India’s Theatre Command Model and it’s Strategic Connotation

As India starts re-organizing its military command matrix to effectively deal with the external security challenges, it will be interesting to see how this reconstitution will be perceived in the years to come and the sum effect it will have on New Delhi’s evolving Grand Strategy. 1

To start with, the momentum to change the command matrix to suit its security challenges started with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which was a game changer in India’s civilmilitary relations, joint warfare approach and for pursuance of effective inter-service synergy, which will enable the formation of the theatre commands as a continuation.

Civil Military Relations and Theatre Command in Indian context

Earlier, India’s civil military relations composed of a three-tiered security system, which extends from the Cabinet level to that of the three service chiefs. At the apex was the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) under which was the Defense Minister’s Committee (DMC). (In 1978, the DCC became the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet). At the third level was the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in which the three service chiefs have formal equality despite enormous differences in the sizes of the forces and their respective share in the budget. This structure, which excludes the service chiefs from apex decision-making structures, has remained intact over the decades even though this structure is no longer appropriate for contemporary India which is aspiring for a Great Power status.

The above has been somewhat compensated with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which helps facilitating its Grand Strategy. India’s CDS as an institution will co-ordinate the jointness among the three-services and to provide a single-point military adviser to the civilian politicalbureaucratic establishment.

On the other hand, India’s approach to theatre command was influenced by China's military modernization, under President Xi Jinping, which has been marked by reforms that include the restructuring of the PLA into five theater commands: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central. These reforms aim to improve joint operations and enhance the PLA's capabilities for modern warfare, focusing on fast decision-making, integrated command systems, and coordination across all branches of the military.

The theater commands are strategically aligned with China's security priorities, including regional conflicts, border stability, and global power projection.

Coming back to India, theaterization of the command is understood to be logical step to make the CDS more effective. Without an integrated system and a CDS, combat power (consisting of personnel and material) accretions by individual services remain fiefdoms without the ability to use their tremendous power as a single, war-fighting machine. In this context, it can be understood that theaterization will develop the necessary force multiplier by having better co-ordination among the services.2 But integrating all the three services into one common war theatre is a process which will involve extensive changes to the current India’s military command structure, and an empowered CDS could then prove to be a silver bullet for India's Great Power status and evolving Grand Strategy.

As of now, Andaman and Nicobar is the only Tri-Command structure overseen by the Integrated Defence Staff. India’s military strength at present is evenly distributed among the three services, despite the fact that the Indian Navy’s stake runs deeper. The initial proposal for India’s theatre command involved geographical commands: an Eastern Command responsible for China, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia; a Western Command responsible for Pakistan, Central Asia and West Asia; and a Southern Command responsible for littoral Africa and the West Asia.3

More theatre commands may be created as the scale and scope of military activities expand and it is likely that India will have five theatre commands.

Indian Military Command Matrix and force disposition

As the debate has started on the Theatre Command, it is understood that India’s military command matrix will be organized as the Northern Command- along the border with China, the Western Command- along the border with Pakistan, the Peninsular Command, the Air Defence Command, and the Maritime Command, would be headed by commanders of Lieutenant General and equivalent ranks who would have operational control, while the service Chiefs would be tasked with mobilizing resources to the theatre commanders. Further, to avoid complication, the Air Force’s assets across different commands would be placed under the Air Defence Command which would be tasked with defending the Indian airspace. At present, India has 19 commands - six of the Indian Army, three of the Indian Navy, seven of the Indian Air Force, one tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).4

It’s understand that Air Force has issues with theatrization of the command as the Air Force has five C-in-C level billets compared to six of the Army and three of the Navy with area responsibilities. Theatrization would result in amalgamation of existing commands thereby cutting down their number from 14 to possibly four which made the Air Force to oppose the theatre command in principle.

The theatre command will be under the HQ IDS which will address India’s Continental security concerns and so addressing India’s expanding maritime profile. Therefore, the continental theatre is split into two theatres with the one theatre responsible for the North (Northern Theatre Command- NTC) against China and a second theatre for the West (Western Theatre Command- WTC) against Pakistan.5

India’s commitment in Indo-Pacific lend itself into a single theatre which due to reasons of threats from two nations could have two Maritime Commands located in the East and West and largely conform to the existing area of responsibility of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command.

