial sea that extends seawards from baselines on mainlands as well as islands. For administrative convenience and also for explanation, maritime border becomes an area unlike a line over land, in maritime border security decision problems. It is a choice for the government based on its policy of governance by national security. India’s relation with the ocean thereby becomes important. India has heavy responsibilities in the ocean by its geo-location and being a leading and responsible geo-entity

Maximisation of Ocean Property

Maritime security aspects of national security can be done by concept of maximization of ocean property. Ocean property regime facilitates modeling security across the maritime terrain (Paleri, 2002). Ocean property is all encompassing expression of ocean wealth and utility value as a geo-property of the nation, which comprises of four elements (Paleri, 2022):

1. Ocean resources: Ocean resources include living and non-living resources.

2. Ocean islands: They are islands that a nation has in the ocean whether near or offshore.

3. Ocean advantage: Ocean advantage is utility value of ocean e.g. transportation, trade, industry, energy, depth, military use, geo-location, logistics movement etc.

4. Ocean environment: Ocean environment includes interfacial environment, coastal zones, marine environment external to interfacial environment, climate etc.

The idea of ocean property advocates marine security in more objective and convenient manner for modeling maritime security strategy. The challenge is to maximise ocean property that a nation owns by carefully mapping and scientifically modeling the strategy for governing them to best advantage (Paleri, 2022).

Unlawful dimension of maritime security and rule of law

The concept of coastal security originated in context of rule of law in suppression of unlawful activities at and from the sea. Establishing rule of law is task of government, expected to be done as part of governance to ensure safety and security of people by making law under due process and enforcing it in maritime terrain. It is about unlawful dimension of maritime security. Various unlawful activities take place at and from the sea. Suppression of these acts needs law enforcement using forces. The unlawful acts includes crimes at sea on-board vessels and platforms, maritime piracy, armed robbery, smuggling, trafficking, IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing, maritime environmental violations, terrorism, intelligence activities etc. Enforcement of law to suppress such unlawful activities is not only task of target or victim nations but also advancing global community collectively exercising domestic and international law as ocean is for all barring exceptions (Paleri, 2022).

India was distressed and seriously concerned when terrorists were transported by sea from across the Indo-Pak disputed border to Mumbai clandestinely that resulted in terrorist attack on people and properties on 26th November 2008. The 12 serial bombings in Mumbai in 1993 were also linked to coastal waters with internal help. The terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008 were much more elevated and real time guided. The issue here is to prevent or preempt such activities in future. In both the cases, lawful activities and their covert supporters including handlers used ocean as medium of transportation under ocean advantage from port of origin to destination. It was a direct, covert and external (DCE) threat to sovereignty of India. Minimising such advantage is task of government under rule of law (Paleri, 2022).

Coastal Security System (CCS)

Since Mumbai terror outrage, many measures are implemented to rectify lacunae in our coastal security (Arun Prakash, 2016). Accordingly, coastal and offshore security apparatus has evolved as per changes in nature and type of threats with increased involvement of Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard in support of State Police and security agencies. Changes in Coast Guard Act, 1978 have been made to give more teeth to the Coast Guard.The Indian Navy has been designated as ‘the authority responsible for overall maritime security’, which includes coastal security and offshore security. Indian Navy is assisted by Indian Coast Guard, Coastal Police and other Central and State agencies. The existing commanders-in-chief of Eastern and Western Naval Commands have been designated as ‘C-in-C Coastal Defence’. At same time, Coast Guard has been designated as ‘authority for coastal security’ in territorial waters, and Director-General, Indian Coast Guard has been designated as ‘Commander Coastal Command’. The State governments have been tasked with raising Marine Police forces for security of coastal belt. Indian Coast Guard is additionally responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal police (Arun Prakash, 2016).

The coastal security paradigm is extremely complex and involves not only Centre-State relationships but also cuts across many agencies and organisations. There is multi-tier arrangement for protection and maritime security of India involving Indian Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police of coastal States and Union Territories. The surveillance on high seas is carried out along limits of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by Navy and Coast Guard. In territorial waters, Coast Guards protect Indian interests with vessels and through aerial surveillance. Coastal patrolling close to shallow waters is done by State Marine Police. The State’s jurisdiction extends up to 12 nautical miles in shallow territorial waters.

