Although landlocked, Afghanistan has always occupied a position of geopolitical significance and has been meeting point of four ecological and cultural areas: West Asia, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent and Far East, for Pamir Mountains intrude into Chinese Sinkiang (Dupree, 1973). Afghanistan’s history clearly demonstrates that regional context and external involvement can create or disrupt peace building process. It is in interest of regional states to stabilise the volatility within the area and develop joint approach towards Afghanistan that can secure more lasting peace (Strand & Harpviken. 2002). While many states in neighbourhood are weak in many respects, they tend to command significant coercive capacity in Afghanistan (Harpviken, 2010). Although each of neighbouring countries have tried to stay out of turmoil in Afghanistan, they have been obligated to support or assist one side or other in order to protect their own stability (Lohman, 2001). It is reiterated that regional strategy is required that includes Pakistan, India, Central Asian States, China, Russia and Iran (Petraeus, 2010).
The continuing challenges in Afghanistan emanating from current situation where peace and stability seem to be distant dream have renewed interest among members of strategic community to debate and discuss probable future of Afghanistan in merging regional security environment especially after US troop withdrawal and taking over of government by the Taliban. On August 15, 2021, Taliban entered Afghan capital of Kabul, completing rapid takeover over the country with a speed that surprised many. Taliban’s advance came as the United States was completing the military withdrawal to which it agreed in February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord. The U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal and evacuation operation concluded on August 30, 2021, with departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The internal fabric and architecture of Afghanistan’s security have been threatened especially in context of takeover of the government by Taliban. It is well known fact that intensity and degree to which levels of insurgency and terrorism have been growing in Afghanistan reflect major concerns among members of international community. The ongoing war on terrorism has not been able to produce desired results. Afghanistan has been plagued by insecurity, insurgency, impunity and corruption. It has always been confronting number of problems including terrorism and warlordism. The debate on future of Afghanistan affecting regional security environment has again gained salience. Afghanistan will continue to be highly volatile place and peace and stability will be too difficult to realise. Lack of proper security forces and institutions in Afghanistan became main reason for continuing crisis. Future of Afghanistan depends on legitimacy of the Afghan government and its will and capacity to implement rule of law.
Afghanistan - Graveyard of Empires
Around 330 BC, Alexander the Great and his army suffered staggering losses in fierce battles against Afghan tribes. His astonishing conquest of Eurasia became bogged down in Afghanistan and India. Over next two thousand years, the region was deeply problematic for major empires from West and East—from Arab armies to such legendary conquerors as Genghis Khan, Timur and Babur. Modern Afghan state was founded in mid-eighteenth century by Ahmed Shah Durrani, who united region’s disparate Pashtun tribes and conquered major portions of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, northeastern Iran, and western India.
By nineteenth century, Russia and Britain became intimately intertwined in what would become the Great Game, using Afghanistan as buffer state in struggle between their empires. Between 1839 and 1919, British fought three brutal wars in Afghanistan to counter Russian influence in the region. The British tried a number of strategies against Pashtun tribes during Anglo-Afghan Wars. One was “butcher and bolt,” practice of slaughtering unruly tribesmen and then moving quickly to pacify new areas. But they were unable to conquer the country, leading Winston Churchill to refer to tribesmen as “a brave and warlike race” (Churchill, 1901: 274).
The Soviet Union suffered a similar fate. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was met with fierce resistance from Afghan population and thousands of Russian soldiers and mujahideen (fighters involved in jihad, or holy war) died in conflict. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), with assistance from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, provided substantial assistance to mujahideen and such Afghan leaders as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, some of whom would later take up arms against the United States and other Coalition forces after September 2001 terrorist attacks. When Soviets withdrew in February 1989, Afghanistan was devastated. An estimated one million Afghans had been killed, more than five million had fled abroad and as many as three million people were forced to leave their homes to avoid bloodshed (Rashid, 2000; Rubin, 1995; Grau, 1996). U.S. military and diplomatic officials were well aware of Afghanistan’s history. In late 2001, General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, said, “Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld and I agreed that we should not flood the country with large formations of conventional troops…. We don’t want to repeat the Soviets’ mistakes” (Franks, 2004:324). U.S. policymakers gravely underestimated gritty resolve of Afghans. Though most of landscape is barren and parched and though its people appear unobtrusive and primitive, this region has nurtured proud warrior culture that has repelled invading armies for more than two thousand years. This history was disregarded. The United States began its operations with good plan, competent people and significant support from local Afghans, but was unable to take advantage of the opportunity.
