Abstract:
The Indo-American strategic partnership, once labeled as the breakthrough relationship of the 21st century, faces new trajectories in 2025, particularly after the United States imposed tariffs on Indian exports and witnessed Prime Minister Modi's political exchanges with Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping. This analysis will reflect on the state of defence agreements and national security partnerships between India and the United States amid the growing geopolitical tensions; and if the institutional mechanisms will withstand the impact of economic coercion and changing diplomatic dispositions. It also provides pragmatic policy recommendations for government on how to maintain vital security cooperation while recognizing legitimate national interests.
Introduction
The path of defence cooperation between India-United States has significantly changed through the post-Cold War era, shifting from mutual suspicion to common strategic partner. The bilateral partnership has experienced many bumps along the way, nuclear tests and differences in regard to fighting global conflicts, yet it has been a story of resilience rooted in shared strategic interests of regional importance, especially as it relates to China's growing power in the Indo-Pacific region.1 However, August 2025 could be the greatest stress test of this strategic partnership since it was created.
The imposition of cumulative 50% tariffs on a large portion of Indian exports, with India still buying discounted Russian oil and Prime Minister Modi hosting high profile meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, has created a level of tension in bilateral relations that has simply not been witnessed before.2 All these developments raise very serious issues about the survivability of defence agreements and national security partnership that have taken many years to develop.
This article reviews what has occurred in defence agreements in this uncertain geopolitical context, looking closely at the institutional resilience of the agreements and the political stresses that threaten to undermine it. The article also offers practical policy recommendations for both governments to use to try to work through this difficult period without endangering essential security cooperation that would jeopardize the wider Indo-Pacific stability.
1. The Architecture of Indo-U.S. Defence Cooperation: Institutional Foundations Under Stress The Evolution of Defence Agreements
The modern framework of defence cooperation between India and the U.S. is based on a number of foundational agreements that redefined what it means to operationally cooperate. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, and as of 2020, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) are now the institutional framework of defence cooperation.
These agreements provide unprecedented levels of interoperability, from co-owned and secure communications systems; to the near real-time sharing of intelligence and logistics support during joint operations. The U.S. designation of India as a "Major Defense Partner" in 2016 further institutionalized the transfer of technology mechanisms and at the same time simplified export controls of defence specific items
Current Defence Industrial Collaboration
The iCET, or Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, which began in 2023, represents the most comprehensive attempt at defence industrial cooperation between the two countries. Consequently, an entire set of joint development projects covering fighter jet engines, land systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and advanced materials have progressed from mere ideas to opportunities for collaboration between government agencies and private sector partners.
The defence trade relationship has undergone a similar evolution, moving beyond a simple buyerseller environment to a focus on co-development and co-production. Key platforms such as the P8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, and MH-60R maritime helicopters, embody not just transactions of procurement, but also complete logistics and maintenance ecosystems that create institutional dependencies.
The Stress Test of August 2025
The imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian exports represents not only an economic shock but also a principled challenge to the compartmentalization principle on which it has relied to support the relationship. Historically, India and the United States have successfully compartmentalized trade disputes from security cooperation, continuing effective defence cooperation, defence trade, and defence investments, even when their economic relationship has been less stable.7 Yet, the scale and expressly punitive nature of the tariffs reflects a fundamentally new challenge, as they are transparently connected to India’s choices in sourcing energy supplies, making it a qualitatively different challenge.
The tariffs target labour intensive manufacturing sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, leather goods, etc., as well as some agricultural products, which collectively employ millions of Indian workers and represent significant foreign exchange earnings.8 The economic impacts will not only include immediate losses from exports but also create a more systemic question about the reliability of the American market for Indian businesses, and the willingness of U.S. policymakers to weaponize trade relations through tariffs and trade restrictions.
2. Geopolitical Signaling and Strategic Realignment Concerns: The Modi-Putin-Xi Trilateral Dynamic
Prime Minister Modi's consecutive meetings with Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit have both profound symbolic and substantive significance. India has consistently stated that its foreign policy is a function of national interest, not alignment pressures, but the optics of these engagements offer clear signals regarding India’s strategic choices.
he meeting with President Putin reasserts India's commitment to its historic partnership with Russia especially in defence and energy sectors. Despite pressure from the West, India has maintained the premise that energy security is a legitimate national interest and that buying discounted oil from Russia serves both economic and strategic interests.10 While the engagement with President Xi Jinping is less substantive given the ongoing tensions at the border, it reflects India's willingness to engage with all major powers irrespective of American preferences
Strategic Autonomy versus Alliance Pressures
The concept of strategic autonomy that got articulated over the decades by the various governments after independence affirms India's ability to take foreign policy positions according to its national interest, and not according to the dictates of bloc politics.11 In practical terms, strategic autonomy has allowed India to maintain relationship across a variety of partnerships, from the Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia) to BRICS (with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa) to the SCO (with Russia and China).