For securing coasts, multi-layered arrangement of sea-patrols and surveillance has been put in place. In first layer, i.e. from coast till 5 nautical miles, marine police patrol the sea. In intermediate layer, i.e. between 5 nautical miles and 200 nautical miles, coast guard is deployed. Beyond that, it is responsibility of Indian Navy. Apart from these security agencies, customs department also patrols the sea till 24 nautical miles (Das, 2014).

A variety of electronic equipments have been deployed for surveillance and detection for coastal security purposes. All fishing trawlers and other vessels are required to be fitted with navigational and communication equipment (for vessels above 20 meters AIS transponder B) to enable easy identification and tracking (Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2012). All major ports are being made International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code compliant with Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) and Ship Security Alert Systems being installed (Das, 2014). Bio-metric identity cards are being issued to all fishermen for their identification by security forces at sea (Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2012).

Coastal Security – Overview

Department of Border Management, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is implementing Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) in phases with objective of strengthening infrastructure of Coastal Police Force for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas.

Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I

Keeping in view the vulnerability of coasts to activities of criminals and anti-national elements, Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I was formulated, which was approved in January 2005 for implementation in 5 years from 2005-06 with an outlay of Rs.646 crores over period of 6 years. The Scheme was extended for one year till March 2011. Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I stands completed on March 2011 (Annual Report, 2012-13:40). Coastal States/ UTs were provided with 73 Coastal Police Stations, 97 Check posts, 58 Outposts and 30 Barracks equipped with 204 boats, 153 Four-wheelers, 312 Motorcycles and 10 Rubber Inflatable Boats. 204 boats have been procured centrally by Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Construction work of Coastal Police Stations, barracks, check posts, outposts and procurement of vehicles has been done by Coastal States/ UTs (Lok Sabha Starred Question no.344, dated 18.12.2012).

Coastal Security Scheme Phase-II

Subsequent to Mumbai incident on 26/11, coastal security has been thoroughly reviewed by Government of India. The coastal States/ UTs were asked to carry out vulnerability / gap analysis in consultation with Coast Guard to firm up their additional requirements for formulation of Phase-II Scheme of Coastal Security. After getting detailed proposals from coastal States/UTs, Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-II) has been approved. The CSS (Phase-II) has been formulated to carry forward objectives specified in phase-I of Coastal Security Scheme, by way of providing additional infrastructural support to coastal states/UTs for marine patrolling and with a view to supplement other coastal security initiatives being effected by Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard. The Coastal Security Scheme (PhaseII) has been approved for implementation w.e.f. from 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2016 with an outlay of Rs. 1579.91 crore which has been further granted extension up to 31.03.2020. Under Phase-II of the Coastal Security Scheme, coastal states/UTs have been sanctioned with 131 CPS, 60 jetties, 10 Marine Operational Centres, 225 boats, 131 four-wheelers and 242 motorcycles.

Comments on 26/11 attack

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament said that the 26/11 attack in Mumbai could have been avoided but for the irresponsible attitude of those at helm of affairs for securing India’s maritime interest and security. In its 21st report on Indian Coast Guard’s role and functioning, PAC said that had Operation Swan been conducted in right earnest and intense patrolling continued, incident like 26/11 could have not happened. The Report said that Indian Coast Guard was kept out of inner layer operations in Maharashtra till December 2010.

The Parliamentary Panel was critical that coastal patrolling by Indian Navy was discontinued by Maharashtra in September 2005 on basis of MHA decision to establish state coastal stations, though police stations were not ready in Maharashtra and Gujarat. The coastal patrolling was left to state marine police who had meagre operational assets. A parliamentary panel noted that there was gap in surveillance capability of both Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard due to lack of aerial platforms and vital surveillance equipment, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, long range surveillance aircraft and medium range maritime Dornier Aircrafts.

Constituted by Government of Maharashtra, the Ram Pradhan Committee Report on 26/11 called Coastal Security, a total failure. It stated that progress on most aspects of coastal security was little or negligible. Lack of ‘actionable intelligence’ is one factor that led to breach of India’s coastal security in November 2008. The mechanism suffers from various inadequacies and deficiencies, and systemic flaws.