Debating Afghanistan
Why did an insurgency occur? Some argue that Afghanistan’s ethnic makeup was largely responsible for insurgency. Afghanistan has four major ethnic groups: Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara, as well as range of minor ethnic groups. The long-standing ethnic fissures in Afghanistan made violence inevitable. The last decade of fighting had pitted Pashtun groups from southern Afghanistan against Uzbek, Tajik and other groups from northern Afghanistan, fueling long-held grudges and sparking further conflict. Others have argued that Afghanistan’s insurgency was caused by series of economic developments broadly subsumed under umbrella term greed. Afghan insurgent groups were motivated by potential for profit from cultivation, production and export of poppy. After the U.S. invasion, Afghanistan cornered global opiate market. In 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) announced: “No other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007:iv).
A careful examination of Afghanistan since 2001, shows that these arguments are fundamentally flawed. None of them can adequately explain why an insurgency developed. Rather, two factors were critical. One was weak governance, which provided an important precondition for rise of insurgency. Inability of Afghan government to provide key services to local Afghans, especially in rural areas, gutted support for national government and forced citizens to look elsewhere for security. Afghan leaders at all levels failed to provide good governance. Institutions such as Afghan National Police were unable to secure a monopoly of legitimate use of violence. National and local officials were unable to effectively manage resources and implement sound policies. Insurgent groups were able to tap into broad array of resources from individuals in neighboring governments and international jihadi community (Giustozzi, 2007).
The second motivating factor for insurgent leaders was religious ideology. Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden advocated jihad to recover “occupied” Muslim lands. They demanded return to radical interpretation of Islam stripped of local customs and cultures. The Taliban leaders saw themselves as cleansers of social and political system gone wrong in Afghanistan and an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and infidelity to the Prophet. Al Qaeda leaders were motivated by an ideology grounded in works of Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual in Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist thinkers and they advocated establishment of a radical interpretation of sharia (Islamic religious law). In sum, there was both a “supply” of rural villagers disgruntled by a failing government and a “demand” for recruits by ideologically motivated leaders. Afghanistan’s insurgency was caused by synergy of collapsing governance and virulent religious ideology that seemed to fill the void.
Who are Taliban?
In 1993-1994, Afghan Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin formed Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen who had become disillusioned with civil war among mujahideen parties that broke out after 1989 Soviet withdrawal and subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported government in 1992. Many members of the movement had studied in seminaries in Pakistan and chose the name Taliban (plural of talib, a student of Islam) to distance themselves from the mujahideen (Rashid, 2000). Pakistan supported Taliban because of group’s potential to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally,” thus giving Pakistan “greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called ‘strategic depth.’” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 64).
Taliban beliefs and practices were consonant with and derived in part from conservative tribal traditions of Pashtuns, who represent a plurality of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic makeup and who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan. Like Taliban founder Mullah Omar, most of senior figures in Taliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of major Pashtun tribal confederations. Most modern Afghan rulers have been from Durrani Pashtun tribal confederation. Taliban viewed post-Soviet government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as weak, corrupt and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between mujahideen groups (1992-1996) created popular support for Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and more able to deliver stability.
Taliban took control of southern city of Kandahar in November 1994 and launched a series of military campaigns throughout Afghanistan that culminated in capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including public executions, to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care and publicly executed women for alleged adultery. In March 2001, Taliban drew international condemnation by destroying monumental sixth-century Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamyan city, which Taliban considered idolatrous and contrary to Islamic norms.