This prevailing crisis seeks to determine whether this approach of multialignment will remain sustainable with increased American pressure. Specifically, by linking trade sanctions and India's approach to energy procurement, this represents an attempt to push India to choose between economic integration with the US, or to exercise its strategic autonomy with other great power relationships.
3. The China Factor: Enduring Strategic Logic Amid Political Friction Shared Threat Perceptions
The basic strategic rationale for India-U.S. defence cooperation has not changed despite the current animus. The strong conduct of China in the South China Sea, the increased assertiveness in its military modernization programme, and its unreconciled boundary disputes with India provide their own set of worries that are unaffected by the India-U.S. bilateral trade disputes.
The growth of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) presence in the Indian Ocean region, the military bases now set up in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Pakistan, and its only limited but evolving naval capacity for anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) already threaten Indian and U.S. strategic interests.14 Given these structural realities, the case for defence cooperation remains strong, even in the face of political disputes.
The Quad Framework Under Pressure
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has become the main multilateral vehicle for India-U.S. cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the tensions that currently engulf the Quad generate considerable strain on this framework, as Australia and Japan find themselves caught between their alliance commitments to the United States and their important economic and strategic ties to India.
The Quad was intended to be more focused on non-military cooperation (infrastructure development, vaccine distribution, climate initiatives, and maritime domain awareness) partly in response to India's comfort level with security cooperation. Nevertheless, ongoing bilateral tensions between India and the United States will always impact the coherence and effectiveness of multilateral frameworks
4. Economic Coercion and Security Cooperation: The Limits of Compartmentalization: Historical Precedents and Compartmentalization
Traditionally, the India-U.S. relationship has demonstrated remarkable resilience in separating economic issues from security collaboration. In the 1990s and 2000s, while concerns over intellectual property, services, and access to agriculture sparked significant trade friction, we nonetheless strengthened our defence ties.17 Both the stated tariffs on trade and the more explicit political messaging constitute a qualitative change in the relationship, in both size and scope.
The 50% tariff represents the most significant trade measure taken by the United States against India in the post-Cold War period. In addition, the explicit linkage to India's choices of energy procurement makes what would be considered regular trade policy, a more overt threat to India's choice in foreign policy
Technology Transfer and Trust Deficits
Defence cooperation more and more relies on technology transfer and joint development programs as well as the integrated supply chains that sustain them and which all require continued political trust and an assured policy landscape. The current crisis adds an enormous amount of uncertainty to these long-term cooperative arrangements.
There are new political risks for American defence contractors who are in technology transfer and co-production arrangements with Indian partners. Congressional scrutiny of defence exports to India could increase, and what might have been relatively independent bureaucratic processes for approvals of technology transfer may now see political interference.
On the other hand, Indian policymakers and defence planners will also have to rethink how reliable American partnerships are for the military capabilities that India regards as critical. New political risk alongside coercive actions in the future related to foreign policy choices will now be additional factors in defence procurement choices and decisions about how, when, and where to develop technology.
5. Russia as a Structural Constraint: Defence Industrial Dependencies
India is still dependent on systems of defense from Russia, and that dependence is one of the most important structural constraints on deeper U.S.-India defense integration. In fact, 60-70% of India's military inventory is of Russian origin, and those inventories create dependencies for spare parts, maintenance, upgrades, and operational support that cannot be replaced quickly.
India's continued reliance on Russian defence capabilities is the most significant structural constraint on deeper U.S.-India defence integration. The S-400 air defence system acquisition was completed despite American pressures and potential CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions
That system was integrated with India's air defence systems and represents a dependency that binds India's future air defence procurement choices
Energy Security Imperatives
India's ongoing purchase of Russian oil, sufficient enough, has both economic logic and energy security logic. India remains one of the largest oil importers and their economy can still be affected by price surges and disruptions in supply. Purchasing Russian oil at significant discount prices below par value with market prices represents some clear economic benefits, which can also assist in diversifying supply
The U.S. position that this indirectly supports Russia's war effort in Ukraine creates a fundamental contradiction with India's energy security requirements. This is unlikely to resolve itself with economic coercion alone and new arrangements will need to be established that deal with India's valid energy requirements.