Initiatives after 26/11 Mumbai Incident

Since November 2008, several initiatives have been taken by Government to strengthen security of coastal areas against threat of non-state actors from the sea by restructuring coastal security and pushing defensive perimeter further away from the coast into the seas.

The focus was on building National maritime domain awareness (NMDA) grid via number of organisational, operational and technological changes.

• The Indian Navy has been designated as authority responsible for overall maritime security which includes coastal security and offshore security. Indian Coast Guard has been additionally designated as authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police.

• Training to Policemen deployed in coastal police stations is imparted by Indian Coast Guard. The Government of India has decided to set up Marine Police Training Institute (MPTI), one each on East Coast and West Coast to train marine police personnel.

• Monitoring and assessment of coastal security system is an ongoing process. National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), under Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary monitors progress in respect of coastal security initiatives. In addition, coastal security exercises are followed by conduct of debriefing and sharing of lessons learnt between all stakeholders along with interactions with fishermen and State agencies through coastal security awareness programs. The coastal security exercises and review are an ongoing process which ensure interoperation and seamless coastal security (Lok Sabha Unstarred Question no.3849 dated 17.12.2012).

• Ministry of Shipping has been mandated to streamline process of compulsory registration and identification of all types of vessels.

• Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries has been mandated to issue biometric ID cards to all fishermen.

• Joint Operations Centres (JOC): Indian Navy has established four Joint Operations Centres (JOC) at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair. As a result of this, there is good coordination, synergy and understanding between all agencies. All coastal security operations are now coordinated from the Joint Operations Centre, which are manned round the clock by Naval and Coast Guard teams. In addition, the State Marine Police and other agencies such as Customs, Intelligence Bureau and Ports etc. are also networked with these centres.

• Sagar Prahari Bal with a special force comprising of 1000 specialised personnel and 80 Fast Interceptor Crafts for force security protecting of naval bases has been raised (Lok Sabha Question no.344, dated 18.12.2012).

• Community Interaction Programmes (CIP): CIPs are conducted by ICG with three-fold objectives: train fishermen to be ‘Eyes and Ears’ in intelligence collection, raise awareness among fishermen about safety hazards of sea and sensitise fishing community about current security situation.

• Fishermen Biometric ID Cards: Department of Animal Husbandry Dairying & Fisheries (DAHD&F) issues Fisherman Biometric ID Cards to fishermen. 99 % of total identified eligible fishermen (1974098 out of 1990521) received biometric ID cards as per DAHD&F.

Tracking of vessels / boats: All vessels over 20 m long are required by law to be equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment.

• In accordance with guidelines of National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Committee (NCSMCS), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has been requested to supply 500 responders each to coastal states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. ISRO is in process of delivering and integrating 500 transponders each to states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu.

• Coastal Mapping: Coastal Mapping is important step in strengthening coastal security. It is way of mapping information such as coastal police stations, local police stations, intelligence centres, fisheries, fishing communities, harbours, custom check posts, hospitals, train stations, bus stations, bomb disposal services etc.The coastal mapping process is almost finalised in states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, West Bengal and in UTs namely Dadra Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu, Puducherry along with Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

• National Academy of Coastal Policing: Approval of setting up National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) in Mojap village, District Devbhoomi, Dwarka in Gujarat is granted by Indian government and for these 100 hectares have been identified by MHA.

• Vessel Traffic Management System: Installation of Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) in all important Ports and Channels to ensure safety and security of Ports/ harbours and shipping in the channels. Vessel Air Traffic Management System (VATMS) has been installed in Offshore Development Areas for enhancing surveillance of offshore installations.

• Establishment of National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network (NC3I) at Gurgaon as a part of an effort to enhance maritime domain awareness is an over-arching coastal security network capable of collating data about ships, dhows, fishing boats, and all other vessels operating near the coast. NC31 to share intelligence between navy, marine police and ICG.

• Deployment of ships and aircrafts for surveillance on daily basis to ensure maritime law enforcement, coastal security, pollution response, search & rescue and other charted / mandated duties towards public function.

• Coordination with major and non-major ports by ships on patrol and surveillance through Coastal Security.

• Promulgation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Coastal Security in all coastal states/UTs by ICG for coordination between all stakeholders.

• Deployment of Pollution Response Vessels and teams for oil spill response to protect marine ecosystem.