United States had played major role in supporting anti-Soviet mujahideen, but U.S. attention to Afghanistan declined with withdrawal of Soviet troops after 1988 Geneva Accords. The U.S. embassy in Kabul was evacuated for security reasons in January 1989 and remained closed until 2001. United States sustained some military assistance to mujahideen groups who continued to fight the Soviet-supported Afghan government. After that government fell in 1992, there was little appetite to maintain U.S. engagement (Coll, 2005). When Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996, U.S. policy toward the group was unclear as, “American officials issued a cacophony of statements—some skeptical, some apparently supportive—from which it was impossible to deduce a clear position” (Coll, 2005: 338).
Rising international and U.S. popular attention to plight of Afghan women and renewed focus on human rights under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, led to U.S. policy shifting against the Taliban by 1999. The Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden eventually became central issue affecting U.S. views of and relations with Taliban. In 1996, Osama bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had previously spent most of the 1980s as a high profile financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen. Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced Osama bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 64). Osama bin Laden established an alliance with Taliban whereby he provided millions in financial aid to the group and military support for Taliban efforts to complete their conquest of the country and Taliban provided safe haven for AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in Afghanistan (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 66-67). U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Kabul in April 1998. In response to Richardson’s request that the Taliban expel Osama bin Laden, the group “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In any case, Taliban said, [bin Laden] was not a threat to the United States” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004:111). The threat posed by Osama bin Laden became clearer on August 7, 1998, when Al Qaeda operatives simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 200 people. In response, United States launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan that were unsuccessful in either killing Osama bin Laden or persuading Taliban to expel him. In July 1999, President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions on Taliban that were equivalent to those imposed on governments deemed state sponsors of terror (E.O. 13129). United Nations Security Council travel and economic sanctions against Taliban were added in October with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 and expanded with UNSCR 1333, which included arms embargo against Taliban, in December 2000. In face of these threats, Taliban leadership was unmoved. Their relationship with Osama bin Laden was “sometimes tense” but “the foundation was deep and personal” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 125).
Where and why did the American withdrawal begin?
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S. troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-2011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops (Peters, 2017; Lubold and Youssef, 2017).
In June 2017, President Trump delegated to Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to around 3,500 additional troops. Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September 2017 (Copp, 2017). Those additional forces arrived in Afghanistan within months, putting total number of U.S. troops in the country between 14,000 and 15,000 by end of 2017 (Lamothe, 2017; Jaffe, 2018). As of September 30, 2017, total number of active duty and reserve forces in Afghanistan was 15,298 (Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017).
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with lack of military progress against Taliban and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan government participation. As those talks developed under Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express frustration with U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces, saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can” (Baron, 2019; TOLOnews, 2019). U.S. force levels began to contract in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that number of U.S. forces had been gradually reduced by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000 (Gibbons-Neff & Mashal, 2019).
In February 2020, the United States and Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the United States committed to withdrawing all of its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021. In return, Taliban committed to prevent any groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not allowing those groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not conditioned on Taliban reducing violence against Afghan government, making concessions in intra-Afghan talks or taking other actions. The agreement also stated that up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by Afghan government and up to 1,000 Afghan personnel captured by Taliban “will be released” in March 2020. Per the agreement, intra-Afghan negotiations were also to begin that month, but talks remained unscheduled for months amid political gridlock in Kabul and disagreements over prisoner release. The parties to the conflict completed prisoner release in early September 2020 and intra-Afghan talks began in Doha on September 12, 2020.
Throughout 2020, U.S. officials stated that Taliban were not in full compliance with the agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 one month ahead of mid-July 2020 deadline in U.S.-Taliban accord (Atwood & Browne, 2020; Burns, 2020; Reuters, 2020a). Confusion about the United States’ future military posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Trump Administration officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have the small remaining number of our Brave Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!” (Reuters, 2020b). On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “We will implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces” from Afghanistan and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting Secretary Miller characterized the drawdown as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it “does not equate to a change in U.S. policy or objectives” (Department of Defense, 2020). On January 15, 2021, Acting Secretary Miller confirmed that number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500 (Department of Defense, 2021).