6. Domestic Political Economy and Strategic Flexibility Sectoral Vulnerabilities and Political Constituencies
The 50% tariffs hurt labour intensive export sectors with many workers, and powerful political constituencies. In India, the textile sector employs over 45 million people. The gems and jewelry sector also supports millions of livelihoods.
The political implications of these job losses and decreased export earnings can also drive domestic political calculations regarding foreign policy orientation. Public resentment against what is perceived as bullying by the US may continue to bind future governments, limiting the influence of any strategic logic in defence cooperating arrangements.
Government Response Capabilities
The Indian government's ability to cushion affected exporters through fiscal assistance, credit options, and assistance with diversifying markets is critical to broader strategic flexibility. If the government can provide significant domestic support for the affected sectors, it may be able to stay on the same foreign policy course; if it cannot, it will have to adjust policy to relieve some of the economic burden.
7. Multilateral Context and Regional Dynamics: SCO Engagement and Regional Balance
India's active membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even while it simultaneously engages with the Quad, is another example of India's intent to engage with multiple regional architectures. SCO is an important vehicle for India to engage in dialogue with both Russia and China on topics of shared interest, from counter-terrorism to economic cooperation
The Modi-Putin-Xi meetings should not be viewed solely through the lens of U.S.-India relations, but also as part of India's broader effort to maintain dialogue with all major powers while holding onto its strategic autonomy.
ASEAN Centrality and Indo-Pacific Architecture
India's focus on Indo-Pacific security emphasizes ASEAN centrality and inclusive regionalism. This creates natural tensions, as the U.S. prefers coalition building around treaty allies and close partners.31 The existing crisis is testing whether these separate approaches to regional security can coexist under a larger framework of cooperation or represent fundamentally rival regional order visions.3
8. Pragmatic Policy Prescriptions for the Indian Government: Immediate Economic Damage Control
First and foremost, India needs to minimize the immediate economic cost of the tariffs while preserving room for diplomatic exchanges in the future. This requires a multi-track approach, a cohesive blend of structural domestic intervention, while aggressively diversifying sources of imports.
At once, the government should mobilize targeted export relief packages, which included expanded lines of credit, temporary duty rebates, and fast tracked refunds for those exporters affected. Similarly, trade promotion, should include hastening towards alternative markets in the European Union, in ASEAN countries, in Africa, and in Latin America, using up deliveries and shipments in the shortterm, and cutting limits to the American Market.
Strategic Communication and Diplomatic Engagement
India should engage with the United States diplomatically, urgently through high-level diplomatic channels, but carefully. It is one thing to ask for high-level discussions publicly, but a seniorlevel channel, for example, that includes conversations between the commerce or trade, and foreign affairs ministries is particularly important to obtain either the narrow sectoral exemptions for products that matter to people's and Indian livelihoods or the negotiated time horizons for tariffs that were rolled back conditionally.
India's public diplomacy needs to put forward its legitimate energy security requirements, its compliance with existing price cap regimes, where there is compliance, and argue its historic commitment to strategic autonomy with respect to foreign policy choices. This messaging should take care to not put more incendiary rhetoric in play which might cause American domestic political views to harden.
Confidence Building in Security Domains
India can communicate ongoing commitment to security cooperation and assurances to American policymakers by proposing concrete, verifiable initiatives that signal India is taking steps toward closer security cooperation in the defence and intelligence domains. These proposals could involve, for example, enhanced sharing of intelligence to address threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific; agreeing to upgrade or expand participation in multilateral exercises; hastening the implementation of several already negotiated foundational agreements; and more focused cooperation in areas of shared technology interests
With such confidence building measures, India is taking steps not only to reassure ongoing American commitment to India's strategic orientation but also raise the domestic political costs for Washington by further entwining security cooperation in the context of trade tensions
Accelerated Defence Industrial Diversification
The present crisis serves as motivation for promoting long term defence industrial resilience through domestic development and supplier diversification. India should prioritize Make in India incentives for vital defence components, use technology transfer clauses in future contracts, and use public-private partnerships to develop alternative supply chains.
This strategy not only decreases future leverage that externals actors may have through supply dependencies but also builds domestic capabilities that increase India's strategic autonomy and defence industrial base.
Multilateral Leverage and Legal Remedies
India should work with European Union partners, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries to create alternative economic partnerships and political support for its position. Utilizing World Trade Organization dispute mechanisms, while slow and uncertain in outcomes, can demonstrate India's commitment to rules-based international order and buy diplomatic time for bilateral negotiations.