• Coastal monitoring and surveillance is being carried out on real time basis by Indian Coast Guard around India’s coastline Chain of Static Sensors (CSS) consisting of 46 radar stations which have been established under Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN)

• Coastal Surveillance System through Chain of Coastal High-Definition Surface Warning Radars is one of the means through which Coastal Security is being implemented.

Coastal Security post Mumbai Attack

Singh (2018) analyses coastal security post Mumbai attack and states that after attacks on Mumbai, government made concerted efforts to improve coastal security infrastructure and law enforcement. In radical overhaul of coastal security apparatus, three-tier security grid was installed with Indian Navy, Coast Guard and marine police jointly patrolling India’s near seas. An existing Coastal Security Scheme, originally instituted in 2005 was accelerated, with greater fund allocations for coastal infrastructure, including police stations and radar stations along India’s coastline. This included measures to improve surveillance and domain awareness through installation of radar stations and identification systems and enhancement of coordination through Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) (Singh, 2018).

Today, coastal preparedness is better than earlier, but overall picture is less than satisfactory. While state of inter-agency coordination has improved, state governments continue to be indifferent to needs of coastal security and state-police are still reluctant to shoulder responsibility (India Today, 2017).

There are systemic flaws in police apparatus, from low numbers of marine police stations to underutilisation of patrol boats for patrol tasks, absence of shore-based infrastructure, manpower shortages, unspent funds (Report of CAG of India, Government of Odhisha, 2015; Indian Express, 2015).

The proposal to set up Apex Coastal Authority remains frozen. India’s policymakers recognise need for full-time manager to coordinate large number of agencies in coastal security space. National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security, which presently coordinates joint activities is an ad-hoc arrangement (Takshashila Blue Papers, 2016). Parliament has still not passed bill on Coastal Security that would establish a National Maritime Authority (Ray, 2015).

There has been surge of illicit activity in littorals. Narcotics trafficking incidents have witnessed increase, most prominent incident was seizure of M.V. Henry in August 2017 (Singh, 2017). Besides using porous coastline for narcotics smuggling, drug traffickers are turning old harbours into hub of contraband (Times of India, 2016).

The government has responded by enhancing coastal security allocations to states and by seeking to extend jurisdiction of coastal police stations to 200 nautical miles (Yadav, 2018).

Indian security agencies have tended to focus on terrorism threat, placing less emphasis on nontraditional challenges like human trafficking, climate-induced threats and maritime pollution. Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard have developed significant capability to deal with irregular challenges and multiagency exercises like Sagar Kavach have helped improve coordination (Yadav, 2018).

The Coast Guard has developed strength in recent years and has come up with plan to become 150 ship and 100 aircraft force by 2023. Critical gaps persist at Indian ports, where authorities have yet to install fool-proof security measures. According to Intelligence Bureau audit in 2016, out of 227 minor ports in India, 187 had little or no security at all (Das, 2017).

The security of oil infrastructure poses peculiar problem. While most of India’s crude oil imports are through certain identified ports and Single Point Moorings (SPMs), there is no integrated strategy for their protection. Chapter III of Coast Guard Act 1978 places responsibility for protection of artificial islands and offshore terminals within Indian Coast Guard’s functional ambit (Anandan, 2015). But Indian Coast Guard’s officers say that task of protecting SPMs is 15 nautical miles from shoreline must be performed by CISF. CISF claims that they lack required assets and trained personnel to discharge the function (Indian Coast Guard Act, 1978).

A proposal for Central Maritime Border Police Force, proposed by Maharashtra is still under consideration. The Central Government wants new agency to be modeled after Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) – raised, funded and administered from New Delhi. But many experts believe that the plan is unviable. With no authority to register offences or carry out investigations, new agency would not be effective (Das, 2016).

Even as Indian agencies grapple with security threats in near seas, it would be fair to say that security agencies and security planners have better sense than earlier of complexities involved in coastal security. Indian agencies have begun active collaboration in near-littorals and are seeking to align visions and pursue operations with unity of purpose (Singh, 2018)

Limitations of Coastal Security Measures

Coastal Security measures implemented post 26/11 has enhanced surveillance and patrolling of coastal areas. There are challenges such as:

• Detection of small boats which are used by non-state actors for their operations remains a daunting task especially in dark and bad weather conditions.