President Biden, who took office on January 20, 2021, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels as Vice President in 2009 and expressed skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan as a candidate during 2020 primary campaign (Coll, 2018; CBS News, 2020). As President, he said in March 16, 2021 interview that the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but would be “tough” (ABC News, 2021). He also said an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year (C-SPAN, 2021). On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021 (The White House, 2021b). In a written response, Taliban accused the United States of breaching the February 2020 agreement and stated that the U.S. decision to stay beyond May 1 “in principle opens the way for [Taliban forces] to take every necessary countermeasure, hence the American side will be held responsible for all future consequences” (Voice of Jihad, 2021). A senior Administration official said “We have communicated to Taliban in no uncertain terms that if they do conduct attacks against U.S. or allied forces, we will hit back hard” (The White House, 2021a).
Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement
After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies (Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 2020). In the months after the agreement, several U.S. officials asserted that Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda (Reuters, 2020a). U.S. officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the agreement (TOLOnews, 2020). Although no provisions in the publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks on U.S. or Afghan forces, the Taliban reportedly committed not to attack U.S. forces in non-public annexes accompanying the accord. In March 2020 testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told Senate Armed Services Committee panel that committee members “have all documents associated with this agreement” and that the Taliban pledged not to attack U.S. or international forces, as well as Afghan provincial capitals and other high profile targets” (CQ Congressional Transcripts, 2020).
U.S. Military Drawdown
The United States began withdrawing forces before February 2020 agreement was reached and continued to do so afterwards, despite U.S. assertions that Taliban violence and other actions were inconsistent with the agreement (Gibbons-Neff & Mashal, 2019; Atwood & Browne, 2020). On January 15, 2021, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that number of U.S. forces had reached 2,500, lowest level since 2001, completing drawdown ordered by President Donald Trump in November 2020. On April 14, 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021 (The White House, 2021b). Under the Biden Administration, U.S. officials have expressed an intention to continue “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism efforts after U.S. troops depart Afghanistan. In his April 14 address, President Biden said, “We’ll reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in the region to prevent reemergence of terrorists” in Afghanistan (The White House, 2021b). The final stage of planned U.S. military withdrawal began on May 1, 2021 and by June, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that as much as 44% of “retrograde process” was complete (CENTCOM, 2021). Most NATO allies and other U.S. partners withdrew their forces by July (Moulson and Gannon, 2021). On July 8, President Biden announced that “our military mission in Afghanistan will conclude on August 31st.” A rapid Taliban advance, culminating in the August taking of Kabul and the emergency evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and some Afghans out of Afghanistan, prompted United States to deploy several thousand additional troops to facilitate the evacuation. On August 14, President Biden released a statement saying, “One more year, or five more years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot or will not hold its own country. And an endless American presence in the middle of another country’s civil conflict was not acceptable to me” (The White House, 2021c). He reiterated that position in August 16, 2021 address saying “there never was a good time to withdraw U.S. forces” (The White House, 2021d).
Fall of Afghan Government and takeover of Taliban
Throughout 2020 and 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay potential detrimental impact of U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing need for continued U.S. financial assistance to Afghan forces (Rahimi, 2021). In May 2021 press conference, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterised as the strengths of Afghan government and military (Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021a). In its 2021 annual threat assessment, Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that “the Afghan Government will struggle to hold Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021). In external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that Taliban enjoyed a strong advantage over Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in cohesion and slight advantage in force employment and that two forces essentially split on material resources and external support. The one ANDSF advantage, size, was assessed as much narrower than often assumed. The author concluded in his net assessment that Taliban enjoyed narrow advantage over the government (Schroden, 2021). Taliban had also come to control significant territory. In October 2018, the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available, the group controlled as much as 40% of Afghanistan and continued to make gradual gains in subsequent years. In early May 2021, Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of country’s rural areas, solidifying their hold on some areas in which it already had significant presence. Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising. Some northern areas had militarily resisted Taliban when the group was in power in 1990s, making their 2021 fall to Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021 (Clark & Ali, 2021). The speed of Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before departure of U.S. forces (De Luce, Yusufzai & Smith, 2021). In July, Taliban began seizing border crossings with Tajikistan, Iran and Pakistan, depriving Afghan government of critical customs revenues. On July 21, 2021, General Milley estimated that over 200 districts were under Taliban control but emphasized that Taliban had not seized any provincial capitals where Afghan forces were consolidated (Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021b).