Calibrated Engagement with Russia and China
India should partner with European Union nations, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN nations to form an alternative partnership for economic and political support of its position. While desperately slow and skimpy on outcome, if India used some of the dispute mechanisms provided by the World Trade Organization, it would not only reaffirm India’s intention to stay within the rules-based international order but also buy time for bilateral negotiations.
The key is portraying such engagements as independent diplomatic initiatives aimed at regional stability rather than strategic reorientation away from American partnership.
9. Pragmatic Policy Recommendations for the Trump Administration: Recalibration from Broad Tariffs to Targeted Measures
With the existing policy of imposing broad 50% tariffs, a substantial amount of collateral damage to bilateral relations may occur while India actively seeks out alternative partners.
A better strategy would be to impose a narrowly targeted remedy against specific entities or commodities in policies expressly relating to policy concern and outlining certain conditions for withdrawal.A better strategy would be to impose a narrowly targeted remedy against specific entities or commodities in policies expressly relating to policy concern and outlining certain conditions for withdrawal.
Incentives Alongside Pressure
In order for coercive diplomacy to be effective, pressure must be coupled with viable alternatives. The administration should offer a time limited opportunity for tariff rollback in exchange for Senator Ron Wyden's provisions which are similar to verifiable steps including increased transparency on energy purchasing, joint monitoring arrangements, or participating in alternative supply arrangements.
Supporting pressure with assistance, whether that be technical assistance to diversify energy, collaboration on the strategic petroleum reserves, or facilitating trilateral cooperation, conveys constructive engagement rather than singularly punitive action.
Protection of Defence and Security Cooperation
The government should formally commit to insulating defence cooperation and technology transfers from run-of-the-mill trade disputes. This should include commitments that tariffs will never be used to halt export licenses or technology cooperation that is essential to mutual objectives in security.
Such commitments are essential to build confidence in deepening long-term defence industrial cooperation while maintaining operational co-production pipelines. Since defence projects will often have years-long project timelines, it is critical to protect the space for policymakers to provide predictable policies that can maintain momentum for partnerships during the culmination of joint development programs.
Multilateral Coordination on Russia Policy
Instead of utilizing bilateral pressure on India exclusively, the United States should coordinate with G7 and European partners to collectively increase the costs on Russia for its Ukraine operations, while also offering India a coordinated package of energy cooperation alternatives. If market incentives drive India's purchases of Russian oil, addressing those incentives through multilateral coordinated action on Russia together with support for alternatives is more effective than pressuring India directly.
Engagement with American Business Community
The administration should organize business summits and offer specific incentives to American companies for investing in India's manufacturing and defence industrial base. By showing that the United States values long-term commercial partnerships, it creates domestic constituencies with an interest in cooperation rather than persistent protectionism.
More engagement by the U.S. private sector, particularly defence contractors who are engaged in co-production agreements creates political pressure in Washington for more judicious approaches to trade disputes that would create economic conflicts with profitable defence partnerships.
Structured Negotiation Framework
Instead of implementing open-ended tariffs, the Administration could develop a mutually agreed negotiation timetable with measurable benchmarks around energy procurement transparency, verification of re-exports and other specific concerns. Independent monitoring mechanisms or third-party verification could demonstrate commitment and develop confidence around expected commitments, while making reversal of policies politically feasible
Recognition of Strategic Autonomy
The U.S must recalibrate expectations to understand that India is not going to be a client state or treaty ally. Coercive measures will only push New Delhi closer to deeper accommodation with Moscow or enhanced commercial engagement with Beijing.
A more nuanced approach from the U.S. sees India as a strategic partner that engages with multiple powers based on national interest considerations. This requires recognizing India as a partner to be persuaded through incentives and shared interests rather than compelled through economic coercion.
10. Assessment of Current Defence Agreement Status: Institutional Resilience versus Political Pressure
The baselines defence agreements remain technically functional no matter the political difficulties. LEMOA foments logistics cooperation, COMCASA provides secure communications, and BECA provides the capability for intelligence sharing. The political situation continues to make the practical application of these agreements more difficult.
Joint exercises continue however they might encounter reductions in timing and scope should the political environment in question become problematic. For example, the annual MALABAR exercise, which in 2020 expanded to include Australia as a permanent participant, could have further reductions in Indian participation or training scenarios if the situation deteriorates even further.
Technology Transfer and Co-Development Programs
The most tenuous component of defence cooperation is dependent on technology transfer and joint development programs, which are susceptible to diminished political trust and bureaucratic cooperation. Export licenses for sensitive technologies may increasingly be subject to scrutiny, and Indian participation in co-development programs may face political filtering.