These two commands could be part of a single Maritime theatre Command. But two factors work against singularity. First – the maritime vision is one of expanding capabilities to the waters beyond the Indian Ocean and that would make a single maritime theatre unwieldy.6

Second, the permeability of external and internal threats demands that Theatre Commands share the internal continental space. Therefore, the two existing Western and Eastern Naval Command are redesignated as Southwestern Theatre Command (SWTC) and Southeastern Theatre Command (SETC).

Each would be based on fleets, Area Headquarters of the Army and Operational Groups of the IAF and have tri-service Component Commanders with assets allotted by the HQ IDS. The existing Integrated Andaman & Nicobar Command will come under SETC.7 Such a model will facilitate for India’s image as a Great Power which of course will be facilitated by a Command Structure modelling both China and the United States. Such a re-arranged Command Structure will replicate the US military working undersix theatre command for its Global Command Responsibility while China in 2015 shunned seven regional commands. India will likely to have five Theatre Commands.

The sum effect of these changes in force composition and deployment will allow India to develop a blue water joint force expeditionary capability that is increasingly oriented towards the Indo-Pacific as a priority area of operations.

Meanwhile, USA was the first nation to adopt the theatre command concept as part of a policy that encompassed the entire globe. These ‘unified combat commands’ are organized either on geographical basis with a defined mission in a specific ‘area of responsibility’ somewhere on the globe or on a ‘functional’ basis. USA has six geographical combat commands and four functional commands comprising cyber command, special operations command, strategic command and transportation command. Each combat command is fully equipped with necessary resources of land forces, air assets, naval vessels and Marine Corps elements.

Theaterisation of the command is the next logical step to make the CDS more effective. Without an integrated system and a CDS, combat power (consisting of men and materiel) accretions by individual services remain fiefdoms without the ability to use their awesome power as a single, war-fighting machine. But integrating all the three services into one common war theatre’ is a process that is several years down the line. It will involve extensive changes to the current India’s military command structure. The Southern Command.

In 2016, China reorganised its 2-million strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) into five theatre commands and it’s now felt that Beijing’s theatre at times overstretched. In India’s case theatrization will involve the creation of a joint HQ with common intelligence, communication, surveillance and air defense systems. Service chiefs will become force creators’ and force providers’in charge of planning, training and managing defense budgets in a marked departure from the system worked out during the Independence. An empowered CDS could then be just the silver bullet India’s Great Power status and evolving Grand Strategy

In India, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Force Command (which oversees nuclear weapons) are the only two Integrated Theater Commands. The second point is that the Theater Commands concept is embraced by major geopolitical powers like China, Russia, and the US due to their substantial economic and military resources.8

However, India is not a global geopolitical power; rather, it is a geopolitical pivot alongside countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

For example, despite authorizing 42 squadrons of fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force, India possess 30 squadrons, highlighting a critical deficiency. Additionally, while 67 submarines and warships are under construction in Indian dockyards, they are not scheduled for completion until 2030, further exacerbating our equipment deficiencies. Therefore, creating theatre commands will pose a challenge due to existing deficiencies in fighter aircraft and other equipment. It should be delayed until these deficiencies are addressed.

The third point is that the effectiveness of Theater Commands hinges on the presence of a national security strategy. This strategy delineates a nation’s combat objectives, providing clarity to all sectors, including government, corporate, and semi-governmental entities, as well as various arms of the military.

According to the most recent military drafts, which came out in January 2023, three main theatre commanders focus on enemies:

The Western Theatre Command, which could be based in Jaipur, to deal with risks from Pakistan.The Northern Theatre Command is based in Lucknow and is in charge of the border with China.