On August 6, 2021, Taliban captured their first provincial capital, a notable achievement given that U.S. commanders and others had often pointed to Taliban’s inability to take and control a provincial capital in recent years as evidence of the Afghan government’s relative strength. Taliban’s capture of half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in the following week surprised many observers and U.S. officials (Miller et al., 2021). By August 13, U.S. officials were reportedly concerned that Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With fall of Jalalabad in east and Mazar-e-Sharif in north, Taliban captured last major cities and eliminated final outposts of organized Afghan government resistance. On morning of August 15, 2021, Taliban began entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country. The central and historically significant province of Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to establish an armed resistance to Taliban, was reportedly captured by Taliban forces in September 2021 amid reports of Taliban killings of civilians (BBC News, 2021b). While Taliban faced stiff but unsuccessful resistance from government forces in some areas (BBC News, 2021a) some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting. In many areas, Taliban reportedly secured departure of government forces and handover of their weapons through payments or through mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed (George, 2021).
President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterised by electoral crises, factional infighting and gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled Afghanistan on morning of August 15, 2021 and same day evening, Ghani posted on Facebook that he left Kabul to prevent bloodshed and that “Taliban have won the judgment of sword and guns and now they are responsible for protecting the countrymen’s honor, wealth and self-esteem” (Da Silva, Mengli & Yusufzai, 2021). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation announced on August 18 that “the UAE has welcomed President Ashraf Ghani and his family into the country on humanitarian grounds” (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2021). Militia commander and former Herat governor Ismail Khan was captured by Taliban in fighting in Herat before being allowed to relocate to Iran. Marshal Abdulrashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, another former governor, convened their forces in northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and subsequently fled to Uzbekistan. Another group of Afghan political leaders, including High Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah, former President Hamid Karzai, and former Islamist insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, met with Taliban officials after the group’s takeover, but are not playing a role in Taliban government. One August 26 media account described Karzai and Abdullah as “effectively under house arrest” (Robertson, 2021). Former First Vice President Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter on August 17 to be the “legitimate caretaker President” and to be “reaching out to all leaders to secure their support & consensus” (Saleh, 2021). Saleh had previously vowed to never submit to Taliban rule and called on Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He relocated to central province of Panjshir, whose strategic location and historic legacy give it outsized import. He was joined by the son of the late Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. They stated that they have formed an armed resistance to the Taliban and appealed for U.S. and international support (Massoud, 2021). Taliban claims to have taken control of the province as of September 6, amid reports of continued sporadic fighting and Taliban killings of civilians (Turak, 2021). With taking of Panjshir, Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike 1990s when former Northern Alliance represented significant armed opposition and held around 10% of country’s territory. Taliban have controlled territory in parts of Afghanistan for years, but their takeover of the country in August 2021 puts them in control of urban areas for first time since 2001. Afghanistan that Taliban will govern in 2021 is different in economic, political, and social terms from the country the group ruled two decades ago. As Taliban consolidated power, observers also speculated on how much they had changed and how they might govern (International Crisis Group, 2021a).
The hardline “caretaker” government announced by Taliban on September 7, 2021, does not indicate a more inclusive approach to governing. On September 7, 2021, longtime Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid announced names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting” ministers that fill a “caretaker cabinet” to administer the country. The Taliban refer to this government as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s government in 1990s reportedly was also “nominally interim” (International Crisis Group, 2021b). Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada is to hold supreme power as group’s emir. Former Taliban Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund is Acting Prime Minister. One analyst describes Akhund as “relatively weak” and “uncontroversial” figure whose selection forestalls competition among more powerful figures and factions within Taliban (van Bijlert, 2021). Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led negotiations with the United States, is Acting Deputy Prime Minister. The BBC reported on September 15, 2021, that Baradar had gone to Kandahar after a heated disagreement with Haqqani figures over whether Taliban’s political or military wings deserve credit for group’s takeover (Nasar, 2021). Other key figures include Acting Director of Intelligence Abdul Haq Wasiq and Acting Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob. Nearly all members of “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All members of “caretaker cabinet” are male and vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns, mostly from southern Afghanistan. Over half were previously designated for U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to arrest of Haqqani, who is head of Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Some argue Haqqanis’ role in Taliban caretaker government is reflection of their outsized military import and could make U.S. cooperation with Taliban more difficult (Findlay, 2021).