• Physical Guarding of Coast is not feasible by positioning security men all along the coast and at sea like typically undertaken on land by police to nab criminal or terrorist.

• Identification at sea is a challenge as coastal waters are highly crowded. Identification of target boat among large number of boats and dense shipping traffic is very difficult. Identification of persons manning boats is difficult in absence of suitable identity cards.

• Identification problem is not only for small boats but also includes identification of thousands of containers and cargo vessels that call at Ports or pass close to coasts, to prevent smuggling of arms, ammunition and explosives.

• Availability of information with help of surveillance technologies in itself is of no great use, unless information is analysed, actionable information is generated and used appropriately.

• Major ports are generally secured. It is other dense traffic areas which have not got attention from coastal security planners and are likely to be exploited by terrorists.

• Integration of Maritime Stakeholders continues to remain a key concern. There is requirement of sharing information among all agencies for coordinated action against the common threat.

Recommendations

While number of steps are taken to overcome above limitations, it is imperative that innovative use of advanced technology be resorted to aid detection and identification of targets, integration of all stakeholders, generation of actionable information and directing security forces to neutralise the threat. Towards this following step are recommended: -

• Aadhar card as identity document: Aadhar should be used as document for proving identity of fishermen at sea

• Regulation of fishing: Fisheries often cite inadequate staff and infrastructure to regulate fishing activities. Using modern data handling devices which provide instant information on fishing boats, their whereabouts and such other information needs to be explored.

• Port and container terminal security: This can be enhanced by making use of high-speed X-ray machine, CCTV surveillance, VTMS, biometrics; etc.

• Nanosatellites Tracking of ships (NTS): NTS could be considered successfully in tracking of ships/ fishing crafts using space-based AIS technology.

• Stronger Coastal Police: Instead of setting up coastal border security force with no legal powers, authorities must better integrate coastal police into littoral security architecture.

• Data Bank of Vessels: Creation of data bank of all types of vessels plying in Indian waters will enable quick processing, assimilation and retrieval of data for optimising operational efficiency.

• Modernisation and Augmentation needed: Steadily augmenting force levels for effective surveillance and optimum coverage. Multi-mission maritime aircraft, twin-engine helicopters, state-ofart surface platforms with modern sensors, combination of high endurance and high-speed surface platforms for sustained deployment and rapid response, Force Multipliers Interceptor boats as quick reaction assets, Hovercrafts for shallow water operations are required. Deployment of Unmanned platforms, aerial vehicles are needed which will provide for quick launch and effective surveillance for prolonged periods.

• Surveillance and Interagency Coordination: For better domain awareness, India needs better surveillance coverage. Beyond expediting installation of coastal radar chains and AIS stations and ensuring broad access to information, authorities must ensure mandatory fitment of AIS on power-driven vessels with length more than 10m. The government must address problems of coordination arising out of multiple agencies.

• Legislative Framework: Comprehensive legislations must be enacted to place systems and processes for protection of India’s maritime infrastructure, covering both shipping and port sectors. Port trusts, state maritime boards, non-major ports, private terminal operators and other stakeholders need to be clearly outlined and minimum standards of port security requiring statutory compliance stipulated.

• Strengthening of Coast Guard: Coast Guard must be strengthened to play leadership role in coastal security. Ambiguities from Coast Guard Act need to be removed to ensure security agencies are clear about roles and responsibilities they are expected to perform.

• BSF Water Wing: Existing water wing of Border Security Force (BSF) needs to be strengthened for effective patrolling in areas of Gujarat and West Bengal.

• National Commercial Maritime Security Policy: The government must promulgate National Maritime Security Policy document to articulate its strategic vision for maritime security. It must also promulgate National Strategy for Commercial Maritime Security for effective, efficient and coordinated action for protection of port and shipping infrastructure. The suggested architecture must include all agencies such as Ministry of Shipping, Director General Shipping, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Fisheries, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, State Police, Port Authorities and civilian agencies.

• Installation of Vessel Management System: This is required for monitoring and controlling ship movement entering or leaving ports and channels in all ports.

• India’s Ocean Property Mapping: This should be mapped and periodically refreshed for maximising results in maritime security integration. Island security is critical factor for ocean property governance for India at present considering how international crime syndicates are using them for committing crimes (Paleri, 2022).