A suggested Maritime Theatre Command in Coimbatore would be in charge of the Indian Ocean Region more effectively distributed military power would be two Peninsular commands — East (Vizag) also encompassing the Myanmar land border, and West (Karwar), inclusive of the formal land border with Pakistan (upto Gurdaspur), with a smaller Udhampur-based integrated command for operations on/across the Line of Actual Control in J&K. It will reflect India’s emerging concerns where Pakistan is no more than a tertiary threat and deserves proportionate attention. That’s a big swing from the present when the bulk of all forces are, detrimentally for India, Pakistan-oriented.

For the Indo Pacific , Southern Command should be the land-based air heavy element, permitting two of the three aircraft carriers the navy has decided unwisely to invest in, on station in the east and the west, and earning their keep by deploying deep out in the Indian Ocean basin in the arcs southern tip of Western Australia -Southeast Asian straits — Sunda, Lombok, Malacca, and Simonstown-Gulf. An adversary venturing nearer shore can be dealt with adequately by land based air.

India’s Strategic Threat and Theatre Command Strategic Connotation

It is assumed that China assumes primacy as India’s main and only strategic, aerial, maritime and landward threat, the length of the China front under one command is asking for trouble. Two of them — China Front East and China Front West with the territorial division east and west of Lucknow with HQs located as forward-based as possible, seems a more prudent solution considering the different terrain specificities and appropriate fighting platforms — high altitude desert in the west, mainly mountainsvalleys in the east (except on the northern Sikkim plains).

And the Strategic Forces Command should be retained hopefully, manned by a specially trained nuclear cadre of officers — something Pakistan Strategic Plans Division has done from the word go. In that concept, having 1 Strategic Forces Command, 3 peninsular commands, 2 landbound anti-China commands plus the minor LOC command (for Pakistan contingency), and 5 support commands — special forces, logistics, cyber-elint, transport, military infrastructure (merging into it the Border Roads Organisation), for a total of 12 integrated commands. This is a far better, more efficient, more practicable use all-round of fighting and support assets which will help India develop itself as a Great Power.

In the United States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the equivalent of India’s CDS, has an advisory body that includes the Vice Chairman, Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Chief of Space Operations, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Chairman is the single point advisor on all defence matters, and senior, by appointment, to the Service Chiefs who are responsible only for training and administering their respective Services. He is responsible for all higher defence planning but does not exercise any command function. The theatre commanders function directly under the President/Secretary of Defence.

The proposed integrated theatre commands are designed to address specific threats. The Northern and Western Theatre Commands will primarily focus on the threats posed by China and Pakistan, while the Maritime/Peninsular Theatre Command will be responsible for seaborne threats and power projection in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Northern Command will also be responsible for border areas with Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.

The momentum to change the command matrix to suit its security challenges started with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff which was a game changer in India’s civil-military relations and for pursuance of effective inter-service co-operation, which will enable the formation of the theatre commands.

Earlier, India’s civil military relations composed of a three-tiered security system, which extends from the Cabinet level to that of the three service chiefs. At the apex was the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) under which was the Defense Minister’s Committee (DMC). (In 1978, the DCC became the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet). At the third level was the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in which the three service chiefs have formal equality despite enormous differences in the sizes of the forces and their respective share in the budget. Theaterization of the command is understood to be logical step to make the CDS more effective. Without an integrated system and a CDS, combat power (consisting of personnel and material) accretions by individual services remain fiefdoms without the ability to use their tremendous power as a single, war-fighting machine. In this context, it can be understood that theaterization will develop the necessary force multiplier by having better co-ordination among the services.

But integrating all the three services into one common war theatre is a process that is several years down the line, which is challengeable. It will involve extensive changes to the current India’s military command structure, and an empowered CDS could then prove to be a silver bullet for India's Great Power status and evolving Grand Strategy. The Department of Military Affairs under the CDS will facilitate the restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources, by bringing more synergy in operations, including through the establishment of joint commands.

Further, it will implement the Five-Year Defence Capital Acquisition Plan (DCAP), and TwoYear roll-on Annual Acquisition Plans (AAP), as a follow-up of Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP).