Some had speculated that Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials or to others from outside the movement as part of their promise to establish an “inclusive government.” Taliban appears to lack many technical and administrative capabilities and may struggle to execute functions of government and security nationwide, especially without participation of individuals who had previously supported former Afghan government. At August 17, 2021, press conference, Mujahid reiterated the Taliban’s proclaimed amnesty for government employees. Taliban made similar statements after taking control of Kabul in 1996, only to contradict them with brutal repression and human rights violations (Wood, 2021).
Taliban in Afghanistan and Implications for India
As Taliban last week announced the cabinet set to now govern Afghanistan, of the 33 men who were given key posts, almost all have been with Taliban since the group emerged in 1990s and – aside from five who had been held in Guantanamo Bay until last year – all had spent past 20 years in hiding in Pakistan. The Haqqanis, a faction of Taliban known for their close ties to Pakistan and hardline belief in global jihad, were particularly well represented in the cabinet. For many in India, it both diminished any hope that this could be a different, more progressive and less dogmatic Taliban than that which ruled in 1990s and seemed to secure influence of Pakistan, over Afghanistan’s future. The fall of US-backed government of Ashraf Ghani, which was considered an ally to New Delhi and swift takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban present multiple problems for India. Firstly, India has long viewed Taliban as nothing more than proxy for Pakistan. Taliban was nurtured and gained power in 1990s with help of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and after fall of government in 2001, when the US invaded, Taliban leaders found sanctuary over the border. Since then, Pakistan has remained crucial to the group. It was where they lived, trained and regrouped, enabling them last month to take back Afghanistan by force and bring down the government. Pakistan has denied direct ties to Taliban. However, before announcement of cabinet, ISI’s director general, Faiz Hameed, landed in Kabul, amid suggestions he was there to smooth over cracks among the group and make sure they could form a government. Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan and its interference in the new Taliban regime has been very visible. If the whole process becomes ISI-driven and ISI-controlled, then this is a huge cause of concern for India. India’s second, closely related concern is over regional and domestic security risk that Taliban regime poses. For decades, India’s Muslim-majority region of Kashmir has been embroiled in separatist insurgency with an allegiance to Pakistan. Two of the main Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, have historical ties to Taliban and according to a UN report, between 6,000 to 6,500 members of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad have been active on Afghan battlefield (Ellis-Peterson, 2021).
For India the fear is that Taliban’s victory will embolden similar Islamist groups and individuals across the region, boosting insurgency. There is concern that Afghanistan will provide a regional hub for militants who may carry out jihad on Indian soil and provide flow of weapons and explosive materials over the border. That entire geography, from Afghan-Iran border stretching up to border of India, is now susceptible to jihadist groups. This outcome in Afghanistan is very detrimental to India’s security. Since they took power, Taliban’s own messaging on this has been mixed. They have vehemently pledged that they will not allow Afghan soil to be used for any foreign terrorist groups, stating that they want “strong and healthy relations with our neighbours” and describing Kashmir as a “bilateral issue” between India and Pakistan. But Taliban leaders then said they would “raise their voice” for Kashmiri Muslims and recent statement by Taliban supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, made reference to all Muslims and mujahideen who helped them win victory, which many took to include Kashmiri liberation groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Ellis-Peterson, 2021).