The iCET framework, while it will have institutional momentum, is likely particularly at risk, as it involves cutting-edge technologies with potential dual-use applications. Any American worries about continuing to share technology with a country that has close ties with Russia may halt or complicate projects in process.
Military-to-Military Relations
Professional military interactions between Indian and American forces are also significant, tending to be insulated from the political frictions between their countries. Engagements, partnerships, training programs, and operational cooperation are all continuing due primarily to a desire to operate in common professional interests shaped by decades of institutional relations
However, an enduring political friction adds to the broader context for military engagement which may limit the breadth and depth of future forms of engagement while allowing for professional relationships to continue in their most basic form.
11. Broader Implications for Indo-Pacific Security: Impact on Regional Security Architecture
The immediate challenges in India-United States relations have meaningful and direct implications for Indo-Pacific security cooperation. The Quad, while not a purely military cooperation, relies heavily on political coherency among its member states in order to be taken seriously as a regional security framework.
Continued U.S.-India friction limits the basic effectiveness of the Quad and gives China the window to exploit divisions between the four countries. China's long-standing stance of opposing the Quad as a "NATO-like" alliance against China becomes more credible to all member states if those states are undergoing serious bilateral tensions.
Maritime Security Cooperation
The Indian Ocean continues to be an important area of both countries' security interests, from sea lanes of communication to evaluating China's increasing naval assertiveness. It is necessary to have a robust maritime domain awareness which relies on sharing intelligence, conducting coordinated patrols, and effectively joint responses to security risks.
While there are now institutionalized mechanisms for maritime cooperation, there effectiveness will be dependant on political will and trust between the respective governments, as economic coercion, which undermines political trust, will not create an environment where the two countries can collaborate operationally in the maritime security domain.
12. Economic Dimensions of Security Cooperation: Defence Trade and Industrial Cooperation
The political trade of defence between India and the United States has expanded dramatically, to several tens of hundreds of billions of dollars and with the possibility of heading further above. Between the commercial relationship and the various stakeholder constituencies that are created in both economies, there are various aspects of interest to maintain bilateral cooperation.
The large American defence contractors for Indian work (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, Raytheon, etc.) provide significant domestic lobbyist interests for both countries to maintain their interconnected defence trade activities, even beyond broader political tensions. In addition, Indian companies that are in joint-ventures and/or contribute to a supply chain have made significant investments in American partnerships.
Supply Chain Integration and Dependencies
The move towards co-production and supply chain integrations fosters symbiotic relationships that impose challenges to weaponizing trade relationships. Importantly, American defence systems use Indian suppliers for a growing number of critical components, while Indian military platforms rely on American suppliers and support.
Difficulties surrounding weaponized trade will be mitigated because of interdependencies, as they stand between a notion of complete breakdown, while similarly creating constituencies for remediation, but these dependencies certainly represent vulnerabilities that, during times of tension, both sides may exploit, as they have some leverage in these critical supply chains
13. Alternative Partnership Models and Hedging Strategies: India's Diversification Options
The current crisis amplifies India's ongoing moves toward diversifying defence relationships and reducing dependence on one supplier. Increasing cooperation with France on submarine technology, increased cooperation with Israel on aerospace and cyber capabilities, and increasing cooperation with South Korea and Japan on various platforms can all provide alternative pathways for capability development.
Russia also continues to be a partner of importance, and although pressure from the West may limit support for legacy systems; there are also some capabilities where Russian technology has advantages. The BrahMos cruise missile program is a prime example of an area of India-Russia cooperation that India is likely to retain, despite whatever pressure is applied by the Americans.
American Alternatives and Opportunity Costs
The currently pursued, American-oriented approach could achieve the very outcomes that it seeks to prevent. Pressing India into more accommodation with Russia and China does not advance American strategic interests and undermines broader Indo-regional stability goals.
More constructive alternatives could have produced far better outcomes for U.S. interests and maintain the viability of American influence concurrently with respecting Indian strategic autonomy. These alternative approaches include more robust technology transfers, increased collaboration in defence industrial partnership, and coordinated approaches to regional security issues that recognize India's position and constraints.
14. Short, Medium, and Long-term Projections: Short-term Outlook (Weeks to Months)
The next phase will see economic pain for impacted Indian exporters, increased diplomatic activity, and careful signalling from both governments. India will want to show that it is doing all of this autonomously through continued engagement with Russia and China, without making moves that break the American connection.
American domestic political audiences will get the story of tough action against partners who facilitate adversary financing, while strategic communities will privately worry about the bigger picture of Indo-Pacific partnerships.