Further, to create better synergy and jointness among the services, the Integrated Defence Staff was formed in 2001 and an experimental Tri-services Command was formed in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

As an extension, the sum effect of these changes in force composition and deployment will allow India to develop a blue water joint force expeditionary capability that is increasingly oriented towards the Indo-Pacific as a priority area of operations. The power-projection from the Islands will be facilitated first through the first experimental Tri-Command Service which is assigned with permanent Command position within the Indian navy and second as the Command Position becomes a part of India’s Third Fleet.

It is understood that Tri Command service model will be replicated as and when India rearranges its command matrix. Such a model will facilitate India’s image as a Great Power, which of course will be facilitated by a Command Structure modelling both China and the United States which will replicate the US military working under six theatre command for it’s Global Command Responsibility while China in 2015 shunned seven regional commands.

The initial proposal for India’s theatre command involved geographical commands: an Eastern Command responsible for China, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia; a Western Command responsible for Pakistan, Central Asia and West Asia; and a Southern Command responsible for littoral Africa and the Middle East.

More theatre commands may be created as the scale and scope of military activities expand and it is likely that India will have five theatre commands.

It is understood that India’s military command matrix will be organized as the Northern Command- along the border with China, the Western Command- along the border with Pakistan, the Peninsular Command, the Air Defence Command, and the Maritime Command, would be headed by commanders of Lieutenant General and equivalent ranks who would have operational control, while the service Chiefs would be tasked with mobilizing resources to the theatre commanders.

Further, to avoid complication, the Air Force’s assets across different commands would be placed under the Air Defence Command which would be tasked with defending the Indian airspace.

At present, India has 19 commands - six of the Indian Army, three of the Indian Navy, seven of the Indian Air Force, one tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).

It’s understood that Air Force was against the theatrization of the command as the Air Force has five C-in-C level billets compared to six of the Army and three of the Navy with area responsibilities. Theatrization would result in amalgamation of existing commands thereby cutting down their number from 14 to possibly four which made the Air Force to oppose the theatre command.

On the other hand, the change in Command matrix will provide the shift from the centralized Soviet style rigid Command structure to be an effective force which is capable of effective Joint PowerProjection in the wider Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The theatre command will be under the HQ IDS, a single Continental Theatre would be unwieldy, to be managed by a solitary theatre commander. Therefore, the continental theatre is split into two theatres with the one theatre responsible for the North (Northern Theatre Command- NTC) against China and a second theatre for the West (Western Theatre Command- WTC) against Pakistan.

Second, the permeability of external and internal threats demands that Theatre Commands share the internal continental space. The internal space that one maritime based Theatre would have to share is sizeable and evident from the map above.

Therefore, the two existing Western and Eastern Naval Command are re-designated as South Western Theatre Command (SWTC) and South Eastern Theatre Command (SETC). Each would be based on fleets, Area Headquarters of the Army and Operational Groups of the IAF and have tri-service Component Commanders with assets allotted by the HQ IDS. The existing Integrated Andaman & Nicobar Command will come under SETC. It is expected as a subset of the theatre commands will have specified or joint command and will have centralized resources, which can be applied in any of the theatres based on the operational necessity. These would be Logistics, Training, Cyber, and Special operations.

USA and Theatre Command Model

Earlier, the USA was the first nation to adopt the theatre command concept to do justice to its global military commitments. These 'unified combat commands' are organized either on geographical basis with a defined mission in a specific 'area of responsibility' somewhere on the globe or on a 'functional' basis.

USA has six geographical combat commands and four functional commands comprising cyber command, special operations command, strategic command and transportation command. Each combat command is fully equipped with necessary resources of land forces, air assets, naval vessels and Marine Corps elements. They have integral C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and can seek assistance from any of the functional commands when required.

They can conduct military operations independently. Each combat command has one commander, from any service, who reports directly to the President of the USA through the Defence Secretary.