India’s investment in Afghanistan
India invested $3 billion in development projects, offered scholarships to Afghan students and helped construct parliament building at cost of $90 million, earning huge goodwill in the country. During 2020 Afghanistan Conference, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said no part of Afghanistan was “untouched” by “400-plus projects” that India had undertaken in all 34 provinces. Bilateral trade between two countries had also increased significantly and reached $1.5 billion in 2019-2020 (Kuchay, 2021). In addition to building Afghan infrastructure, India has helped organise trade routes to Afghanistan and through it, to countries in Central Asia. It secured waivers from U.S. sanctions to build the $8 billion Chabahar port in Iran, hoping it could be key trade route to Afghanistan that bypasses Pakistan (Frayer, 2021). Trade through Afghanistan under a Taliban regime would be routed through Karachi and Gwadar and Indian investment in Chabahar port, may become unviable. It is for this reason that both the U.S. and China have already centred their connectivity projects from Central Asia through Pakistan, with newly announced U.S.-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Quadrilateral, and Chinese plans to link China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with Trans-Afghanistan railroad and Belt and Road Projects. Indian-built projects, including already built Zaranj-Delaram Highway and Salma Dam, are already under Taliban control and a cloud hangs over those under construction, including check-dams, schools and urban projects (Haider, 2021). India was also part of a consortium planning a 4,400-mile rail network linking Afghanistan with Europe. Now those projects face uncertain futures and all that investment has come to a grinding halt, given the developments in Afghanistan (Frayer, 2021; Haider, 2021; Chakraborty, 2021; Kuchay, 2021).
The Changing Power Equations
The withdrawal of the NATO and western forces from the region after twenty years will inevitably lead to new realignments. Russia, China, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, India will readjust their positions. This is at a time China is trying to rewrite the global rules. Most Afghans feel that they have been betrayed and abandoned by the US. This has raised doubts about the reliability of the US as a credible partner. The US will have to work hard to restore its credibility. Russia is back in the game, but it is vulnerable to terrorism and drug menace from Afghanistan and has held series of high profile military exercises with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities. Taliban are looking towards China as an economic and developmental partner. The BRI may be extended to Afghanistan and linked to CPEC. China will need to get cast-iron guarantees from Taliban that Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is not allowed to operate from its soil. Taliban have assured China but it is not clear whether that assurance will be implemented. Iran is happy that United States is out of the region but it is worried that instability in Afghanistan may spillover to Iran and is also concerned over growing role of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Pakistan has gained massive strategic depth in Afghanistan. It has played a role in ensuring that Haqqani network gets prominent positions in interim government. India is concerned about growing influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan, the resuscitation of global terrorism and new realignments in the region (Gupta, 2021).
But now that the coffin of the United States is lowered in proverbial graveyard of empires that the war torn country is so often called, the question amidst an unfolding humanitarian crisis is a simple one: Who is next in line to brave the security challenge that Afghanistan poses regionally and globally now that the last American is out? A new phase of great power rivalry between Washington and Beijing could be tested in the Afghan theatre, as the Chinese seek commitments from Taliban to keep its border areas in Wakhan corridor free from Islamist support to separatist Uighurs in Xinjiang province, in exchange for Chinese recognition of Taliban and economic aid to Afghanistan. As part of Russia, China, US Troika on Afghanistan, Beijing has moved swiftly to say it is willing to support “friendly relations” with ‘new’ Taliban. Russia is biding its time to see “how the regime will behave”, before committing to formal recognition of Taliban (Mirchandani, 2021).
Epilogue
The recent developments in Afghanistan do not augur well for global or regional stability. The region has become highly unstable with the return of Taliban. The likelihood of terrorism and radicalisation emanating from Afghanistan engulfing rest of the world has increased several folds. The regional power vacuum created by withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan is likely to create further turbulence in the region. None of this bodes well for India. It may be curtains for America’s war on terror in Afghanistan, but chaos it leaves in its wake makes India even more vulnerable than before to security threat posed by links between Pakistan’s ISI and Taliban. Given these concerns, India has three options, none of them are easy. The first option is to stick to its principle of backing only a democratically-elected government in Kabul and providing political and humanitarian support while that lasts. The second would be to accelerate contacts with Taliban. Thirdly, India could simply wait and watch and weigh its options accordingly.
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