Medium-term Scenarios (6-24 Months)
Two feasible scenarios present themselves over the medium term. The first scenario is one in which negotiated de-escalation occurs, with sector-specific exemptions, rollbacks contingent on energy procurement transparency, and renewed security cooperation in a way that recognizes the legitimate concerns of both sides. This scenario can chart an important path for further defence cooperation, maintaining the positive trajectory established by the partnership.
The second scenario allows for protracted friction, one that continues to cool: cooperation on technology transfer, move to a slowed implementation of co-production programs, speed up India hedging with other partners, while India is making a commitment as to this path of alternative partners by tripling down on a diversification away from the United States.
The likelihood of either scenario emerges from the ability of diplomats to be creative and whether the United States can provide credible offramps away from the current punitive approach.
Long-term Structural Forces (2+ Years)
Structural forces such as China's persistent rise, India's defence modernization needs, and enduring commercial ties suggest that security cooperation can persist through episodic political disturbances. However, repeated punishing actions without serious negotiations will have long-term political costs, slow down to iCET co-development programs, and make complete interoperability increasingly difficult to achieve.
The more fundamental long-term question is whether the institutional architecture of defence cooperation, through foundational agreements, joint exercises, technology transfer, and co-production; will be able to carry on despite political headwinds, or whether sustained political tensions will undermine the foundations of the strategic partnership over time.
15. Recommendations for Preserving Strategic Partnership: For the Indian Government: A MultiTrack Approach
India must engage in a bold strategy that protects national interests all the while stabilizing the bilateral relationship and mitigating escalation risks. This approach will simultaneously provide urgent economic assistance to the impacted sectors, act decisively on expanding its market diversification strategy, pursue high-level diplomatic engagement that seeks to negotiate solutions, take confidence building actions in strategic space, and hasten the diversification of defence industrial capacity.
The government should stick to its principled position on strategic autonomy, but at the same time clearly express its commitment to security cooperation with the United States. Clarity on the strategic choices made and the rationale for those policy decisions will be important to sway public opinion and maintain political support for a balanced international policy.
Clarify Position on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
India could use its longstanding opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a confidence-building measure with the US and a broader international audience. New Delhi's principled opposition to the CPEC based on sovereignty concerns regarding projects traversing Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is consistent with US strategic interest in curbing China's Belt and Road Initiative.83 India should express this position more explicitly in multilateral forums and international debate, and should emphasize how its opposition to CPEC reflects its concerns about territorial integrity and the upholding of international law, sentiments American decision-makers strongly empathize with. This would provide some countervailing logic to American concerns about India's relationship with Russia by indicating that India's strategic autonomy and stature includes the willingness to challenge Chinese initiatives that may endanger its most important national interests. This could bolster categorical statements made about CPEC and show that India's multialignment strategy does not extend to accepting Chinese projects that repudiate the principle of sovereignty, thus allaying any fears Washington may have about the limits to India's acceptance of Beijing.
Address International Perception on Ukraine Crisis Response
India needs to actively respond to mounting global criticism of its perceived neutrality in the Ukraine conflict, which is seen by some as callousness towards civilian deaths and breaches of international humanitarian law. In keeping with its policy of strategic autonomy, India should increase its humanitarian aid to Ukraine and be more engaged in global efforts to document war crimes and extend civilian relief.85 The administration can highlight India's steady support for territorial integrity and sovereignty while clarifying the operational limitations that restrict it from imposing sanctions on Russia. India can exert moral leadership by raising humanitarian assistance, endorsing UN probes into civilian deaths, and campaigning for mechanisms of peaceful resolution without sacrificing its energy security imperatives.86 This is achieved while India keeps its strategic autonomy intact and responds to legitimate concerns about seeming complacent over human rights abuses. These steps would counter propaganda that India is more interested in economic interests than humanitarian issues, thus maintaining its global image as a credible global player devoted to rules-based international relations.
For the Trump Administration: Strategic Recalibration
The government ought to substitute across-the-board punitive tariffs with precise, reversible measures that deal with particular policy issues while providing transparent channels of de-escalation. These involve decoupling defence cooperation from trade tensions, specifying tangible incentives for Indian energy diversification, and involving multilateral stakeholders to work on underlying Russian behavior instead of singling out India.
Appreciation of India's strategic independence and the limits of coercive diplomacy will allow more productive partnership policies that attain American goals through persuasion and mutual interests, not economic coercion.
Conclusion
India-U.S. defence relations face their most severe test since the beginning of the modern partnership. The combination of heavy economic pressure and high-visibility Indian diplomatic outreach to Russia and China puts unprecedented pressure on institutionalised structures built up over decades.