In 1986, after Goldwater and Nichols Defence Reforms Legislation was passed to ensure closer integration of the US military, leading to evolution of the present structure based in Unified Commands.9

The US model of theatre command involves envisaging five regional unified commands operating independently, away from the mainland and other commands, generally on expeditionary role in designated areas of the globe, requiring integrated combat power of the three services, which justifies the need of unified commands. They do no some other force multipliers needed to be controlled centrally; hence they have functional US Space Command, and the Strategic Command. For Special Operations, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is formed to execute operations regardless of their geographical location.

On the other hand, China has successfully pursued a long-term comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities in power projection, anti-access and area denial. China has laid down a time bound three-step developmental strategy in modernizing its national defence: 1st step - lay a solid foundation by 2010. 2nd step - make major progress by 2020. 3rd step - achieve strategic goal of building 'informatized' (net-centric warfare enabled) armed forces capable of winning wars by 2050.

Historically, most major nations have attempted to synergise various elements of their national security apparatus for optimizing their combat potential. US efforts leading to Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 for the formation of geographic combatant commands and China’s adoption of the Integrated Theatre Command system (ITC) in 2017 along the US lines are noteworthy example.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army has five Theater Commands, namely the Eastern Theater Command, the Southern Theater Command, the Western Theater Command, the Northern Theater Command and the Central Theater Command.

In China, the President being the Commander in Chief of PLA, National Command Centre and heading the Central Military Commission (CMC), the problem of the top decision maker not getting direct professional military advice is not there, but the PLA allegiance to Communist Party of China (CPC) makes it a political Force. In case of US, despite being a multiparty democratic country, the institution of Joint Chiefs of Staff has been in place since 1947, which makes it possible to render one point professional military advice directly to National Decision makers. Such an arrangement also facilitates better co-ordination among the services.

USA and Theatre Command Model

In conclusion, as India reorganizes it’s military command matrix to suit it’s geopolitical perspective and geo strategic orientation thereby dealing it’s external security environment it will have challenges internally to organize it’s command structure among the services as an extension it will have impact on the civil-military relations.10

Notes:

1) Alok Bansal, Pradyot Bora Indian Express, Reconfiguring the military ( February 19.2015) https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/reconfiguring-the-military/

2) As Threat Rises from Neighbours, India to Get 5 Military Theatre Commands, 1 Each for China & Pak ( Cnn Ibn October 27, 2020, ) https://www.news18.com/news/india/as-threat-rises-fromneighbours-india-to-get-5-military-theatre-commands-1-each-for-china-pak-3011375.html

3) Ajay Shukla The chimera of tri-service commands (Business Standard, 17th Jan 2020 )

4) Patrick Bratton (2012) The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command, Strategic Analysis, 36:3, 440-460

5) Col DJS Chahal The Concept of Integrated Theatre Commands ( Olive Greens, June 1,2020) https://www.olivegreens.co.in/easyblog/the-concept-of-integrated-theatre-commands

6) Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia, Integrated Theatres – Transforming Indian Military Force To Military Power Cenjows Paper pp 1-7 25-NOV-2020 https://cenjows.in/upload_images/pdf/Integrated-TheatresTransforming-Indian-Military-Force-by-Lt-Gen-Vinod-Bhatia-(Retd)-on-24-Nov%20-2020.pdf

7) Anit Mukherjee India’s Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command is a Failed Experiment East West Centre Number 289 | November 17, 2014 https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb289.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=34843

8) Balaji Chandramohan India mulls Military Command matrix amidst growing complexity (Indiannewslink, June 7,2021) https://indiannewslink.co.nz/india-mulls-military-command-matrixamidst-growing-complexity/

9) Balaji Chandramohan Growing importance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands Future Directions International ( July 8, 2017) https://navalinstitute.com.au/growing-importance-of-andaman-andnicobar-islands/

10) Three Theatre Command bases identified Military Affairs Department working to integrate forces for future wars ( Economist, July 3, 2024) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/threetheatre-command-bases-identified-military-affairs-dept-working-to-integrate-forces-for-futurewars/articleshow/111466494.cms?from=mdr

By Balaji Chandramohan

Balaji Chandramohan is a research scholar with University of Madras and he was previously a visiting fellow with future directions international, Perth Australia.'