• Comprehensive National Coastal Security Policy: There is need to evolve India’s Coastal Security Doctrine involving all stakeholders, which will bring out comprehensively their roles and tasks.

• Threat Perception Analysis: There is need to analyse threat perception in relation to its occurrence in near, middle and long term so that force structuring and security preparedness can be planned accordingly.

• Threat Response Plan: There must be threat response plan ready for handling threat proactively by pre-emption and prevention.

• National Strategy for Coastal Security: All coastal security initiatives should be brought together in a comprehensive document. The strategy should be to prevent terrorist attacks, criminal and hostile acts, protect coastal related population centres and critical infrastructure, minimise damage and expedite recovery and safeguard ocean and its resources (Mahajan, 2017)

• Develop AIS type which can be fitted on smaller craft which operate in Indian coastal waters to aid detection and identification. Fitment of AIS is mandated only for vessels greater than 300 Tonnage.

• Distress Alert Transmitter (DAT) is provided by Coast Guard to transmit emergency condition and position location to central hub station via UHF transponder of INSAT for rescue operation. This technology could be used to indicate threat observed by fishermen while at sea.

Although Indian security forces had responded swiftly to '26/11 Mumbai attack', it exposed three significant cracks in India's maritime security calculus, porous nature of India's coastline; inadequate surveillance of maritime domain; and lack of inter-agency coordination. Post 26/11 attacks, Indian government specially, Indian Navy undertook number of proactive measures to restructure coastal security and push the defensive perimeter further away from the coast into the seas. One of most significant achievements has been integration of all maritime stakeholders, including several State and Central agencies into new coastal security mechanism. Indian Navy has established four Joint Operations Centers (JOC) at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair. As a result, there is good coordination, synergy and understanding between all agencies. Navy, Coast Guard and State Police teams have visited coastal villages and fishermen have been made aware of possible threats from the sea and their important role towards strengthening coastal security. This has paid rich dividends in last few years as there have been many incidents, reported by them, leading to successful interceptions. In order to periodically review readiness of security agencies and state administrations in thwarting threats from inimical elements, Indian Navy has taken lead in conducting coastal security exercises in every coastal state and Island territories in conjunction with Coast Guard, Marine Police, Customs, and Immigration and Port Authorities etc. As a result of these exercises and drills, there has been significant improvement in coordination between all agencies. Indian Navy has now set up National Command Control Communication Intelligence (NC3I) network that hosts Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC). The focus was on building national maritime domain awareness (NMDA) grid via number of organisational, operational and technological changes. The network connects 51 radar stations (20 Indian Navy and 31 Coast Guard) located along coast and island territories, and helps collate, fuse and disseminate critical intelligence and information about 'unusual or suspicious movements and activities at sea'. The Indian government has drawn plans to reinforce NMDA via multilateral cooperation. It is in talks with around 24 countries for exchanging information on shipping to ensure that seas are safe and secure for global commerce. India has placed maritime security high on agenda through active participation in Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus.

A nation with India's maritime assets, challenges and opportunities urgently needs multidisciplinary maritime advisory body to conceptualise a vision, draw up plans and monitor activities in maritime domain. The first task of such a body should be to craft an overarching Maritime Security Policy and thereafter to undertake its integration with India's Maritime Strategy. Only such a synergy can ensure that India draws maximum advantage from maritime sector – to benefit our economy and also to reinforce maritime security.

Conclusion

Review of coastal security apparatus in India is a continuous process. In ocean terrain, and associated maritime security governance, coastal security has to be appreciated as an integral part of national security governance and not standalone concept. The maritime border is an area concept, permanent as well as varying at sea with due consideration under domestic and international laws. A three-tier coastal security ring all along our coast is provided by Marine Police, Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy. Government has initiated several measures to strengthen Coastal Security, which include improving surveillance mechanism and enhanced patrolling by following an integrated approach. Joint operational exercises are conducted on regular basis among Navy, Coast Guard, Coastal Police, Customs and others for security of coastal areas including island territories. Intelligence mechanism has also been streamlined through creation of Joint Operation Centers and multi-agency coordination mechanism. Coast Guard Stations along the coastline are set up considering threat perception, vulnerability analysis and presence of other stations in the vicinity. Coastal challenge is prevention of access to hinterland to all anti-nationals and nefarious elements.

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