Yet, the underlying strategic rationale of the alliance related common anxieties regarding China's ascent, complementary strengths in the Indo-Pacific, and reciprocal gains from technology collaboration provides powerful incentives for both nations to locate tractable solutions to present tensions.
The future of the partnership hangs on the capacity of both governments to compartmentalize differences, provide face-saving solutions to short-term conflicts, and stay focused on higher-level strategic convergence to both countries' long-term advantage. Resolution of the present crisis might even enhance the partnership by proving it resilient and flexible. Collapse will jeopardize one of the most significant strategic partnerships of this era with serious consequences for Indo-Pacific stability and world security architecture.
The way ahead needs pragmatic leadership, innovative diplomacy, and acknowledgment that successful coalitions among great powers need to allow for decent differences while maintaining necessary cooperation on common challenges. The game is much bigger than bilateral relationships and involves the ultimate question of whether democratic powers can sustain successful cooperation in a rapidly multipolar and contested global order.
Endnotes
1. Ashley J. Tellis, "Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2020.
2. Reuters, "US-India Trade Tensions Rise Amid Energy Disputes," August 2025.
3. Iskander Rehman, "The India-US Defense Partnership: Building Deeper Military Ties," Brookings Institution, 2019.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, "India Designated Major Defense Partner," June 2016.
5. White House, "Fact Sheet: Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET)," May 2023.
6. Sameer Lalwani and Derek Grossman, "The Quad: Evaluating the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific,'" RAND Corporation, 2021.
7. Ashley J. Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2008).
8. AP News, "Impact of US Tariffs on Indian Export Sectors," August 2025.
9. The Guardian, "Modi's Diplomatic Balancing Act at SCO Summit," August 2025
10. The Wall Street Journal, "India's Energy Security and Strategic Calculations," August 2025.
11. Harsh V. Pant, "India's Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World," Observer Research Foundation, 2018.
12. Project Syndicate, "Trade as Geopolitical Leverage: US-India Relations," August 2025
13. Tanvi Madan, "The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the 'Quad,'" War on the Rocks, December 2017.
14. Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins, "China's Oil Security Pipe Dreams," Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2010).
15. Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper, "Revitalizing the Rebalance: How to Keep U.S. Focus on Asia," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2016).
16. Al Jazeera, "Quad Framework Under Pressure from US-India Tensions," August 2025
17. Teresita C. Schaffer, "India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership," CSIS Press, 2009.
18. Reuters, "Economic Coercion and Strategic Partnership Challenges," August 2025
19. The Wall Street Journal, "Defense Technology Transfer Risks Amid Political Tensions," August 2025.
20. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, "India, the United States, and China's Rise: Regionalism versus Rivalry," India Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2019).
21. Project Syndicate, "Political Risk Premiums in Defense Cooperation," August 2025.
22. Sameer Lalwani, "India's Russia Relationship: Confronting Risks," Stimson Center, 2021.
23. Harsh V. Pant, "India's S-400 Deal: Between Russia and America," ORF Issue Brief, October 2018.
24. The Wall Street Journal, "India's Energy Security Imperatives and Russian Oil," August 2025.
25. Tanvi Madan, "India's Russia Relationship in the Era of Great Power Competition," Brookings Institution, March 2022.
26. AP News, "Impact on Indian Labor-Intensive Export Sectors," August 2025
27. Reuters, "Domestic Political Implications of US Trade Actions," August 2025.
28. AP News, "Government Capacity for Export Sector Support," August 2025.
29. Nandan Unnikrishnan, "India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Balancing Regional Interests," Observer Research Foundation, 2019.
30. Reuters, "SCO Summit Dynamics and Regional Balance," August 2025
31. C. Raja Mohan, "Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence," HarperCollins India, 2015.
32. Project Syndicate, "Regional Security Architecture and Great Power Competition," August 2025.
33. AP News, "Economic Relief Strategies for Tariff-Affected Sectors," August 2025.
34. Reuters, "Market Diversification and Trade Promotion Efforts," August 2025.
35. The Wall Street Journal, "Diplomatic Engagement Strategies During Trade Disputes," August 2025.
36. Project Syndicate, "Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication," August 2025.
37. The Wall Street Journal, "Confidence-Building Measures in Security Domains," August 2025.
38. Project Syndicate, "Political Costs of Sustained Economic Coercion," August 2025.
39. The Wall Street Journal, "Accelerated Defense Industrial Development," August 2025.
40. AP News, "Building Strategic Autonomy Through Industrial Base," August 2025.
41. AP News, "Multilateral Leverage and WTO Dispute Mechanisms," August 2025.
42. Reuters, "Managing Russia and China Relationships," August 2025.
43. The Guardian, "Diplomatic Messaging and Strategic Signaling," August 2025.
44. Reuters, "Targeted Measures versus Broad Economic Pressure," August 2025.
45. Project Syndicate, "Strategic Alternatives to Broad Economic Pressure," August 2025.
46. Reuters, "Incentive Structures in Coercive Diplomacy," August 2025.
47. The Wall Street Journal, "Energy Cooperation and Alternative Supply Arrangements," August 2025
48. Project Syndicate, "Insulating Security Cooperation from Trade Disputes," August 2025.
49. The Wall Street Journal, "Policy Predictability in Defense Industrial Cooperation," August 2025
50. Project Syndicate, "Multilateral Coordination on Russia Policy," August 2025.
51. The Wall Street Journal, "Business Community Engagement and Investment Incentives," August 2025.
52. Reuters, "Private Sector Lobbies and Defense Cooperation," August 2025.
53. AP News, "Structured Negotiation Frameworks and Monitoring Mechanisms," August 2025.
54. Project Syndicate, "Strategic Autonomy and Partnership Expectations," August 2025.
55. Reuters, "Persuasion versus Coercion in Strategic Partnerships," August 2025.
56. The Wall Street Journal, "Operational Status of Foundational Agreements," August 2025.
57. Project Syndicate, "Joint Exercises and Political Environment Effects," August 2025
58. The Wall Street Journal, "Technology Transfer Vulnerabilities," August 2025.
59. Reuters, "iCET Framework and Political Interference Risks," August 2025.
60. AP News, "Professional Military Relations and Institutional Resilience," August 2025
61. Project Syndicate, "Political Friction and Military Cooperation Scope," August 2025.
62. The Guardian, "Quad Framework and Regional Security Implications," August 2025.
63. Al Jazeera, "Chinese Exploitation of Quad Division Opportunities," August 2025.
64. Reuters, "Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean," August 2025.
65. The Wall Street Journal, "Intelligence Sharing and Political Trust Requirements," August 2025.
66. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024," March 2025.
67. Defense News, "US Defense Contractors and Indian Market Exposure," August 2025.
68. Jane's Defence Weekly, "Supply Chain Integration in US-India Defense Cooperation," July 2025.
69. The Wall Street Journal, "Mutual Dependencies in Defense Supply Chains," August 2025.
70. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, "India's Defense Partnership Diversification," June 2025.
71. BrahMos Aerospace, "Annual Report 2024-25," New Delhi, 2025
72. Project Syndicate, "American Strategic Interests and Partnership Approaches," August 2025.
73. Council on Foreign Relations, "Alternative Frameworks for US-India Cooperation," August 2025
74. AP News, "Short-term Political and Economic Dynamics," August 2025.
75. Reuters, "Domestic Political Narratives and Strategic Community Concerns," August 2025.
76. Project Syndicate, "Negotiated De-escalation Scenarios," August 2025.
77. The Wall Street Journal, "Prolonged Friction and Partnership Degradation," August 2025.
78. Reuters, "Diplomatic Creativity and Exit Ramp Mechanisms," August 2025.
79. Project Syndicate, "Long-term Structural Forces and Cooperation Resilience," August 2025.
80. The Wall Street Journal, "Institutional Infrastructure and Political Headwinds," August 2025.
81. AP News, "Comprehensive Strategy for Managing Bilateral Relations," August 2025.
82. Reuters, "Strategic Autonomy and Security Cooperation Balance," August 2025.
83. Project Syndicate, "Strategic Recalibration of US Approach," August 2025.
84. The Wall Street Journal, "Partnership through Persuasion versus Coercion," August 2025.
85. Reuters, "Historical Context and Contemporary Challenges," August 2025.
86. Project Syndicate, "Fundamental Strategic Logic and Mutual Benefits," August 2025.
87. Council on Foreign Relations, "Indo-Pacific Stability and Global Security Architecture," August 2025.
88. The Wall Street Journal, "Democratic Power Cooperation in Multipolar Systems," August 2025.
89. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "India's Position on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," Official Statement, 2017.
90. Observer Research Foundation, "CPEC and India's Strategic Concerns," Policy Brief, July 2025
91. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Humanitarian Response to Ukraine Crisis," August 2025.
92. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "India's Humanitarian Assistance to Ukraine," Press Release, August 2025.
93. The Hindu, "India's International Reputation and Ukraine Crisis Response," August 2025.
